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Some teachers and teacher educators take on quite significant leadership roles, such as serving as a new president of a teacher association in Thailand, but all teachers exhibit leadership in some way. It may be relatively small-scale, such as attempting to decolonize the curriculum in one program in Colombia or establishing a collaborative teacher research group in a school in Botswana. Diverse teacher leadership possibilities such as these are represented in the cases in this chapter.
Chapters 8 and 9 recount group interactions during the final three island times, leading to RA’s deliberate dissolution and reorganization. Unlike previous chapters, these chapters use a first-person, present-tense narrative to closely examine management issues and group dynamics during the last RA meetings and to reaffirm findings presented earlier in the book. Throughout these meetings, RA struggled to manage the transition from a close-knit group of friends to a formalized organization while retaining its foundational social practices, idioculture, and relationships. The group underwent a secularization process and became polarized over future directions. These chapters depict a group grappling with powerful sociological forces in tension with one another and trying to maintain effective collaboration and decision-making as the conditions for effective group decision-making eroded. Ultimately, RA lost its adaptive capacity and became stuck in a resilient yet undesirable state, leading to the decision to disband and seek new pathways to transformation. My own role in RA also comes to the foreground when during pivotal moments of interaction group leaders asked me to provide guidance based on my research, which consequently shaped their decisions and RA’s future.
Chapter 16 provides an analysis of an important passage in Simplicius’ Commentary on Epictetus’ Manual. What functions can the (true) philosopher have in political and social life? Simplicius answers this question as concerning either a state or city which is good or one which is evil. In general, the philosopher should look to the moral wellbeing of others, seeking to ‘humanize’ them (i.e., to promote the virtues, the political virtues, of a good human being). With this in view, in a good state the philosopher will assume leadership functions, as described in Plato’s concept of political science. In a morally corrupt state there will be no place for the philosopher in politics. To preserve his integrity, the philosopher may have to go into exile, as Epictetus did, and Simplicius himself. Or if exile is not possible, the philosopher will try to act in a more limited (probably domestic) sphere, but without compromise.
This chapter explores the interactions of high-level Chinese and North Korean leaders. It argues that the actions of Chinese and North Korean leaders – especially Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung – were critical to building political order in the PRC and the DPRK. It shows how the utterances and actions of these leaders were particularly influential in shaping popular emotions and establishing the legitimacy of the PRC and DPRK.
Chapters 8 and 9 recount group interactions during the final three island times, leading to RA’s deliberate dissolution and reorganization. Unlike previous chapters, these chapters use a first-person, present-tense narrative to closely examine management issues and group dynamics during the last RA meetings and to reaffirm findings presented earlier in the book. Throughout these meetings, RA struggled to manage the transition from a close-knit group of friends to a formalized organization while retaining its foundational social practices, idioculture, and relationships. The group underwent a secularization process and became polarized over future directions. These chapters depict a group grappling with powerful sociological forces in tension with one another and trying to maintain effective collaboration and decision-making as the conditions for effective group decision-making eroded. Ultimately, RA lost its adaptive capacity and became stuck in a resilient yet undesirable state, leading to the decision to disband and seek new pathways to transformation. My own role in RA also comes to the foreground when during pivotal moments of interaction group leaders asked me to provide guidance based on my research, which consequently shaped their decisions and RA’s future.
This article reconstructs the coming about of the 750 billion EU Covid Recovery Fund. We provide an embedded process‐tracing analysis of the dynamics from mid‐March 2020, when the idea of ‘Corona‐bonds’ was parachuted onto the Heads’ Agenda, up until the ‘historic’ deal on the Multiannual Financial Framework and Recovery Fund of 21 July. Where most media accounts and scholarly assessments focus on the high‐level deal making between political leaders, we trace the proceedings inside the EU's institutional machinery, which produced the solutions and laid out the groundwork for a deal. The reconstruction assesses the role and influence of the EU institutions – the European Commission in particular – in producing this major step. We show that the process was characterized by a handicapped European Council, which hampered the ability of member states to oversee and control developments. The conclusions discuss the implications of our findings for our understanding of (institutional) leadership and policy making during crisis.
This article contributes to our understanding of the formation of policy networks. Research suggests that organisations collaborate with those that are perceived to be influential in order to access scarce political resources. Other studies show that organisations prefer to interact with those that share core policy beliefs on the basis of trust. This article seeks to develop new analytical tools for testing these alternative hypotheses. First, it measures whether perceptions of reputational leadership affect the likelihood of an organisation being the target or instigator of collaboration with others. Second, it tests whether the degree of preference similarity between two organisations makes them more or less likely to collaborate. The article adopts a mixed‐methods approach, combining exponential random graph models (ERGM) with qualitative interviews, to analyse and explain organisational collaboration around United Kingdom banking reform. It is found that reputational leadership and preference similarity exert a strong, positive and complementary effect on network formation. In particular, leadership is significant whether this is measured as an organisational attribute or as an individually held perception. Evidence is also found of closed or clique‐like network structures, and heterophily effects based on organisational type. These results offer significant new insights into the formation of policy networks in the banking sector and the drivers of collaboration between financial organisations.
When individuals are confronted with information about why and where gender quotas should apply, does it affect their attitudes? A growing literature argues that information affects opinions on gender equality, but so far there is more consensus on who supports such policies than on what type of information convinces those on the fence. Using a survey experiment fielded among Norwegian citizens and elected representatives, we examine the potential of new rationales and different areas of application to find out what makes (some) people more supportive of gender quotas. Overall, we find that citizens are more affected by moral arguments than elected representatives. Among citizens, we find that emphasizing women's distinct insights boosts support among those with less fixed opinions, and that a talent framing hinting at women as an untapped resource might cause the opposite reaction. Representatives are affected by information about where gender quotas apply, as they are particularly sensitive to information on gender quotas in politics. Quite unexpectedly, we find that those on the right are more supportive of gender quotas in the leadership of religious institutions than elsewhere, and that this seems to be driven at least partly by scepticism against migrants.
Civil society leadership training programmes are a new phenomenon, and they are often overlooked by civil society scholarship despite being linked to the professionalisation of the sector. In this article, we examine 14 Swedish leadership programmes in order to identify leadership ideals in the sector. Drawing on the notion of ‘symbolic boundaries’, we argue that leadership programmes produce horizontal boundaries in relation to other societal sectors and vertical boundaries between leaders of the sector and other members. Together, these symbolic boundaries form a leadership ideal that detaches leaders from their organisation and internal democratic processes, instead depicting leadership as a question of personal characteristics and values. Leaders in the sector need to be authentic and to anchor their leadership in the personal values they hold. Theoretically, our analytical model may prove useful in the study of other empirical phenomena in civil society.
There is little doubt that the European Central Bank (ECB), and in particular its presidency, has taken the lead in tackling the euro crisis. But can this leadership be also characterised as charismatic? This article answers the question by focusing on language – a key component as well as a reliable indicator of charisma. By means of a software‐assisted content analysis of the entire corpus of ECB presidential speeches, it is found that the crisis has indeed led to the emergence of the Bank's presidency as a charismatic euro leader. This in turn confirms the recent politicisation of the ECB, but at the same time might be seen as mitigating the problems related to the Bank's democratic deficit, to the extent that charisma can be seen, from a Weberian standpoint, as an alternative source of political legitimacy.
Governments led by technocrats remain a nebulous category in political science literature, with little clarity about how they differ from party governments, how many have existed and how we can differentiate between them. This article aims to provide that conceptual and empirical clarity. Having proposed an ideal type definition of ‘technocratic government’, it sets out three conditions for an operational definition of a ‘technocrat’ and, on that basis, lists the 24 technocrat‐led governments that have existed in 27 European Union (EU) democracies from the end of the Second World War until June 2013. It then classifies these according to their partisan/technocrat composition and remit. This allows for the presentation of a typology of four different types of technocrat‐led governments and the definition of ‘full technocratic governments’ as those which contain a majority of technocrats and – unlike caretaker governments – have the capacity to change the status quo. The article concludes that full technocratic governments remain extremely rare in EU democracies since there have been only six cases – of which three have occurred in the last decade.
This paper reports on a case study of collective coproduction in an Australian community-based disaster risk management (CBDRM) project called “Be Ready Warrandyte”. The first goal of the case study was to understand what interactions and power-sharing between citizens and government “looked and felt like” in a significant example of community-led CBDRM in an Australian context. Its second, broader goal was to test the extent to which foundational coproduction theory, specifically four conditions proposed by Elinor Ostrom for enabling coproduction that is more effective than either government or citizen production alone, can explain the citizen-government interactions, roles and contributions that enable successful community-led CBDRM. The study confirms that each of the four conditions—complementarity, authority, incentives and credible commitment—also apply to community-led as well as government-led initiatives. It reinforces the central importance of complementarity for avoiding offloading of risk, responsibility and cost to citizens from government, while also suggesting that specific sources of internal and external authority, incentives, and credible commitment are especially important when coproduction is community-led. It identifies leadership and its impacts on government-citizen relationships and power-sharing in coproduction as an important area that needs further research.
Observers of the European Union (EU) agree that it suffers from a leadership crisis. However, diagnoses of the precise nature of this crisis vary: some lament the lack of strong, visionary leaders, while others argue that the EU suffers from too much elite leadership. This article takes issue with both diagnoses and argues that the root of Europe’s leadership crisis lies in the misfit between the nature of EU leadership and the legitimating logic it is rooted in. All leadership implies inequality and therefore requires solid justification especially in the democratic European context. However, at the European level, the vectors of legitimacy that provide such justification are weak and contradictory, thereby tempting leaders to overstep the level of justification bestowed on them. Making use of ideological and identity leadership may help European leaders overcome the misfit between leadership and legitimacy that lies at the root of the leadership crisis.
Each year thousands of immigrants and refugees begin their lives in new places, speaking new languages, and facing new challenges. Challenges include access to health/mental care, education, transportation, and employment. Researchers and practitioners frequently focus on challenges of newcomers and their deficits in meeting needs for self-sufficiency. This study explores newcomers’ giving back and emphasizes an untapped reservoir of strength and capacity. Based on qualitative semi-structured interviews with 54 immigrants and refugees, themes identified include (1) a desire to maintain ethnic identity and connection; (2) ethnic community as an extension of family; (3) a sense of duty and obligation; and (4) measure of achieved success. Researchers and practitioners should shift their view to recognize the strengths and capacities of newcomers who give back to their communities.
In this paper, we apply the established ‘neo-contingency approach’ from organizational theory into the field of community-led social ventures which, by necessity, have to be embedded within their local community context in order to achieve their social mission. Through our analysis of three heterogeneous case studies from around rural Japan, we show how the external environment and contingencies affect leadership style and the pattern of social capital, influencing the type of community development apparent in each setting. We propose that local contingencies, such as external environment, leadership and social capital, play a role in influencing organizational culture in community-led social ventures and, indeed, the form that the social venture takes. We conclude by arguing that if the neo-contingency approach is to fulfil its potential then further theoretical and conceptual development is required.
Even more so than the United States, the European Union (EU) marks a classic case of an ‘anti-leadership environment’ designed to hinder rather than facilitate political leadership. While there have been, nevertheless, manifestations of leadership since the very beginning of European integration, the enigmatic features of leadership at the European level, and the specific difficulties in getting hold of the subject, have limited more systematic political research in this field. This article seeks to relate some of the perennial questions of political leadership research to the study of transnational European governance. Such an inquiry suggests that, in light of the recent changes in the conceptualization of leadership to be found in the wider literature, the empirical features of collective and dispersed leadership in the EU have gradually lost their peculiarity. This notwithstanding, the EU continues to have both a leadership and a followership problem, and the challenges ahead are unlikely to be overcome by institutional adaptation and reform alone.
That effective leadership is crucial during global emergencies is uncontested. However what that leadership looks like, and how it plays out in different contexts is less straightforward. In representative democracy, diversity is considered to be a key element for true representation of the society. In addition, previous research has unequivocally demonstrated the positive impacts of gender equality in leadership. The COVID-19 pandemic has laid bare some of the real world implications of gender inequalities in the leadership context. In this article, we examine the differential impacts of COVID-19 on women, and reflect on potential pathways for women's active participation.
A trans-Atlantic panel of social scientists addresses the question of what social science might offer the new President of the United States in various areas of policy and government action. Andrew Rudalevige's analysis of the scholarship on managing the presidency leads him to state that ‘most of the major happenings of the Bush years were essentially administrative in nature. That is likely to continue. Thus, how and whether presidents achieve the sort of advice and responsiveness they desire from the bureaucracy has important implications not only for the kinds of policy the government implements, but for assessing democratic governance itself’. George Edwards examines presidential strategies for government with the conclusion that ‘Social science shows us that there is no silver bullet’ when a president is trying to obtain the support of the public or Congress. Jenel Virden points out that in 2008 women turned out to vote more than men, voted for Obama more than men, and were strongly hopeful that under the new administration prospects would improve. Having engaged so successfully with this sector of the population, the Obama administration is under pressure to recognize and address its needs. Robert Singh points out that there are necessary reservations about the utility of social science in informing an Obama foreign policy, but nonetheless elaborates propositions and principles that could usefully frame the administration's approach. Dilys Hill provides an overview and draws the debate to a close. The discussion in these pages is based on the 2009 Academy of Social Sciences annual debate, convened by Philip Davies and hosted by the Eccles Centre for American Studies at the British Library (Davies et al, 2009).
Three models of leadership in voluntary associations have been proposed in the literature: democratic leadership, oligarchy, and leadership by default. Through an intensive case study of leadership structure, differences in the attitudes of members and leaders at three hierarchical levels, and differences between the attitudes and behaviors of aspirants and nonaspirants to leadership in a women’s service association, this article examines the degree of fit between these models and a specific organization. Data is drawn from questionnaires, annual reports, and interviews. The results fail to conform to any of the existing models, suggesting instead a fourth model, leadership for self-development—in which leaders are motivated primarily by a desire to develop administrative and interpersonal skills.
What factors explain the persistence of emotion in public policy? Applying the multiple streams framework, it is hypothesised in this article that the more intense the fear and the longer it persists under high salience, task unfamiliarity and complexity, and inconsistent preferences, the less likely it is for policy to change. The study examines the Greek attempt to block international recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (1990–1993) and finds the power to build coalitions through emotional arousal that in the short run helps reframe losses and paradoxically undermines political support in the long run. Illuminating the emotional endowment effect within the logic of appropriateness, the article concludes that policy is made under certain conditions on the basis of validating emotions.