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Research agrees that the importance voters ascribe to political issues, ie individual-level issue salience, affects political behaviour. However, due to measurement limitations, we lack research on who considers which issues important. Specifically, the often-used most-important-problem/issue question complicates between-individual comparisons of issue salience. Using a rarely employed measurement of issue salience and data from six Western European countries, this research note explores the salience of different issues across different socio-demographic groups. Our exploratory findings suggest that different socio-demographic variables affect different issues’ salience across and within individuals over time. Further, we find that predictors of individual-level issue salience and attitudes frequently differ – highlighting the importance of analysing them separately. We call for research on individual-level issue salience using measurements that enable the study of its determinants and analysing predictors of salience and attitudes separately.
This article was submitted to the ‘The Legacy of Giovanni Sartori’ symposium on IPSR/RISP – Italian Political Science Review. The goal of this note is to suggest an alternative approach to the of party family. The literature agrees that individual party families should be ideologically distinct and cohesive but maintains a broad understanding of ‘ideology’. This comes with conceptual and operational complications, including rarely explicit definitions of party family and frequently inconclusive empirical evidence. Instead, I suggest that the historically rooted ideological distinctiveness and uniqueness of party families should be conceived at the issue level. Accordingly, an alternative conceptualisation of party family is proposed: groups of parties whose patterns of issue salience ideologically reflect their historical origins. Importantly, this approach revolves around the identification of party families’ core issues, based on their cleavage/historical origins. Parties belonging to a party family will be the most consistent emphasizers of their core issues within their party system. This note provides a first discussion of how this alternative approach may provide party family scholars with greater clarity, both conceptually and in proposed empirical applications.
This paper examines how public demand and institutional contexts shape the substantive representation of LGBTQ+ populations across Europe. I argue that while positive social constructions of LGBTQ+ populations are a necessary condition for the advances of LGBTQ+ rights, issue salience can facilitate LGBTQ+ rights only if public opinion on LGBTQ+ is positive. Furthermore, I assert that translating social constructions of LGBTQ+ populations into policy outputs is mediated by the proportionality of electoral systems. I analyze policy scores, public attitudes, and online interest concerning LGBTQ+ topics. I find that positive social constructions are correlated with more inclusive LGBTQ+ rights across countries, and the positive impact of issue salience on LGBTQ+ rights is observed only in countries with positive social constructions. Additionally, the analysis of electoral systems provides mixed evidence regarding the role of proportionality.
In this research, we update the measure of case salience for state supreme courts originally developed by Vining and Wilhelm (2011). The original measure was compatible with the Brace-Hall State Supreme Court Data Project (SSCDP) and covered 1995 through 1998. Our updated measure is now compatible with the Hall–Windett Data on State Supreme Court Outcomes (2013), a more contemporary source for state supreme court information. Here we discuss the new dataset of salient cases from 1995 to 2019 and provide descriptive statistics.
How can public opinion change in a pro-immigration direction? Recent studies suggest that those who support immigration care less about it than those who oppose it, which may explain why lawmakers do not enact pro-immigration reforms even when voters are pro-immigration. To see if the personal issue importance of immigration can be changed, I conducted a probability-based, nationally representative US survey experiment (N = 3,450) exposing respondents to verifiable arguments about the broad national benefits of expanding legal immigration and the costs of not doing so. Using new measures of issue importance, my descriptive results show that only one-fifth of voters who prioritize the issue have a pro-immigration preference. Furthermore, while anti-immigration respondents prioritize policies regarding law enforcement and (reducing) future immigration, pro-immigration respondents prioritize (helping) immigrants already here. The experimental results confirm that the provided arguments raised immigration’s importance among pro-immigration voters but did not backfire by mobilizing anti-immigration voters. Contrary to expectations, the arguments increased pro-immigration policy preferences, but did not change voters’ subissue priorities within immigration or their willingness to sign a petition. Overall, the treatment was effective beyond changing minds by shifting stated issue positions and priorities in a pro-immigration direction. It can thus be used in a nontargeted information campaign to promote pro-immigration reforms.
This chapter provides an overview of the arguments for the stability of public opinion as well as the arguments of those who believe public opinion is unstable. We then explore conditionality, or the conditions under which public opinion appears to be more unstable. Concepts such as low information rationality, issue salience, and question wording are covered.
Chapter 5 asks why the public continues to support restrictive policies given their considerable economic and rights costs. It identifies the predominant values informing and facilitating the liberal state’s governance of contemporary immigration and its implications for restricting human mobility by focusing on the effects of a threat environment in sustaining the onerous policies of the migration policy playing field. It argues that the persistence of these policies can largely be explained by the continued negative framing of these events by political elites and the mass media. In particular, their conflation of public safety and national security with immigration makes the issue more salient for the public, and the popular legitimacy of restrictive policies is sustained and endorsed by center and extreme Right politicians and political parties. The chapter concludes that the predominance of a security paradigm has shifted the baseline of values salience and realigned popular values and attitudes regarding immigration.
Chapter 4 investigates whether the public endorses the institutional and policy developments described in the previous chapter. It considers the ‘soft’ norms that legitimize the liberal state’s exclusionary immigration and human mobility policies. Utilizing public opinion data derived from the Gallup, Pew, European Social, Eurobarometer, European Value, and World Value Surveys, it finds that the expansive migration policy playing field and its restrictive immigration measures are endorsed by most Europeans and Americans, that is, the public prioritizes the strict regulation of immigration strictly even when, in the process, its civil liberties and those of migrants are contravened. It argues that the success of the liberal state’s immigration and human mobility policies not only depends upon the compliance and active cooperation of non-central state actors, but also derives from the public’s trust that the state and its surrogate immigration gatekeepers are acting on its behalf and in its interests.
Integration into the democratic system may induce the moderation of radical parties. This chapter assesses the extent of mainstreaming of populist radical right parties that follows their entry into local power. It does so through analysis of their discourse before and after attaining the leadership of the local government and considers four dimensions of mainstreaming. First, programmatic expansion and the relative salience of issues outside of their ideological core. Second, de-radicalization, in terms of the positioning towards and framing of the issue of immigration. Third, a softening of anti-establishment discourse and behaviour, considering both conflicts with other political actors and institutional reforms. And fourth, the self-presentation as normal and responsible, as opposed to a prior reputation for extremism and/or incompetence. To analyse changes across these dimensions, it draws from a range of data sources: council meetings, Facebook posts and newspaper articles. The chapter reveals cross-national differences in the extent of mainstreaming and suggests that institutional and party-strategic differences are crucial determinants of the extent and form of such change.
This Element documents long-term changes in the politicalattitudes of occupational groups, shifts in the salience of economic and cultural issues, and the movement of political parties in the electoral space from 1990 to 2018 in eight Western democracies. We evaluate prominent contentions about how electoral contestation has changed and why support for mainstream parties has declined while support for challenger parties has increased. We contribute a new analysis of how the viability of the types of electoral coalitions assembled by center-left, center-right, radical-right, and Green parties changes over these decades. We find that their viability is affected by changes over time in citizens' attitudes to economic and cultural issues and shifts in the relative salience of those issues. We examine the contribution these developments make to declining support for mainstream center-left and center-right coalitions and increasing support for coalitions underpinning radical-right and Green parties.
What has caused the marked, cross-national, and unprecedented trends in European electoral results in the 21st century? Scholarly explanations include social structure and challenger party entrepreneurship. We argue that these electoral changes more proximally result from public issue salience, which results from societal trends and mainly affects rather than is caused by party agenda setting. We use aggregate-level panel data across 28 European countries to show that the public issue salience of three issues—unemployment, immigration, and the environment—is associated with later variation in the results of the conservative, social democrat, liberal, radical right, radical left, and green party families in theoretically expected directions, while the party system issue agenda has weaker associations. Public issue salience, in turn, is rooted in societal trends (unemployment rates, immigration rates and temperature anomalies), and, in some cases, party agenda setting. We validate our mechanism at the individual-level across 28 European countries and using UK panel data. Our findings have implications for our understanding of the agency of parties, the permanency of recent electoral changes, and how voters reconcile their social and political worlds.
What makes immigration a salient issue among Latinos? We focus on immigration – one of the most pressing issues facing the United States (US) – and evaluate the factors that motivate immigration salience among Latinos over several election cycles. Although immigration policy has been linked with the Latino electorate over the period of our study due to high foreign-born rates and mixed-status families within this community, immigration policy has actually not been the dominant issue for the majority of Latino voters over this time period. Using survey responses from the 2008, 2012 and 2016 elections, we test multiple theories of issue salience by exploring social, political and individual determinants of policy salience among Latino voters. We find that in addition to nativity, consumption of ethnic media and group identity are associated with reporting immigration as a salient issue. These findings provide a valuable addition to literature of public opinion on immigration and the origins of policy issue salience among ethno-racial minorities in the US.
Political participation and party attachment in Western democracies have become more and more volatile. In turn, political campaigns seem increasingly dependent on short-term discursive windows of opportunity opened by dynamic debates on issues such as migration, climate, employment and economic policies. Based on panel data from nine European countries, we investigate how patterns and changes in the materialist and postmaterialist concerns of respondents affect electoral turnout and party switching. By relating these variables, we aim to uncover whether and to what extent underlying concerns – and thus short-term politicization – account for short-term patterns of electoral volatility. We pay special attention to young respondents, who are often framed as being particularly dynamic and less bound to traditional political loyalties. Our findings offer insights into short-term change in discursive opportunities for political mobilization and broader democratic engagement.
This article analyzes how niche parties may utilize a strategy of policy shifting to garner additional voters. It leverages a unique opportunity in which a Costa Rican political party released two different versions of its party manifesto at different moments during a single election cycle. This rare opportunity uncovers how the party shifted from having a hard conservative stance on social issues, such as abortion, to moderating its stance and centering its focus on less contentious issues in a runoff election campaign. Understanding how a single political party may alter its strategy is important because it allows us to better gauge the effectiveness of shifting policy positions, especially for niche parties, for which a particular issue area is dominant. Moreover, this analysis opens additional avenues of research on political parties in the Latin American context, since research utilizing manifesto data in this context has been limited.
Why do politicians and policymakers not prioritize pro-immigration reforms, even when public opinion on the issue is positive? This research note examines one previously overlooked explanation related to the systematically greater importance of immigration as a political issue among those who oppose it relative to those who support it. To provide a comprehensive empirical assessment of how personal immigration issue importance is related to policy preferences, I use the best available cross-national and longitudinal surveys from multiple immigrant-receiving contexts. I find that compared to pro-immigration voters, anti-immigration voters feel stronger about the issue and are more likely to consider it as both personally and nationally important. This finding holds across virtually all observed countries, years, and alternative survey measures of immigration preferences and their importance. Overall, these results suggest that public attitudes toward immigration exhibit a substantial issue importance asymmetry that systematically advantages anti-immigration causes when the issue is more contextually salient.
This article examines how challenger parties enter the political arena and the effect of this entry by looking at the Italian 5 Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle – M5S). We explain the M5S's entry strategy in 2013 using the spatial approach to party competition and employing expert survey data collected for each national election between 2008 and 2018. These data allow us to analyse the changing spatial configuration of Italian politics due to the increasing salience of pro/anti-EU and pro/anti-immigration dimensions. We then apply the theoretical notion of the uncovered set (UCS) to trace how the M5S's entry reshaped the overall space of party competition, causing a realignment of existing parties. This work contributes to the ongoing debate on the electoral success of challenger parties and the emerging cleavages and polarization of party systems in Western European countries.
This chapter offers a new theory about the conditions under which gender quotas are most likely to matter for policy outcomes. Building on Mansbridge’s concept of “uncrystallized interests”, I argue that when new policy demands cut across the main left-right (class-based) policy dimension, and the group demanding change faces high barriers to entry in politics, the result is that these issues are often ignored. Parties have little incentive to address issues that cut across the main left-right dimension in politics because they distract from core issues and divide key constituencies. If the groups that support these issues are underrepresented in parties and lack the resources to form a new party, the result is what I call a political market failure -- the issue remains off the agenda. Gender quotas prevent the political dominance of men, and they also signal a new commitment to gender-related concerns. I suggest that quotas are most likely to lead to policy change on those “uncrystallized” issues characterized by: 1) a gender gap in preferences, and; 2) cross-cutting support. The chapter then spells out three main mechanisms through which quotas lead to policy change: factions, ministers, and salience. The final section outlines key assumptions and scope conditions.
This chapter grounds the manuscript’s argument in debates about persisting inequalities in participation and representation. It starts with an overview of collective action in the United States. It describes how American colonists united in collective action events like the Boston Tea Party to demand representation in the British Parliament and how those efforts led to the Declaration of Independence and the First Amendment to the US Constitution, which proclaim the legitimacy and right of protest.
Next, the chapter provides definitions for protest, collective action, resource disparities, and protest costs. The chapter also describes differences in protest costs for groups of different resource capacities. It discusses why legislators might be responsive to protest efforts, particularly those by lower-resource groups. Finally, the chapter describes how the book will develop the central argument that legislators are most likely to support the protest demands of politically marginalized groups.
This chapter presents a theory of costly protest and legislative behavior. The theory contributes to a growing literature on legislators’ responsiveness to collective action demands. It answers an open question: are the groups with the most to gain from representation the most likely to benefit legislatively from protest efforts?
The theory suggests that it is not only likely but strategic for legislators to more frequently support the interests of protesters than non-protesters. The strategic representation of protest goals is especially likely when protesters have fewer resources to engage in collective action. Legislators’ greater support of low-resource groups relative to high-resource groups occurs because costly protest is a stronger indication of protesters’ intense desire for representation. Groups with lower resources can only protest when issue salience is high. Conversely, high-resource groups can protest regardless of their issue salience. Any legislator who ignores salient collective action demands risks electoral participation that could jeopardize their reelection.
This chapter relies on the Dynamics of Collective Action (DCA) dataset to empirically test the claim that legislators are more likely to represent costlier protest. Gause limits the analyses to protests reported in the New York Times from 1991 through 1995. This period avoids notable social movement activity and enables a more straightforward, albeit conservative, analysis.
Gause only assesses Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties protest demands. This issue area embraces civil rights issues relating to abortion, hate crimes, the First Amendment, education, affirmative action, and immigration. It also covers discrimination based on gender, age, sex, sexuality, race, and religion.
Gause finds that the issues protesters raise vary with protesters’ resource capacities. The results also show that legislators are more likely to support issues raised during protests than those not raised during protest. Further, the likelihood of legislative support increases with protest costs. The results hold even while considering other salience measures: protest’s size, media attention, and disruptiveness. Finally, placebo tests suggest that the findings are unlikely to be spurious.