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Chapter 23 stresses that four sets of ideas need to be added to the principles and the topics of focus mentioned in Chapter 22. First, neither international order nor national order can be sustainable if the contradiction that exists today between, on the one hand, the celebration of human rights and, on the other hand, the tendency to treat individuals as disposable, deepens or simply persists. Second, the global justice agenda cannot credibly claim to be feasible if it does not factor in the views of the rest of the world. It is imperative to integrate what the non-West thinks. The ownership of a global agenda cannot be lopsided. Third, a cosmopolitan approach does not have to call for the removal or elimination of the state and sovereignty; rather, it is their reconceptualization and the application of this reconceptualization that are recommended. Fourth, institutional innovation will help implement this agenda.
This article presents an exploratory study of an innovative future adverb construction, going forward, typically meaning ‘in the future, from now on’ (e.g. What does this mean going forward?). Going forward probably originated in the domain of business in or around the 1970s. In this study, the spread of going forward is examined on the basis of over 1,500 examples from six genres of the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA), covering the years 1990–2019. The data is analysed in terms of four morphosyntactic variables, and the developments in the frequency of going forward are analysed using variability-based neighbour clustering. The results show that, in the 1990s, going forward had a modest rate of occurrence mainly in texts having to do with business and finance, but its frequency rose sharply in the 2000s and the 2010s. At the same time, the discourse contexts in which it appeared broadened from business and finance to other domains. The syntactic contexts of going forward show that it has become an adverb. The results highlight the need to incorporate social meanings such as domain preferences in the description of grammatical constructions. They also illustrate the need to consider constructional innovations at the lexical end of the grammar–lexicon continuum, in addition to highly grammaticalised constructions.
With the rise of strategic rivalry and geopolitical competition, governments turned to economic policy to gain influence, power, and resources. The defining feature became the pursuit of national interest, which was invoked to introduce investment screening policies, increase tariffs, prevent cross-border M&A deals, expropriate assets, restrict technology transfer, provide preferential subsidies, and create national champions. To respond effectively, global companies must recognize the systemic changes underway and develop capabilities to address them. Companies need to acknowledge that they will come to be defined by their nationality and innovation is an important battlefield. Government policies to contain the influence of foreign firms from adversarial countries cluster around four levers: market access, level playing field, investment security, and institutional alignment. To actively manage geopolitical tensions, companies need to assess how geopolitics will share their resources, competitive advantage, and firm organization. They need to develop skills to scan the global landscape, personalize the information, plan the response, and pivot if there are headwinds. Impact on employees, who works, how work is performed, and where it takes place need to be evaluated. Managing policymakers becomes a crucial part of managing a global business.
The promise of global innovation lies in the unlikely combination of knowledge and information from different sources and locations. Companies that can scan the globe for fresh ideas and integrate knowledge from multiple subsidiaries around the world stand the best chance of generating innovative solutions. However, innovation is also one of the central arenas of geopolitical tensions. Governments aim to have a leg up in the innovation contest for national security and economic competitiveness. Consequently, when geopolitical tensions increase, governments strive to keep innovations at home and increase barriers to the cross-border flow of cutting-edge knowledge, technology, and information. Multiple technology standards further increase the challenges of cross-border knowledge integration. Companies withdraw or scale back foreign innovation efforts and the flow of ideas, talent, and resources slows. Proactive companies and managers strive to balance knowledge diversity with geopolitical risk, keep more sensitive projects at home, adopt operational strategies to have greater control over innovation, and differentiate between technologies.
Innovation is both the creative and the destructive force at the centre of economic development. It is perhaps the best explanation of current human prosperity yet core to some of our most pressing societal problems. But how does innovation come about? How does it get managed in organizations? Moving from the most foundational ideas to the most cutting-edge debates in the field, this book serves as an invaluable companion to the field of innovation management. Each chapter summarises, discusses and critiques key academic texts, relating them to specific themes and connecting them to broader discussions in the field. Through this unique format, readers will gain insights into the important ideas and debates about innovation, how to manage it, and what it means for business and society. This book also brings interdisciplinary perspectives from economics, sociology, psychology, history and management into the conversation about how to think about innovation scientifically.
This paper examines how the interaction between natural selection, household education choices and R&D activities influences macroeconomic growth. We develop an innovation-driven growth model that integrates household heterogeneity in educational ability with endogenous fertility and the activation of innovation. Our findings reveal that households with lower educational abilities accumulate less human capital but have more offspring and initially gain a temporary evolutionary advantage. This demographic shift enhances the likelihood of innovation taking off; however, the resulting reduction in the share of high-ability households ultimately constrains R&D efforts and slows long-term economic growth. We empirically validate our theoretical model using cross-country data and instrumental variables, demonstrating that disparities in educational ability negatively impact education, innovation and growth over the long run. This study provides new insights into the complex dynamics between natural selection, endogenous fertility and economic development, with significant implications for both policy and theory.
Although treatments for depression are effective, many patients do not respond. Many new innovations are currently being developed, claiming to substantially improve outcomes. We propose a new method to assess the strength of these innovations. Based on response rates of current treatments, we can estimate how many treatments are needed in total to realise response in >99% of patients if they were to be offered another treatment when the previous one did not work. Using a basic model as a benchmark, we can show that none of the current innovations likely represents a ’silver bullet’ that will dramatically change the outcomes. Improvement of mental healthcare for depression needs to be done by multiple, incremental innovations. Only together can these innovations substantially improve outcomes.
Edited by
Richard Pinder, Imperial College of Science, Technology and Medicine, London,Christopher-James Harvey, Imperial College of Science, Technology and Medicine, London,Ellen Fallows, British Society of Lifestyle Medicine
Traditional clinical training has often lacked the leadership and management skills necessary for practitioners to effectively drive change. Despite facing systemic pressures and resource limitations, clinicians can be agents of change by innovating within their work environments. Practising self-care and understanding the benefits of Lifestyle Medicine are essential for healthcare practitioners to sustain their wellbeing and energy for these changes. The transformation of healthcare environments to encourage healthier choices can profoundly affect the wellbeing of both staff and patients. Large-scale change can be fostered by engaging with the community and connecting patients to local groups and activities. The UK has seen examples of successful Lifestyle Medicine projects and we explore some examples of success in this chapter. To innovate in healthcare, one must be clear about their motivation, be prepared to initiate projects without initial funding, plan for their evaluation, and ensure that the projects are enjoyable for all participants involved.
We investigate whether the diseases for which there was more biomedical innovation had larger 1999–2019 reductions in premature mortality. Biomedical innovation related to a disease is measured by the change in the mean vintage of descriptors of PubMed articles about the disease. We analyze data on 286 million descriptors of 27 million articles about over 800 diseases. Premature mortality from a disease is significantly inversely related to the lagged vintage of descriptors of articles about the disease. In the absence of biomedical innovation, age-adjusted mortality rates would not have declined. Some factors other than biomedical innovation (e.g., a decline in smoking and an increase in educational attainment) contributed to the decline in mortality. But other factors (e.g., a rise in obesity and the prevalence of chronic conditions) contributed to an increase in mortality. Biomedical innovation reduced the mortality of white people sooner than it reduced the mortality of black people.
In the first book-length history of the Board of Longitude, a distinguished team of historians of science bring to life one of Georgian Britain's most important scientific institutions. Having developed in the eighteenth century following legislation offering rewards for methods to determine longitude at sea, the Board came to support the work of navigators, instrument makers, clockmakers and surveyors, and assembled the Nautical Almanac. Utilizing the archives and records of the Board, recently digitised by the same team, the authors shed new light on the Board's involvement in colonial projects, Pacific and Arctic exploration, as well as on innovative practitioners whose work would otherwise be lost to history. This is an invaluable guide to science, state and society in Georgian Britain, a period of dramatic industrial and imperial and technological expansion.
New education and training opportunities are critical for the development of a diverse and highly skilled translational science workforce. In this special communication, the authors consider how Narratives of Discovery, an initiative to interview leading scientists about the sources of their creativity, can serve as a novel translational science teaching tool. Reporting on a project to map translational science principles onto nine Narratives of Discovery conducted to date, the authors demonstrate how translational science principles are manifested in the career trajectories of these scientists and propose that the narratives can serve as a formative model for trainees. Findings from systematic coding of the Narratives of Discovery suggest that the narrative format is particularly well suited to highlight translational science principles not well-addressed by existing education opportunities, including what it means for scientists to be creative and innovative, use bold and rigorous approaches, and prioritize diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility. Offering excerpts from the published Narratives of Discovery and quotations from the scientists themselves, the authors aim to create space for continued conversation about how to best crystallize the concepts of translational science and advance translational science education and training initiatives.
Drawing inspiration from Oliver Williamson’s work, we employ a ‘discriminating alignment’ approach to explain how established organizations select and govern external sources of innovation. Our framework integrates ‘standard’ governance mechanisms, such as licensing and joint ventures, with ‘emerging’ mechanisms, such as hackathons and accelerators. First, we classify governance mechanisms into three types – market scanning, opportunity support, and opportunity control – based on four attributes: the degree of reallocation of decision rights, the degree of pooling of property rights, set-up costs, and ex post adaptation costs. We then argue that two key variables – uncertainty and technological distance – jointly help determine the choice of the appropriate mechanism for transactions involving entrepreneurial opportunities. By developing a comprehensive taxonomy of arrangements linked to the governance of external innovations, this study offers propositions that identify the drivers of ‘efficient alignment’ between transactions attributes and organizational choices in entrepreneurial contexts.
Chapter 14 presents a dynamic model of long-term, art historical trends and shows the complexity of overlapping styles and movements. It is based on a modification af a dynamic model of development on the timescale of the human life course. The basic evolution rules are those of simultaneously operating processes of consolidation of the status quo and processes of innovation driven by a familiarity-novelty optimum. The simulation explores different scenarios, one of which generates the typical art-historical pattern of overlapping continuous as well as discontinuous processes.
Despite enormous efforts at healthcare improvement, major challenges remain in achieving optimal outcomes, safety, cost, and value. This Element introduces the concept of learning health systems, which have been proposed as a possible solution. Though many different variants of the concept exist, they share a learning cycle of capturing data from practice, turning it into knowledge, and putting knowledge back into practice. How learning systems are implemented is highly variable. This Element emphasises that they are sociotechnical systems and offers a structured framework to consider their design and operation. It offers a critique of the learning health system approach, recognising that more has been said about the aspiration than perhaps has been delivered. This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.
There are myriad open questions and challenges for the Unified Patent Court (UPC) system and the unitary patent, which constitute a new layer to the European patent landscape on top of the existing courts and types of patents. One of those is the question of how this new system will interact with utility models, which seems to have mostly escaped academic scrutiny so far. This chapter explores this interaction, focusing predominantly on the consequences of the new unitary patent and the UPC for strategies surrounding patents and utility models, including the division of judicial competence. By considering, amongst other things, the complicated relationship and overlap of these rights, the limited but influential mandate of the UPC, the fragmented landscape for utility models, and the different sources of law governing a unitary patent, this chapter examines how litigation before the UPC may affect (strategies involving) utility models.
Since 1985, when China’s first Patent Law came into effect, China has established a legal protection system for utility models. At present, after four revisions of the Patent Law, China’s utility model patent legal system has also been improved. However, among the authorized utility model patents, those that fully meet the necessary conditions of novelty and inventive step might be in the minority. Of course, this phenomenon is not unique in China. The purpose of this chapter is to illuminate the ongoing optimization of the Chinese utility model patent system in the context of the development of China’s overall patent system. Accordingly, Part Ⅰ traces the emergence of China’s Patent System, including the Chinese utility model patent-based subsystem. Part Ⅱ centers on the basic contours of the Chinese utility model patent system. Part Ⅲ then summarizes existing deficiencies of the Chinese utility model patent system and future development trends. It concludes with a discussion of potential implications of proposed revisions to the Chinese utility model patent system.
In Germany, the utility model is a type of intellectual property right that provides protection for novel and useful inventions. It is governed by the German Utility Model Act (“Gebrauchsmustergesetz” – GebrMG) which was enacted in 1891, making it the oldest still-existing utility model system in the world. Utility models grant the right holder exclusive control over the use and commercialisation of an invention for a period of ten years from the date of filing, subject to the payment of annual renewal fees. In a way, the utility model is the “little sister” of a full-fledged patent (also called a “petty patent”), protecting the same type of subject matter (technical inventions) with a more limited scope.
While national rules regarding the scope, availability and issuance of utility models vary from country to country, most utility model regimes offer protection for tangible products, with many, but not all, jurisdictions excluding processes, biological materials and computer software from the scope of protection. The duration of utility model protection ranges from five to fifteen years, with most countries offering ten years of protection. In most countries, utility model applications are not formally examined and must simply disclose the product in question. Given the lack of examination, obtaining utility models is generally viewed as faster and cheaper than obtaining patents. This combination of speed and cost, in theory, makes utility models potentially attractive to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) that cannot afford to obtain full patent protection. Similar considerations have also been raised as advantageous to innovators in low-income countries.
In virtually all societal domains, algorithmic systems, and AI more particularly, have made a grand entrance. Their growing impact renders it increasingly important to understand and assess the challenges and opportunities they raise – an endeavor to which this book aims to contribute. In this chapter, I start by putting the current “AI hype” into context. I emphasize the long history of human fascination with artificial beings; the fact that AI is but one of many powerful technologies that humanity has grappled with over time; and the fact that its uptake is inherently enabled by our societal condition. Subsequently, I introduce the chapters of this book, dealing with AI, ethics and philosophy (Part I); AI, law and policy (Part II); and AI across sectors (Part III). Finally, I discuss some conundrums faced by all scholars in this field, concerning the relationship between law, ethics and policy and their roles in AI governance; the juxtaposition between protection and innovation; and law’s (in)ability to regulate a continuously evolving technology. While their solutions are far from simple, I conclude there is great value in acknowledging the complexity of what is at stake and the need for more nuance in the AI governance debate.