Chapter 4 considers how duties of international cooperation safeguard sovereign equality by reconciling the territorial sovereignty of coastal states with landlocked states’ rights to access the oceans through negotiation or binding arbitration.

Chapter 5 demonstrates that states have accepted obligations of mandatory cooperation with respect to a variety of other transboundary harms, including piracy, terrorism, and at least some cyberattacks.

Chapter 1 draws on the history of Russia’s military interventions in Ukraine to distinguish two conceptions of sovereign equality under international law. It argues that that international law in the twentieth century embraced a constitutional and equitable conception of sovereign equality, generating state obligations to cooperate with one another to resolve disputes over matters of common concern in accordance with equitable principles.

Chapter 3 shows how the international law of the sea moved away from state unilateralism in favor of the equitable model of sovereignty by requiring states to resolve disputes over international fisheries and maritime boundaries through cooperation in accordance with equitable principles.

Chapter 2 explains how international law governing rivers has evolved to establish a requirement that upstream and downstream sovereigns must consult and negotiate in good faith to determine mutually satisfactory solutions for the shared use of rivers.

Chapter 7 examines climate change as a transnational and existential threat to humanity generally, and to certain smaller and vulnerable states most dramatically. Since it poses an existential threat to low-lying coastal states and raises the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, Chapter 7 makes the case that climate change should be understood to trigger duties of international cooperation.

Under the extremes of Indian socialism, the financial system was a handmaiden for state control of the economy, directing resources according to the wishes of the government. State control was achieved through government ownership. A great deal has changed, with a first (1947–1992) and second (1992–2016) phase of central planning where there were conflicting themes of liberalization and enhanced state control. In many areas, private financial firms are now important. The full ecosystem of modern finance, with information processing and risk taking by private persons, blossomed in the equity market. For two decades there was a remarkable policy process that yielded gains in fields such as the equity market, pension reforms, bankruptcy code and so on. But alongside this there was the expansion of the ‘administrative state’ in the form of financial regulators. Regulators engage in micro-management of products and processes. While there is isomorphic mimicry with many things that look like a financial system, officials retain substantial control over how finance works. In a functional perspective, Indian finance today resembles the environment of the 1980s more than meets the eye.

This chapter explores the role of linguistics in language teacher preparation. Against a profound demographic shift currently underway in the US, it provides a rationale for preparing ESL and bilingual teachers who are well-equipped to work with diverse students in K-12 contexts. Crucially, the chapter explores two key points: the value of linguistic analysis and an equity-based approach to language teaching. Linguistic analysis allows teachers to recognize patterns in the language of their students; in doing so, teachers can isolate recurring errors, recognize where their students are in the learning process, and better target their teaching to address the errors and move students forward. The chapter also shows how linguistics training helps teachers understand language variation, dialects, and the role of society, especially for languages with less social power and prestige. It argues that teachers’ awareness of harmful language ideologies helps combat societal inequities that use language as a proxy for discrimination and subjugation. The chapter ends with suggestions for further reading and discussion questions for teachers and teacher educators.

Relationship maintenance scholars have long attempted to understand the processes by which partners foster relationship growth. They have done so by focusing on defining and explaining key maintenance strategies that serve to initiate and preserve romantic relationships. In this chapter, we provide a brief history of the relationship maintenance literature. Then we identify the key theoretical contributions to the current understanding of relationship maintenance and discuss recent theoretical developments and known correlates. We conclude the chapter by highlighting the need to diversify and expand the maintenance literature by identifying possible avenues for future inquiry and proposing ways to integrate work across disciplines.

The case of Ms. Sykes demonstrates some of the ethical challenges that arise in determining whether a patient should be eligible for an advanced therapy, specifically a ventricular assist device (VAD). Ms. Sykes was in advanced heart failure and denied the VAD by the eligibility committee. The denial was out of concern that she lacked the requisite social support at home, as she had told the team her husband was medically abusive and neglectful. While some members of the team did not believe her reports, others were concerned she was being "doubly victimized" by the husband and then by not receiving the only advanced therapy available to her. Ethics was called to assist the team based on this tension. The haunting aspects of the case are relayed by a clinical ethicist who was early in her career and a senior clinical ethicist who was acting as her mentor at the time. The fairness of the eligibility decision, as well as the appropriate role boundaries of clinical ethicists, are central to what they find haunting.

How much do we care when no one is looking? A patient with critical injury and vulnerable to bias—as an uninsured Person of Color experiencing homelessness and social isolation, with a history of mental illness and drug use— experiences barriers to receiving necessary treatment and standard care. When a patient is unable to ask for help, and has no family member or friend to help, what standard of care can they hope to receive? Can the quality of care provided to unrepresented patients represent a hospital’s culture of care? The writer wonders whether to “stay in my lane” and focus only on the ethical question prompting consultation, or if the principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence justify speaking up about substandard care. To mitigate the risk of acting as the “ethics police” by engaging in micromanagement of patient care, the writer describes efforts to expand ethics’ scope to change systemic and cultural attitudes by establishing preventative measures to identify and combat bias and preemptive judgments of futility.

The World Health Organization recognizes disability as part of being human. The fact that people with PICS are a part of a global disabled population at high risk of disparities due to disability itself is underrecognized.To better explore PICS as a subgroup within a larger disabled community, this chapter reviews international consensus on human rights and disability; the difference between equality and equity; the Biomedical and Social Models of Disability; application of the Social Model of Disability to the lived experiences of people with PICS; and practical strategies to make care more just and inclusive for people with PICS based on strategies that have been successful for other communities with disabilities.

Rights are at home in law-courts. In popular understanding, they seem like attributes attached to individuals who are found in isolation. When carefully examined, however, they can be characterised as aspects of relations in the sight of a tribunal (which may, of course, be conscience or public opinion or God). They have their being, it might be said, within a field of vision - the version of reality that the tribunal sees - in which a right apparently located in one person must have a dissimilar correlate located in another. If, when the information that counts as fact in, a court is in principle willing to do X for A against B, it cannot simultaneously have the same willingness to do X for B against A. On the account definitively worked out by Wesley Hohfeld, my claim must have its correlate in someone else’s duty, but even the simplest privilege (my right against the world to take a walk into the park) has correlates in ‘no-rights’ attaching to the indefinite range of other individuals who might take legal action with a view to stopping me.