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This chapter situates the Declaration of Independence in relation to another founding document of the United States, the federal Constitution. It assesses the Declaration’s role in debates over the Constitution, first during the latter’s framing in 1787, then in the struggle for ratification, and then later as political actors sought to interpret each document in light of the other. From the outset, debate over the Constitution highlighted the Declaration’s multivalence as well as its rhetorical power. Both defenders and opponents of the Constitution have sought to show how their cause best aligned with the ideals and aspirations expressed in the Declaration. Anti-federalists and their successors constructed a powerful narrative which juxtaposed the Declaration’s call to liberty with the Constitution’s blueprint for authority. Yet there was from the beginning an equally strong tradition that saw the Constitution as a consummation of the Declaration’s promise. Either way, this chapter argues, the Declaration continues to help shape the meaning of the Constitution – and to have its own meaning remolded in turn.
The recent financial and debt crisis has resuscitated the debate about European federalism – a theme that seemed not to have survived the painful constitutional adventure that ended with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. With the adoption of significant policy and institutional measures for tightening macroeconomic and budgetary coordination (including a constitutionally enshrined debt brake), the reforms of the monetary union have undisputedly brought the European Union further on the path towards an ever closer union. In an era where EU integration has been increasingly politicised, and Euroscepticism has been on the rise and exploited by anti‐system parties, national leaders have to face a political hiatus and respond to increased needs for symbolic and discursive legitimation of further federalisation. This is all the more crucial for French and German leaders who have brokered the main decisions during the crisis of the eurozone. Against this background, the purpose of this article is not to assess whether, or to what extent, the recent reforms of economic and monetary union have made the EU more federal. Rather, the purpose is to tackle the following puzzle: How have EU leaders legitimised the deepening of federal integration in a context where support for more European federalism is at its lowest? To elucidate this, a lexicographic discourse analysis is conducted based on all speeches held by the German Chancellor Merkel and the two French Presidents Sarkozy and Hollande, previous to, or after European summits from early 2010 until the spring of 2013. The findings indicate that federalism is both taboo and pervasive in French and German leaders' discourse. The paradox is barely apparent, though. While the ‘F‐word’ is rarely spoken aloud, two distinctive visions co‐exist in the French and German discourse. The coming of age of a political union through constitutional federalism is pictured as ineluctable, yet as a distant mirage out of reach of today's decision makers. At the same time, the deepening of functional federalism in order to cope with economic interdependence is a ubiquitous imperative that justifies further integration. The persisting gap between the constitutional and the functional vision of European federalism has crucial implications. Insofar as the Union is held responsible for not delivering successful economic policy, political leaders will fail to legitimise both functional and constitutional federalism.
This paper examines the contribution of German subnational constitutional courts to the judicialization of politics in the German states, known as Länder. This research goal entails three dimensions. First, I have to define and measure judicialization. To accomplish this task, I use an index recently developed by an international group of scholars of comparative politics. Second, based on major theoretical approaches, I identify possible causes that might give reasons for judicialization, namely institutional preconditions and preferences of justices. In a third step, I use a linear regression in order to test the theory empirically and find links between causes and effects of judicial decision-making in subnational constitutional courts. The findings confirm institutionalist approaches that contribute to explaining decision-making in German subnational constitutional courts.
This article addresses the effects of decentralisation reforms on regionalist parties' electoral strength. It takes up the debate between ‘accommodatists’ (i.e., electoral loss due to policy accommodation) and ‘institutionalists’ (i.e., electoral gain due to institutional empowerment). These effects depend on the electoral venue considered – regional or national – and on the ideological radicalism of a given regionalist party – secessionist or autonomist. This study finds that increases in the level of decentralisation are positively associated with higher scores for autonomist parties in regional elections, while they are not statistically significantly correlated with secessionist parties' electoral performances. In contrast, in national elections, decentralisation reforms seem to penalise autonomist parties more than secessionist ones. These findings are based on the analysis of a novel dataset which includes regional and national vote shares for 77 regionalist parties in 11 Western democracies from 1950 until 2010.
Although it is widely accepted that a decentralised system can enhance policy learning and the spread of best practices, an under‐researched question is where that learning process takes place. Using data on the diffusion of health care policies in Switzerland, this article analyses the role of institutionalised intergovernmental cooperation and its impact on the spread of successful policies. The results show that joint membership of policy makers in health policy specific intergovernmental bodies is related to the diffusion of best practices.
Constitutional courts (CCs) in federal and quasi-federal systems are often expected to act as neutral arbiters in conflicts between levels of government. This article challenges that assumption by analysing the behavior of Spain’s Constitutional Court over four decades of constitutional litigation. Drawing on an original dataset of 1,888 rulings on all challenges to national and regional legislation (1981–2023), we examine how judicial outcomes are shaped by political alignment, institutional design, and court ideology. Our analysis reveals a consistent pattern of deference to the central government, especially when the Court is ideologically conservative or aligned with the federal executive. These results support a strategic model of judicial behavior and raise broader questions about the role of CCs in multilevel systems. Rather than acting as counter-majoritarian forces, courts may reinforce central dominance in center–periphery conflicts, limiting their capacity to protect territorial pluralism in practice.
Canadian political scientists have often taken a normative approach to political institutions like the constitution, the electoral system, and Parliament. An assumption that institutional reform can itself be a solution to political problems is also reflected in general public commentary and at times has been openly encouraged and supported by the Canadian state itself. This approach has many strengths but also deficiencies, particularly the degree to which it replicates existing understandings of the state, focused on the distribution of power among white men. The study of political institutions in Canada must continue growing to incorporate and integrate a greater diversity of perspectives, including interrogating and challenging their very foundations.
Canadian politics is shaped by three intersecting areas of constitutional law: Aboriginal rights, federalism and Charter jurisprudence. While a canon has emerged on the role of courts in Canadian democracy, it is often asserted that Charter scholarship dominates the field. Is this true—and does it matter? We address these questions through a systematic survey of 423 studies published between 2012 and 2022 in leading Canadian journals, books and edited volumes. We find that most work is produced by legal scholars, is descriptive, focuses on the Charter and examines a narrow range of cases and themes—most notably the court’s relationship with other institutions, its legitimacy and its power of judicial review. We argue that advancing our understanding of courts in Canadian democracy requires moving beyond our tendency to stick to our lanes—engaging core theories of judicial politics, employing explanatory methods and analyzing multiple areas of constitutional law.
Event history analysis (EHA) revolutionized the study of policy diffusion. However, many diffusion studies are snapshots of a policy’s spread. This begs the question of what we are learning from studies of (often) incomplete diffusion. The simple question that we ask – when should a diffusion study be conducted? – is complex to answer. We offer insight into this question using literature on EHA and empirical observation. We use data from the State Innovation and Policy Diffusion database on 83 policies that were adopted by at least 42 states to demonstrate how key results change as the observation window changes. We conclude with advice on how to approach modeling and interpreting incomplete policy diffusion in the future.
This essay links Jeremy Bentham and Immanuel Kant more closely in their politics and political theory through a shared, substantially similar debt to Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations. In particular, I argue that on some key political questions that are foundational to liberalism, they draw strikingly akin lessons from Smith and build on his ideas in a similar direction. That is, even otherwise very different strands of early liberalism find agreement on a constellation of ideas about trade, federalism, and peace. I show that these are not just preoccupations of Kant’s potentially idiosyncratic Perpetual Peace, but help define the whole political tradition.
Chapter 5 introduces readers to India’s regional diversity. The top-down and the bottom-up political changes in India discussed in Chapters 1 to 4 of this book are present more sharply in some parts of India than in others. In order to capture some of this variation, this chapter first provides some systematic comparisons of India’s states, including the context of Indian federalism and how that shapes center–state relations in India.
The book ends by tracking the legacy of the Minorities Commission. The commission set a precedent for managing minority anxieties as Nigeria entered nation-statehood in 1960. It also failed to resolve the political tension these anxieties caused, leaving the newly independent Nigerian state with a crisis of citizenship that lingers to this day. This crisis of citizenship informed the national breakdown that led to the devastating civil war (also known as the Biafran War, 1967–70) and the ongoing fragmentation of Nigeria into smaller and more numerous states. Because certain Niger Delta peoples have been fixed as minorities in Nigeria, the needs and well-being of Niger Delta communities are not priorities, especially as they are construed as being at odds with national needs and priorities. It is in this context that their status as minorities has had the most devastating implications. The book closes by exploring the various ways these communities have used their minority status to simultaneously challenge and insist upon inclusion within the Nigerian state, asking what might be possible for their future as Nigerian citizens.
The Minorities Commission of 1957-58 demonstrated the degree to which people had aligned their ethnic affiliation with the newly articulated political identities by the late 1950s. Even though each region contained significant heterogeneous populations, each of the major political parties aligned with the numerically major ethnic group, which also conformed to colonially construed majorities (i.e., Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo). This further exacerbated the growing sense of alienation minorities felt amid nationalist fervor during this period. In the end, the Minorities Commission recommended that Nigeria enter independence with the existing tripartite regional structure. However, it did recommend the new Nigerian state set up “special areas” or “minority areas” in the Western and Eastern Regions under the jurisdiction of the federal government; the idea was that these would receive special consideration for further development. Addressing the minority question would have required more time and resources than the British government was willing to give to this colony.
Dealing with cumulative environmental problems unavoidably requires repeated interactions (coordination) among multiple and often many actors relevant to the other three CIRCle functions (conceptualization, information, and regulatory intervention). Coordination can promote effective approaches, avoid policy drift, and resolve disputes. Key actors may include multiple agencies and levels of government, quasi-governmental organizations, supranational and international institutions, and nongovernmental organizations representing stakeholders of different kinds. Rules can help overcome significant cost, time, and political disincentives to establishing and maintaining coordination. Two broad types of formal rules for coordination emerge in mechanisms for coordinating conceptualization, information, and intervention: those that establish an institution, and those that provide for interaction in other ways, such as duties to notify or cooperate or undertake joint planning. Legal mechanisms can also expressly provide for dealing with policy drift and resolving disputes between regulatory actors. Real-world examples are provided of legal mechanisms to support these forms of coordination.
This chapter explores the overlooked constitutional reforms and the constitution-making process in the over 550 princely states spread across 45 per cent of the subcontinent’s territory that were not part of British India. We argue that the constitutional processes in the princely states were fundamental to the subsequent successful merger of the states and to the making of the Indian Union. Constitutionalism in the princely states was an insistent refrain to India’s constitution making and became the standard language through which to think about and act on political aspirations for democratic government. The numerous parallel constitution-making processes in the states produced comparable constitutional templates that could ultimately be assembled into the new Indian constitution. The chapter analyses constitutionalism within the states, among different states and between the states and the Constituent Assembly. It examines the understudied constitution making process in Rewa and Ratlam states, the formations of unions of states, and finally looks at Manipur state in the north-eastern frontier of India to show the limits of the constitutional process of integration.
The Indian constitution was poised to create a new map of power, transforming the relationship between existing state agencies and new authorities. This chapter demonstrates how the individuals staffing the state apparatus were not mere spectators, passively following the constitution-making process, but actors who actively sought to influence, change, or resist the emerging constitutional order through both public and private channels. The success of the future constitution of India required a smooth transition of the organs of the colonial state to the postcolonial order. Turning their loyalty and ambitions to the new state and its constitutional order was not an obvious outcome in 1947. The chapter examines how provincial legislators sought to guard their autonomy; how the higher judiciary endeavoured to protect their judicial independence; the contested constitutional status of Delhi; and finally, how the ‘neutral’ bureaucracy who were managing the process of constitution making actively sought to defend their own jurisdiction and interests at the time. This process, which paralleled the integration of territories, led to the functional integration of the units of the state.
This chapter details the fragmented nature of the last sixty years of Aboriginal land repossession across Australia, both in terms of the nature of the rights and the level of restitution. Exploring the limited and uneven national Aboriginal land rights picture in 2024, we argue for an appreciation of the federal dimension of land rights policymaking. Uneven land restitution has resulted not just from spatially varying degrees of land commodification and the differing trajectories of land rights movements, although these were crucial. We aim to demonstrate that shifting state–Commonwealth (or Federal) relations within the Australian federation – crosscut against differing support from states and Commonwealth governments over time, and differing Commonwealth Government attitudes to federalism – led to a spatially uneven set of legislative land rights regimes across Australia. To do so, we narrate the varied responses to the Aboriginal land rights movement across the country in the wake of the Woodward Royal Commission in 1973 with an eye to the federal dimension. We argue that while the Whitlam, Fraser and Hawke governments from 1972 to 1991 all failed to legislate national land rights, they did so for very different reasons, leaving the land rights agenda to the states. Ultimately, it was the centralizing power of the High Court that brought about a national but inadequate and partial resolution to the Aboriginal land question. Finally, we provide a series of maps and tables describing the jurisdictional variation in rights and interests in land restored to Indigenous Peoples at present.
Existing scholarship investigates the influence of out-of-state donors in state-level candidate politics; however, comparatively little attention is given to out-of-state contributions in direct democracy campaigns, such as ballot initiatives and referenda. This study is the first to investigate out-of-state donations to direct democracy campaigns, focusing on the scope and characteristics of individual out-of-state donors across the United States. Utilizing an original dataset of contributions to direct democracy committees from 2006 to 2022, I present three key findings. First, out-of-state contributions to direct democracy campaigns have increased over time, with notable spikes in recent election cycles. Second, a large majority of out-of-state individual contributions total $100 or less, primarily to measures related to social issues and substance use regulation. Third, out-of-state contributions to direct democracy campaigns tend to share certain characteristics. A significant portion of these contributions comes from zip codes with lower to average incomes and states without direct democracy processes of their own. Finally, based on these characteristics, I develop a potential theory for why these donors contribute, arguing that individual out-of-state donors to direct democracy campaigns are primarily motivated by a combination of ideological and consumption-oriented considerations.
David Freeman Engstrom (Stanford) and Daniel B. Rodriguez (Northwestern) argue that current structure of American legal services regulation, known as “Our Bar Federalism,” is outdated. Fifty states maintain their own rules and regulatory apparatus for a legal profession and industry that are now national and multinational. This fragmented system is a key factor in the American civil justice system’s access-to-justice crisis, where restrictive state rules support the lawyers’ monopoly. With new legal services delivery models and AI, this scheme will seem increasingly provincial and retrograde. This chapter argues it’s time to rethink "Our Bar Federalism," and explore hybrid state-federal regulatory system.
Designating India as a ‘Union of States’ under Article 1, the Constitution of India does not adhere to a federal vocabulary. The perusal of the Constituent Assembly Debates establishes this verbiage to be a deliberate choice. Scholars such as Prof. Wheare (1963) have classified the Indian Federalism as ‘quasi-federal’, which remains a part of constitutional vocabulary to date. This scholarship undertakes an assessment of federal semantics and taxonomical choices under the Constitutions of the USA, Australia, Switzerland, Brazil and Canada, juxtaposing them with the ‘quasi-federal’ model of the Indian Constitution. Challenging rigid categorizations, the paper argues that the constitutions identified as ‘federal’ have also depicted centralizing tendencies in their working. Examining the legal and political intent behind the omission of ‘federal’ and its anti-federal fallouts, the scholarship explores that the lack of a uniform federal vocabulary and mis-categorization has allowed the Union government and the judiciary to reinforce the centralization of power that shapes the federal discourse, while sporadically identifying the federal features in the Indian Constitution.