In this chapter, I contrast the account of fictionality presented in the previous chapter with Walton’s, whose work was decisive in shaping it. In recent work, he gives up his account of the fictionality of p in a fictional work in terms of prescriptions to imagine emanating from it. He offers examples that allegedly show that a prescription to imagine p in a given work of fiction is not sufficient for the fictionality of p in that work. Both in support and in further elaboration of the constitutive-norms speech-act variation on Walton’s account that was presented in the previous chapter, I critically discuss his objections here. In addition to answering his concerns and developing the account further, this chapter provides additional abductive support for its explanatory virtues vis-à-vis both Walton’s account and Gricean speech-act proposals.

Chapter 3 focuses on language and translation functions by examining pragmatics and its relevance to translation. After a brief introduction to the concept of pragmatics (“doing things with words”), it considers the differences between grammatical/syntactic functions and pragmatic functions; it also addresses speech acts, which are closely related to function and intention, presuppositions (in connection with the idea of information shared by writer and reader) and the non-linguistic context. These notions are discussed in the context of translation and the implications they have for the translator, with multiple examples and practices. The chapter connects with functionalism (the functions of translation) by focusing on the functions of language and how these are formulated differently across languages. It emphasizes that the pragmatic function (what the commissioner intends to “do with their words/text”) guides the choice of words in the target language, rather than the syntactic structure of the source text.

Historical pragmatics studies the use of language in earlier periods and the developments of usage patterns over time. Recent research in this area has increased our understanding of how usage patterns develop, and we have gained insights into a range of pragmatic phenomena at specific times in the history of English. This chapter provides exploratory accounts for each of the traditional periods in the history of English, from Old English up to Present-day English by focusing on those areas within historical pragmatics that have already received sufficient scholarly attention, in particular the use of pragmatic markers, speech acts and the use of politeness. These overview sketches of the individual periods will be linked through an analysis of specific development patterns.

Covers the following theoretical perspectives as they pertain to conversation memory: speech acts, sociolinguistic/conversation analysis, discursive psychology, communication theory, cognitive theory, and collective memory theory.

This chapter introduces the concept of clause type: a syntactic classification of clauses according to the kind of conversational effect (also known as sentential force) they canonically have when used as root sentences. Scholars traditionally identify three major types (interrogatives, declaratives, and imperatives) alongside several minor types. We review different theoretical approaches to clause types, emphasizing two important dimensions that distinguish them: whether they assume classical speech act theory or a version of the dynamic approach to meaning; and how they assume the conversational function of root sentences to arise at the syntax–semantics interface. We then highlight some of the most important morphosyntactic properties of the major clause types. For interrogatives, we discuss polar, wh-, and non-canonical questions. With regard to declaratives, we discuss whether they are in some sense the default type, and what this means for the syntax–semantics interface. In our review of imperatives, we discuss the special properties of their subjects, restrictions on embeddability and on sentential negation, and their verbal morphology.

Percy Shelley’s relationship to the so-called ‘Lake School’ Poets (Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Southey) has long been framed as a narrative of the earlier poets’ broken political commitments and the missed personal and emotional encounters of the ‘second-generation’ Romantic at his later post-revolutionary moment. Enriching the interpretive texture of this account, this chapter understands Shelley’s complex, productive relationship with Wordsworth, in particular, not simply through the charge of apostasy (political falling-away) but as an affective and poetic performance of inter-generational grief. I engage reading methods drawn from speech-act theory, affect studies, sociolinguistics, and deconstruction to show the weird temporalities of Shelley’s major poems addressing Lake Poet disconnection: ‘To Wordsworth’, Peter Bell the Third, and The Witch of Atlas. I conclude that Shelley’s generous lateral conception of unbounded agency opens his thinking up to an enlarged remit for receptive disappointments.

In Chapter 2, we first discuss what we regard as three major pitfalls in the field: (1) following an ethnocentric view of one’s data, (2) uncritically associating values with political actors and entities, and (3) using one’s research to prove a pre-held conviction. We argue that these analytic traps are interrelated and reflect a typically top-down view of political language use. Second, we discuss the three key pragmatic units of expressions, speech acts and discourse in detail. In studying political language use with the aid of these units, it is recommended to look at conventional pragmatic patterns, which allow us to conduct replicable analyses. Further, we argue that political language use can be effectively interpreted if we look at its ritual manifestations. Ritualised political language use imposes a frame on the participants; that is, in many political contexts the rights and obligations of the participants are defined and language is generally used according to such rights and obligations. We finally discuss how our analytic units can be brought together with a contrastive view of language and politics.

In Chapter 4 we discuss the pitfall of associating positive and negative values with political actors, including both individuals such as Trump or Biden, and political entities such as the US and the EU. In our view, such an association is problematic and dangerous because it precludes approaching language and politics in a more neutral way. As a case study, we analyse the transcript of an unofficial tape recording in which representatives of the EU – which is often regarded as a democratic organisation – attempted to prevent the newly established Slovenian and Croatian states from declaring independence following plebiscites. We use strictly linguistic evidence to illustrate the rather undemocratic procedure through which representatives of the EU – who were supposed to be the upholders of democracy – aggressively persuaded Slovenians and Croatians to temporally suspend declaring independence, hence opposing the results of valid plebiscites.

The Introduction is a chapter-length outline of the of the book which does more than simply summarise. Though not exhaustive, it includes both explanation and discussion of the historical context of Brexit and Brexitspeak, combined with a description of the linguistic tools of analysis. The starting point is that without language politics could not happen, so it is essential to understand how language works in general and how it is strategically deployed by politicians. In this chapter populism is discussed as an unwritten ideology best characterised by its demagogic appeal to an idea of ‘the people’ within a nationalist notion of ‘the British people’, at the same time promoting a friend-foe antithesis, stirring up emotion and avoiding reasoned argument. Demagoguery is a little used term in political science but highly relevant to the present state of democracy. Indeed, demagoguery exploits and undermines democracy. It is both an effect and a cause of post-truth politics, where truthfulness and facts are overridden. The final section takes a closer look at the fundamentals of language and language use that are at issue in examining the discourse of Brexit.

Children learn to distinguish registers for different roles: talk as child versus as adult, as girl versus boy, as parent versus child, as teacher, as doctor, marking each “voice” with intonation, vocabulary, and speech acts. They learn to mark gender and status with each role; what counts as polite, how to address different people, how to mark membership in a speech community (e.g., family, school, tennis players, chess players), and how to convey specific goals in conversation. They reply on experts for new word meanings and identify some adults as reliable sources of such information. They mark information as reliable or as second-hand, through use of evidentials. They adapt their speech to each addressee and take into account the common ground relevant to each from as young as 1;6 on. They keep track of what is given and what new, making use of articles (a versus the), and moving from definite noun phrases (new) to pronouns (given). They learn to be persuasive, and persistent, bargaining in their negotiations. They give stage directions in pretend play. And they start to use figurative language. They learn how questions work at school. And they learn how to tell stories.

As children learn more about language, they use it more effectively to achieve their conversational goals. They choose appropriate speech acts, establish joint attention, contribute new information, take up information from others, and take turns. They learn how to enter an exchange among others from as young as age two. Their intrusions in ongoing exchanges typically contain new information. Planning an utterance takes time, and children learn to plan what to say so as to take turns on time. This can be tracked in their answers to yes/no and wh- questions, where they get faster with age. They plan pretend play, assigning roles, assigning actions, and also utterances for each character enacted. They track common ground and design referring expressions for their addressees, and they repeat new words to mark uptake. They distinguish requests from offers, and, on occasion, persist in making repeated requests themselves. They clarify what they mean when asked and offer spontaneous repairs as well. In all this, they track what the others in the exchange say and choose when to enter the exchange themselves.

This chapter discusses a language component that has not received sufficient research attention, that is, pragmatics. The chapter answers socially oriented questions such as How can I make this request politely? and What’s the best way to address this person? The chapter explains how pragmatics knowledge helps learners be aware of the requirements of the larger social context surrounding the language, and understand which grammatical and lexical forms are appropriate and helpful in different social contexts. Different pragmatic knowledge is discussed, that is, sociopragmatics (i.e., knowledge about the context) and pragmalinguistics (i.e., knowledge about specific linguistic forms). In addition, the chapter discusses speech acts, such as requests and compliments, which are used to achieve goals in our daily life by using language appropriately and effectively. The chapter then explains how pragmatics is embedded in our society by discussing illocutionary force and intercultural communicative competence. Finally, the chapter explores different ways of teaching pragmatics.

This chapter traces the fortunes of our modern understanding of ‘belief’ which is deeply informed by its original uses in a religious context. It begins with an account of faith/belief (Greek: pistis) in early Christianity, showing how the primary meanings of the term related to trust rather than intellectual assent. In the medieval period, this social component of faith/belief was formalised in the conception of ‘implicit faith’, which enabled lay believers to affirm abstruse theological doctrines without the requirement of a full intellectual comprehension of what was being affirmed. While it is possible to speak of the propositional content of belief during this period, the identity of the faithful was established more by liturgical practice than assent to doctrinal propositions.

Chapter 9 examines how speech acts associated with ritual can be examined in a replicable way. The chapter makes an argument against ‘identifying’ new so-called ‘ritual speech acts’ ad libitum because such a procedure shuts the door on studying speech acts through which ritual is realised in a replicable way. Instead, it is a more productive practice to identify and describe one’ subject of analysis with the aid of a finite typology of speech acts. The next task is to consider how this speech act is realised in a particular ritual frame. Chapter 9 provides a case study of the ritual phenomenon of ‘admonishing’ in a corpus of ancient Chinese texts. Admonishing represents a ritual realisation type of the Attitudinal speech act category Suggest (do-x)/(not-to-do-x).