New Zealand and Australian governments rely heavily on voluntary industry initiatives to improve population nutrition, such as voluntary front-of-pack nutrition labelling (Health Star Rating [HSR]), industry-led food advertising standards, and optional food reformulation programmes. Research in both countries has shown that food companies vary considerably in their policies and practices on nutrition(1). We aimed to determine if a tailored nutrition support programme for food companies improved their nutrition policies and practices compared with control companies who were not offered the programme. REFORM was a 24-month, two-country, cluster-randomised controlled trial. 132 major packaged food/drink manufacturers (n=96) and fast-food companies (n=36) were randomly assigned (2:1 ratio) to receive a 12-month tailored support programme or to the control group (no intervention). The intervention group was offered a programme designed and delivered by public health academics comprising regular meetings, tailored company reports, and recommendations and resources to improve product composition (e.g., reducing nutrients of concern through reformulation), nutrition labelling (e.g., adoption of HSR labels), marketing to children (reducing the exposure of children to unhealthy products and brands) and improved nutrition policy and corporate sustainability reporting. The primary outcome was the nutrient profile (measured using HSR) of company food and drink products at 24 months. Secondary outcomes were the nutrient content (energy, sodium, total sugar, and saturated fat) of company products, display of HSR labels on packaged products, company nutrition-related policies and commitments, and engagement with the intervention. Eighty-eight eligible intervention companies (9,235 products at baseline) were invited to participate, of whom 21 accepted and were enrolled in the REFORM programme (delivered between September 2021 and December 2022). Forty-four companies (3,551 products at baseline) were randomised to the control arm. At 24 months, the model-adjusted mean HSR of intervention company products was 2.58 compared to 2.68 for control companies, with no significant difference between groups (mean difference -0.10, 95% CI -0.40 to 0.21, p-value 0.53). A per protocol analysis of intervention companies who enrolled in the programme compared to control companies with no major protocol violation also found no significant difference (2.93 vs 2.64, mean difference 0.29, 95% CI -0.13 to 0.72, p-value 0.18). We found no significant differences between the intervention and control groups in any secondary outcome, except in total sugar (g/100g) where the sugar content of intervention company products was higher than that of control companies (12.32 vs 6.98, mean difference 5.34, 95% CI 1.73 to 8.96, p-value 0.004). The per-protocol analysis for sugar did not show a significant difference (10.47 vs 7.44, mean difference 3.03, 95% CI -0.48 to 6.53, p-value 0.09).In conclusion, a 12-month tailored nutrition support for food companies did not improve the nutrient profile of company products.

While reformulation policies are commonly used to incentivise manufacturers to improve the nutrient profile of the foods and beverages they produce, only a few countries have implemented mandatory reformulation policies. This paper aimed to review evidence on the design, implementation challenges and effectiveness of mandatory reformulation policies and compare them to voluntary reformulation policies. The systematic search retrieved seventy-one studies including twelve on mandatory reformulation policies. Most mandatory reformulation policies were aimed at reducing trans-fatty acids or sodium in foods. Overall, mandatory reformulation policies were found to be more effective than voluntary ones in improving dietary intakes. Mandatory policies were implemented when voluntary policies either failed or were found to be insufficient to improve the composition of foods. Typical features of mandatory policies could also improve the design of voluntary policies. Examples include strict but attainable targets and a tight monitoring of compliance.

This article studies Chinese central government policies in relation to food market building and food security between 1979 and 2008. It investigates major changes in the state's grain purchase pricing, urban subsidized food sales and the state monopoly over rural-to-urban food circulation that were effected in an attempt to ensure both food availability and accessibility under fiscal constraint. By observing the gradual transition from state monopoly to the market, this article traces the mechanisms which enabled the Chinese government to both establish a monopsony by generating artificial price signals for farmers to generate food output, and act as a monopolistic seller by providing subsidized low-priced food to urban consumers in order to fulfil its goal of low-cost industrialization. Thus, China's food security largely hinged on the government's budget to subsidize the price gap. The Chinese government juggled between food security and fiscal affordability to formulate a food budget that would neither excessively impact food security nor cause a crisis to government finance. China's food security puzzle was eventually worked out in the mid-2000s with the boosting of national income, which enhanced the population's access to food and eased the central government's food security concerns.

Increased health inequalities are a result of poverty and socialinequalities. Examples of how food intake is affected by povertyexist throughout the European Region. The diets of low-income groupsare likely to be inadequate. Low-income groups and specific groupssuch as children, adolescents, pregnant and lactating women, andolder people often face problems gaining access to a healthy varietyof safe foods. Safe healthy food may not be accessible to those mostin need. Yet access to a safe and varied healthy diet is afundamental human right and policies are needed to address this.