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The loss of community is often seen as one of the reasons for the alienating experience of modernity. Community seems to allow for a civic-minded solidarity that counteracts the legitimation crisis of democracy by returning agency to citizens. Such a demand for a communitarian correction to liberal constitutional democracy is not without dangers, even when this demand is intended to stand in the service of a more democratic life. This chapter traces the fate of this communitarian desire in a broader transatlantic field, highlighting the uncanny connections among the philosophical debate about communitarianism, the antidemocratic and authoritarian drift in American conservative political and legal thought, and central aspects of European neofascism. These connections should make us suspicious about the democratic potential often ascribed to community. The ease with which arguments for a communitarian correction of democracy can be used against democracy suggests that community lacks an intrinsically democratic and emancipatory potential.
The conclusion unifies the book’s central theme: Mental models shape how people evaluate trade-offs, process information, and choose policies. Those with the Economist Mental Model systematically weigh costs and benefits, integrate new evidence, and ultimately favor measures that maximize aggregate welfare – even if such policies require short-term sacrifices. In contrast, those with Alternative Mental Models rely on different heuristics, often supporting short-term, populist policies that can undermine long-term prosperity. Across policy areas ranging from Brexit to AI, individuals who think like economists prove more receptive to economic information and less swayed by zero-sum narratives. Yet, these findings highlight a demographic skew in economic knowledge, skewing older, educated, wealthier, and male. The conclusion stresses the urgency of democratizing economic reasoning, showing that targeted interventions can broaden its reach. Ultimately, empowering diverse populations to think more like economists holds promise for forging consensus around policies that balance immediate concerns with long-term gains.
Chapter 4 investigates how mental models, particularly the Economist Mental Model (EMM), shape Italians’ support for globalization policies: EU membership, free trade, and immigration. Against a backdrop of economic stagnation and rising populism, the chapter shows that individuals with higher economic knowledge – those who think like economists – are significantly more likely to favor these welfare-enhancing policies. Notably, this holds even for “losers” of globalization in terms of lower income, lower education, or routine jobs, suggesting that economic reasoning can override short-term self-interest. The chapter also explores time preferences, finding that EMM adopters have lower subjective discount rates, making them more apt to weigh long-term gains over immediate costs. Additional tests confirm these findings are not driven by general education, highlighting the distinctive role of economic reasoning in shaping attitudes toward globalization.
Chapter 6 examines zero-sum thinking (ZST) – the idea that one party’s gain must be another’s loss – and contrasts it with the Economist Mental Model (EMM), which recognizes that economic interactions can be positive-sum. Historically adaptive in static, resource-scarce settings, ZST becomes counterproductive in modern, dynamic economies built on cooperation and specialization. Using survey data from the US, the chapter differentiates between generic ZST (a broad tendency to see life as win-lose) and policy-specific ZST, which can reveal partisan divides. Democrats often display zero-sum views about redistribution, whereas Republicans do so regarding immigration or trade. Crucially, people with higher economic knowledge – those more aligned with the EMM – show markedly lower generic ZST and are less inclined toward protectionist policies than those with lower economic knowledge – aligned with Alternative Mental Models (AMMs).
In 2011, Italy narrowly avoided financial collapse, prompting the formation of a technocratic government tasked with enacting sweeping reforms. Although these measures stabilized public finances, they drew fierce opposition and highlighted a broader pattern of public skepticism toward expert advice. Similar dynamics unfolded during the 2016 Brexit referendum, when voters dismissed economic forecasts, and in Donald Trump’s election, where nationalist rhetoric overshadowed warnings on protectionism. These events highlight a persistent gap between how economists and the general public evaluate policy trade-offs, often producing outcomes economists view as welfare-reducing. This book explores how mental models, particularly the Economist Mental Model (EMM), shape individual political decisions and explains why populist solutions gain traction despite longer-term harms. Through diverse cases – from Brexit and US protectionism to price controls – it argues that wider adoption of the EMM could enhance support for welfare-enhancing policies, a crucial insight in an era of heightened populist sentiment.
Parliament is the central institution of UK democracy. It is both a representative body, reflecting the diverse views of the nation, and its senior decision-making forum. In the years after the Brexit referendum, when both the public and the governing party were deeply divided, Parliament struggled to navigate these representative and decision-making roles. The arguments, both inside Parliament and about Parliament’s role, were frequently heated and controversial. Many Brexiteers had argued in favour of boosting Parliament’s sovereignty, and yet the institution emerged battered and bruised from the process – having been repeatedly maligned, shut down by a Prime Minister and reinstated by the Supreme Court, and described as ‘broken’ on the opening page of the 2019 Conservative manifesto. This chapter explores how such contradictions came about. It concludes that the blame laid at Parliament’s door by campaigners, journalists and politicians was often unfair, and damaging of public trust. The Brexit process left much rebuilding to be done.
The concluding chapter summarizes the book’s arguments and findings and discusses their implications. Whether we seek to understand the electoral viability of illiberal forces or their behavior in power, the legacies of critical junctures of market reform remain pivotal. Crucially, as institutional developments entail the interplay between historical legacy and human agency, illiberal outcomes unfold in the probabilistic shadow of prior neoliberal deepening. The chapter closes with a discussion of (1) the study’s contributions to research in the tradition of Karl Polanyi; (2) the social bases and neoliberal adaptations of illiberal incumbents; (3) the legacies of Eastern Europe’s transition to democracy and the market; and (4) the crisis of liberalism and the Left. Although intense market reforms have failed to produce democratic stability and illiberals have kept finding ways to opportunistically exploit neoliberalism to their own advantage, the book ends on an optimistic note. Far from inevitable, the illiberal challenge can be countered – and democracies strengthened – if forward-thinking political agents learn from past experiences and progressive examples, build parties around new ethical principles, and focus on delivering economic well-being to broad social coalitions.
Chapter 7 further develops the study’s critical juncture framework and justifies its extension to cases in South America. Drawing lessons from Eastern Europe, I begin by distinguishing between varying illiberal tendencies in Slovakia and Poland, based on which I offer new theoretical insights. As I elaborate sequences linking (1) illiberals’ divergent ability to be politically dominant back to whether neoliberal reform agents were social democrats or polarizing populists, and (2) contestatory versus moderate tendencies back to whether or not anti-neoliberal protest was institutionalized during critical periods of early market reform, I elaborate the argument about the durable effects of contingency associated with postcommunist junctures. I then make the case for applying the refined framework to South American cases. Here, I note some blind spots in scholarship on Latin American populism and highlight important commonalities between dynamics in Eastern Europe and the Andes. Next, I review the advantages of analyzing developments in Ecuador and Peru from a comparative perspective that is sensitive to both cross- regional and intra-regional patterns of similarity and difference. Ending with a discussion of the insufficiency of standard explanations of illiberal trends, the chapter sets the stage for the paired comparison that follows.
Chapter 1 introduces the study’s core puzzle and overall logic of inquiry. It discusses main themes, locates arguments relative to relevant scholarship, and establishes the analytical framework. Early in the chapter, the puzzle of varying illiberal electoral outcomes is presented and contextualized. Captured by two distinct yet related indicators – illiberal voting and post-neoliberal populist magnitude – illiberal electoral outcomes not only varied persistently across countries but also signaled the high salience of economic issues in postcommunist Europe. The next section establishes the rationale for explaining outcomes by drawing insights from Latin America – another semi-peripheral space that experienced consequential neoliberal junctures. Having argued, based on key economic and political parallels between the two regions, that a critical juncture approach is appropriate also for making sense of developments in Eastern Europe, I spell out the work’s central propositions and highlight theoretical, methodological, and empirical contributions. The final sections discuss matters of research design and evidence – namely, the mixed method approach, case studies, and quantitative and qualitative data, including 100 interviews – as well as the book’s organization.
Chapter 5 examines path dependencies in Slovakia and Poland, where postcommunist junctures produced powerful illiberal reactions in the 2000–20 period. It does so by unpacking political and societal dynamics and emphasizing how illiberal forces reaped considerable electoral benefits. In both countries, mainstream leftist parties embraced the neoliberal agenda and (eventually) failed, with many of their former supporters becoming available for subsequent populist mobilization. As the Left’s failures occurred amid the rising salience of economic concerns, adaptive illiberals gained at the ballot box. While it stresses key similarities in terms of the core mechanism linking postcommunist junctures and illiberal electoral outcomes, the chapter also identifies important distinctions between reactive sequences in Slovakia and Poland. Indeed, bait-and-switch tactics may have defined junctures in both cases, but political configurations featured more nuanced distinctions specifically in terms of agency, which, in turn, conditioned important differences between illiberals in the two countries. Overall, whereas the patterns of similarity substantiate the book’s core theory linking early market reform legacies and illiberal electoral outcomes, the differences suggest that the critical juncture framework can be further refined – to which I return in the book's final part.
Recent populist waves raise crucial questions about why economically harmful policies such as tariffs, Brexit, or immigration restrictions gain popular support. Conventional explanations focus on economic self-interest or cultural values; however, Beatrice Magistro's Who Thinks Like an Economist argues that the puzzle lies in how voters think. She introduces the innovative Economist Mental Model (EMM), which predicts attitudes toward trade, immigration, AI, and more. She explains that those adopting the Economist Mental Model are more likely to favor welfare-enhancing policies and prioritize cost-benefit information over partisan cues, while individuals with Alternative Mental Models (AMMs) show limited responsiveness to economic information and tend to support policies promising short-term relief at the expense of long-term welfare. Drawing on surveys and experiments in Italy, the UK, and the U.S., Magistro offers an indispensable guide for scholars and policymakers seeking to understand—and counter— the appeal of populist policies that ultimately harm society.
Rousseau and Heidegger’s critiques of the modern commercial city, as well as their valorization of rural life, speak to problems of urban–rural polarization and rural alienation. This article disentangles Rousseau’s rural political vision which promotes agrarianism in service of egalitarian republicanism from that of Heidegger, which seeks to radically overcome the “uprootedness” of post-Enlightenment civilization by reconnecting the Volk to its primordial rootedness-in-the-soil of the fatherland. It proceeds by (1) comparing their critiques of the modern commercial city, (2) reconstructing their plans for rural political renewal, and (3) identifying the roots of their differences in competing understandings of “Being,” “nature,” and “history.” It concludes that Rousseau’s more nuanced evaluation of agrarianism, which better comprehends both the limits and possibilities of rural life, serves as a valuable corrective to Heidegger by providing a vision of rural politics that challenges but nevertheless proves more amenable to compromise with increasingly urbanized liberal democracies.
Binio S. Binev's book offers an innovative interpretation of the relationship between economic liberalism and political illiberalism in contemporary Eastern Europe and Latin America. Focusing primarily on the former region, he emphasizes linkages between the legacies of early market reform and the adaptive strategies of subsequent populists. By integrating elements of path dependency and human agency, this book advances a distinctive explanation of illiberals' electoral viability and behavior in power. It uses both quantitative analysis of region-wide patterns and in-depth case studies informed by interviews from fieldwork in both regions to offer a comprehensive and nuanced perspective on the long-term effects of building capitalism, the political Left, and the persistent appeal of populist forces after the end of communism. It also identifies intriguing cross-regional parallels connecting early market reforms, societal reactions to neoliberalism, and illiberals' prospects of dominating politics and contesting democracy.
Spatial inequalities in human capital are reshaping the politics of high-income democracies. However, comparative research on the political consequences of spatial inequality is constrained by a lack of data that is geographically detailed and cross-nationally comparable. This letter introduces the Regional Human Capital Database (RHCD), an open-access dataset covering 60,000 units in twenty wealthy democracies from the 1980s onward. The RHCD offers disaggregated data on educational attainment, demographics, urban structure, and voting, enabling analysis of within-region variation with unprecedented precision. We explain the construction of the dataset, including extensive checks to ensure reliability and validity. Our analysis demonstrates its value by showing growing urban–rural divides in educational attainment across countries with differing institutions and links between human capital and populist-right voting even within economically dynamic cities. The RHCD advances comparative research on the spatial dimensions of political change, offering a vital resource for scholars across political science and beyond.
This Element addresses the illiberal challenge facing public administration amidst the rise of authoritarian populism and democratic backsliding. It investigates how populist governments seek to reshape state bureaucracies, often undermining liberal democratic principles such as pluralism, expertise, and constitutional safeguards, and examines how public administration must respond to safeguard democratic integrity. Drawing on global examples, the Element identifies strategies of populist administrative manipulation, patterns of bureaucratic compliance and resistance, and critical gaps in scholarly understanding. It develops a framework for analyzing these dynamics and proposes normative principles to defend active democratic bureaucracy. Through theoretical inquiry and practical recommendations, it advocates for robust, ethically grounded public administration capable of countering illiberal pressures. Its central thesis underscores the need to restore the intellectual foundation of public administration as a social science deeply embedded in and committed to the democratic policy process. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Populism has become generally equated with far-right politics in public discourse. Beyond this association being widely problematised in much of the literature on populism, in this theoretical intervention, we argue that the populist label is ill-fitting for far-right politics for three reasons. First, any antagonism of ‘the people’ against ‘the elite’ is only secondary, at best, for the far right. Second, while populism constructs an anti-elitist crisis of the system, the far right constructs a crisis in the system, seeking to (re-)entrench elite rule and systems of oppression. Third, populism transgresses hegemonic political norms by making a novel political subject visible, whereas the far right attempts to extend the privilege of its already privileged voting base. As such, we argue that we should abandon the ‘populist’ signifier to refer to reactionary politics and instead rely on more precise, but also more stigmatising signifiers such as far/radical/extreme right for projects of reactionary people-building. Whereas populism builds a coalition through equivalential links between the demands of ‘the people’, such demands are of little concern for reactionary elites. Instead, ‘the people’ are constructed to lend legitimacy to their elitist project. While there are clear risks in attempting to reclaim the concept considering its quasi-hegemonic misuse, we argue that the emancipatory potential of populism makes it worthy of serious investigation in our demophobic and authoritarian times.
This paper critically examines the concept of populism, challenging the predominant ideological definition by highlighting the importance of political relations between populist actors and elites. It argues that populism should be conceptualized as a political phenomenon characterized by conflict with dominant elites, rather than solely as a set of ideas centered on ‘the people’ and ‘elites’. Through a comparative analysis of four politicians – Tony Blair, Emmanuel Macron, Jeremy Corbyn, and Jean-Luc Mélenchon – the study demonstrates that although some actors utilize populist rhetoric, their tendency to generate conflict with elites distinguishes populist actors from other uses of populist ideas. The cases empirically demonstrate that ‘softer’ cases of populism indeed do not contain conflict and, thus, according to my approach, are not really populist. Thus, I demonstrate the inclination of ideational definitions to overstretch the concept of populism.
This is a commentary on von Bogdandy’s article ‘On the Meaning and Promise of European Society’. It attempts to outline what an account of European society might look like if it were formulated from a more straightforward Hegelian perspective.
This article introduces theories of populism and empty signifiers to Canadian Indigenous studies. Canadian populist politics may serve to marginalize Indigenous actors and lead them to feel misrepresented within related social movements. These movements commonly develop empty signifiers, which are vague terms that mean different things to different political actors, but help to unite a “people.” Indigenous resistance movements can make strategic use of empty signifiers to build populist or non-populist social movements that challenge colonial institutions. I argue that any such movement would require careful strategizing between Indigenous and other social movements to ensure that Indigenous priorities are not marginalized.
Chapter 5 analyzes contemporary societal transformations through the lens of emerging technologies, political trends, and cultural shifts. It emphasizes how social media and artificial intelligence (AI), especially large language models, are reshaping communication, public perception, and decision-making processes. Social media amplify discontent, promote self-organization, and facilitate both progressive movements and misinformation. A concerning trend is the apparent societal shift from rational, collective discourse toward more intuitive, individualistic, and emotionally driven communication. This is evidenced by linguistic analyses of books, search trends, and journalistic styles. The chapter also explores the effects of neoliberal economic policies, which have fueled inequality and stress, potentially impacting cognitive function and social cohesion. Concurrently, a rise in populism and democratic backsliding is observed, driven by perceived grievances, xenophobia, and manipulation of public opinion. Together, these interconnected developments suggest humanity is at a critical juncture.