This paper critically examines the concept of populism, challenging the predominant ideological definition by highlighting the importance of political relations between populist actors and elites. It argues that populism should be conceptualized as a political phenomenon characterized by conflict with dominant elites, rather than solely as a set of ideas centered on ‘the people’ and ‘elites’. Through a comparative analysis of four politicians – Tony Blair, Emmanuel Macron, Jeremy Corbyn, and Jean-Luc Mélenchon – the study demonstrates that although some actors utilize populist rhetoric, their tendency to generate conflict with elites distinguishes populist actors from other uses of populist ideas. The cases empirically demonstrate that ‘softer’ cases of populism indeed do not contain conflict and, thus, according to my approach, are not really populist. Thus, I demonstrate the inclination of ideational definitions to overstretch the concept of populism.

This article adopts and reinvents the ethnographic approach to uncover what governing elites do, and how they respond to public disaffection. Although there is significant work on the citizens’ attitudes to the governing elite (the demand side) there is little work on how elites interpret and respond to public disaffection (the supply side). It is argued here that ethnography is the best available research method for collecting data on the supply side. The article tackles longstanding stereotypes in political science about the ethnographic method and what it is good for, and highlights how the innovative and varied practices of contemporary ethnography are ideally suited to shedding light into the ‘black box’ of elite politics. The potential pay‐off is demonstrated with reference to important examples of elite ethnography from the margins of political science scholarship. The implications from these rich studies suggest a reorientation of how one understands the drivers of public disaffection and the role that political elites play in exacerbating cynicism and disappointment. The article concludes by pointing to the benefits to the discipline in embracing elite ethnography both to diversify the methodological toolkit in explaining the complex dynamics of disaffection, and to better enable engagement in renewed public debate about the political establishment.

Looking at foundations in the United States and in Germany from around 1800 to the present from a historical-sociological perspective, the article focuses on the social significance of foundations over the course of time—which social relationships and exchanges they promote, which guiding principles they institutionalize, how they accrue charisma, how they relate to the public good, and which social groups use these instruments to which ends. In both societies, foundations embody the principle of charismatically charged exclusivity. Foundations try to harmonize individual objectives with an idea of the common good that is considered sacrosanct. Large sums of money dedicated to the common good possess a charisma, making them rather immune to criticism and causing them to be perceived positively. In this sense, they occupy a central position within both societies and contribute to their stratification.

This article studies the relation between self‐serving elite behaviour and citizen political participation. It uses a fixed effects approach to analyse the association between portfolio investment in tax havens and voter turnout, using data from 213 parliamentary elections in 65 countries for the period 1998–2014. For well‐functioning democracies a positive relation between the use of tax havens and voter turnout is found, suggesting that self‐serving elite behaviour is associated with citizen political mobilisation rather than voter apathy. The estimated relationship is stronger in the period after the 2008 economic crisis, when elite behaviour was a particularly salient issue.

The nineteenth century marked the founding period of modern public finance. We examine the domestic and non‐war related determinants of direct taxation in this early democratic period and in a state building context. We argue that the reasons for the expansion of direct taxation can be found in the political competition between different elite groups in the context of industrialization. Systematically differentiating between economic and political arenas, we show that intra‐elite competition in industrializing economies leads to higher levels of direct taxation only if the new economic elites are able to translate their economic power into the political arena, either through the representative system or by extra‐parliamentary means. In addition, we demonstrate that these processes are directly linked to public investments in policy areas related to the interests of new economic elites such as public education. Our analysis is based on novel subnational data from the period 1850 to 1910, enabling us to concentrate on the domestic determinants of direct taxation.

Second-order beliefs – what political actors think others think – can shape agenda-setting and even shift public opinion. Because of the collective-action nature of mitigating human-caused climate change, such second-order political beliefs are particularly important to study. Through an innovative survey design focusing on a policy proposal to introduce meat-free days in canteens, we present the first simultaneous comparison of ordinary citizens’, locally elected political representatives’, and centrally employed public administrators’ own opinions and their ability to accurately identify the majority position of citizens. While citizens are split in their opinion on meat-free days in canteens, a clear majority of unelected elites support it, and most elected elites do not support this policy. Nonetheless, we find that all three groups tend to underestimate the level of policy support among citizens. Through rigorous analysis, we show that elected elites are significantly more likely to underestimate public support for a meat-free day compared to citizens and unelected elites. These results provide important insights into the dynamics of democratic governance and suggest that underestimation of citizens’ support for climate policies may further complicate an already challenging policy area.

This article focuses on how Peruvian elites mobilized representations of masculinities as part of discourses on national progress and as essential elements in their assertions of hierarchy. By addressing intellectual elites’ discourses in two cultural magazines, El Perú Ilustrado and Variedades, and various literary works during the 1884–1912 period, the article presents three arguments. First, elites’ diagnosis of the country’s backwardness emphasized Peruvian men’s deficient masculinity, which included the elites’ own white creole masculinity. Thus, intellectual elites placed great importance on catching up with European “masculine” traits as pathways to progress and modernization. Second, discourses on masculinity were central elements by which elites asserted their legitimacy. Elites mobilized discourses on masculinity selectively—either as self-restraint or as physical prowess—to reinforce their hierarchical status vis-à-vis subaltern men. Third, intergenerational conflicts between the elites’ younger and older cohorts also transpired in terms of masculinity. Each generation depicted the other as embodying abject effeminacy. As a whole, by incorporating the analytical lens of masculinity, the article provides new insights into the construction of elites’ identities and of long-standing hierarchies in Latin America.

This essay argues for an integrative move in the investigation of the politics of ‘green’ finance. We suggest that approaching the politics of ‘green’ finance in the form of knowledge contestations can bring out complementarities and bridge divides between different levels of analysis and theoretical traditions. Our focus is motivated by the pivotal role of knowledge and ignorance in the organisation and governance of financial markets identified in economic sociology, political economy, and neighbouring disciplines. Drawing on this scholarship, we consider knowledge both a forum for and a means of politics. We then illustrate how this conceptualisation provides insights into the politics of ‘green’ finance on different levels of analysis and following different theoretical traditions: in the context of tracing elites in their dissemination of specific ideas shaping governance regimes; when following market devices which produce partial calculative representations of the world; in problematising how financial organisations both produce and accept certain types of knowledge to further their interests; and when examining the role of ideology and imaginative capture in stabilising financial capitalism during climate crisis. We conclude by identifying the connective tissue between these different analytical and theoretical approaches made visible by the integrative concept of politics as knowledge contestations.

A recent wave of survey experiments has advanced scholarly understanding of public attitudes towards the use of nuclear weapons. In this article, we address the central question: can public opinion influence decision-makers’ views on nuclear weapon use? We bridge this critical gap in the literature with a survey experiment conducted on samples of UK parliamentarians and US and UK government employees in official policy roles. We varied public support for nuclear strikes in realistic scenarios to examine participants’ responsiveness to public preferences when considering nuclear first use, nuclear retaliation, and third-party nuclear threats. We show that high public support notably increases willingness to endorse nuclear first use against non-nuclear adversaries. Furthermore, public backing shapes beliefs about national leaders’ willingness to order nuclear strikes. However, the effect of public opinion is weaker in nuclear retaliation contexts, suggesting that different considerations become prominent when the ‘nuclear taboo’ has been breached. Importantly, sympathetic public opinion strongly influences perceptions of the credibility of third-party nuclear threats, carrying implications for the practice of nuclear deterrence. Our findings highlight the role of public opinion as both an enabling and constraining force on nuclear use and provide new theoretical and empirical insights into elite decision-making in nuclear politics.

This article critically assesses the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), once seen as a flagship of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and its failure to deliver on its ambitious promises in Pakistan. Instead of driving economic growth and cohesion, the CPEC exposed deep governance challenges – marked by institutional fragility, lack of elite consensus, and military dominance in policymaking. Strategic and security imperatives often outweighed economic rationale, resulting in a non-transparent process that sidelined parliament and marginalized provincial actors. Projects were selected based on political expediency rather than viability, leading to inefficiencies and delays. The CPEC also re-centralized power, weakening provincial autonomy and intensifying center-periphery tensions, particularly in Balochistan. In Gwadar, local communities saw disruption without benefit, fueling political discontent. Investor confidence waned amid an uneven playing field and the failure of Special Economic Zones to take shape. Far from transformative, the CPEC reinforced narrow elite interests, worsened federal strains, and deepened Pakistan’s economic and institutional uncertainties.