This chapter focuses on games with unawareness, where the players may be unaware of some of the choices that others can make. The player’s view specifies the choices in the game that he is aware of. The chapter starts by explaining how a game with unawareness can be viewed as a collection of one-person decision problems. Subsequently, it is shown how belief hierarchies about choices and views can be visualized by means of a beliefs diagram, and mathematically encoded by means of an epistemic model with types. This is used to provide a formal definition of common belief in rationality. It is shown that the choices which are possible under common belief in rationality can be characterized by iterated strict dominance for unawareness. The chapter finally turns to the scenario of fixed beliefs on views, where the players hold some pre-specified beliefs about the opponents’ views.

This chapter focuses on standard games. It starts by explaining how a standard game can be viewed as a collection of one-person decision problems. Subsequently, it is shown how belief hierarchies about choices can be visualized by means of a beliefs diagram, and mathematically encoded by means of an epistemic model with types. This is used to provide a formal definition of common belief in rationality – the central line of reasoning which states that a player believes that others choose rationally, believes that others believe that others choose rationally, and so on. It is shown that the choices which are possible under common belief in rationality can be characterized by the iterated elimination of strictly dominated choices.

This chapter focuses on games with incomplete information, where the players may be uncertain about the utility functions of the other players. It starts by explaining how a game with incomplete information can be viewed as a collection of one-person decision problems. Subsequently, it is shown how belief hierarchies about choices and utility functions can be visualized by means of a beliefs diagram, and mathematically encoded by means of an epistemic model with types. This is used to provide a formal definition of common belief in rationality. It is shown that the choices which are possible under common belief in rationality can be characterized by the generalized iterated strict dominance procedure. The chapter finally turns to the scenario of fixed beliefs on utilities, where the players hold some pre-specified beliefs about the opponents’ utility functions.

Stefanie Markovits’ chapter thinks about counting and accountability, and how they inform literary representations of the military man, one of the most visible of war’s outcomes in mid-Victorian Britain. Markovits reflects on this period as one which saw ‘the rise of statistics as a discipline of social science and a method of statecraft in Britain’, and with it the growing need for accountability in public affairs. The figure of the soldier is both hero and statistic, individual and number, in a period where fiction, philosophy, and popular commentary, were preoccupied with how individuals realised their fully individualised potential. The soldier’s cultural and political potency is enabled because his being is aligned with the numbers that account for him. In the work of Tennyson, Harriet Martineau, and Dickens we see how ‘the mid-century soldier becomes such a potent figure precisely because his “type” aligns so closely with numbers’.

This chapter examines how essayistic personae enabled writers and readers to understand personhood as a means of making a unity out of multiplicity. It draws on Thomas Hobbes’s theory of the person to track how essayistic personae both depicted corporate personhood and themselves served as corporate persons, allowing many writers, real or imagined, to write as one. It also uses Locke’s theory of personhood to show how essayistic personae present conscious persons as contingent unities imposed upon multitudinous thoughts and experiences. Essayistic personae not only extended personhood to non-human beings, such as corporations and animals, they also drew attention to the limited nature of personhood for many human beings, including married women and enslaved people.

This chapter provides details of the different kinds of vaccines available (live, attenuated, killed, inactivated, recombinant, subunit, mRNA, DNA and vector) for virus infections (e.g. SARS-CoV-2, HAV, HBV, influenzaviruses, JEE, measlesvirus, mumpsvirus, rubellavirus, HPV, rabies, polio, rotavirus, smallpox, mpox, yellow fever virus) in humans. It details the routes of administration and usage (e.g. pre-exposure or post-exposure, childhood, occupational health, travel and for at-risk groups).

This chapter looks at the period 1700 to 1820, one of profound change in Ireland as technological advances coupled with social and educational developments deeply influenced the intellectual and literary landscape. In the six and a half centuries since the invention of printing many new technologies affected the creation, distribution, consumption, and enjoyment of printed texts. Innovations and developments in printing, typefounding, papermaking, and marketing contributed to the advance of literary culture. The rise in education from the eighteenth century created an audience for literature in its many forms. Imaginative writing developed and attracted new audiences as literacy expanded among different cohorts. The newspaper provided the most comprehensive medium for the dissemination of information. Literacy was not necessarily a requirement as evidence shows that one newspaper could be shared among readers and read aloud to groups of listeners. Print advertising, an eighteenth-century innovation, increased the market for literary works.

This chapter introduces students to the study of morphology. We look in a preliminary way at the difficulty inherent in defining what we mean by a word and introduce the term morpheme. We introduce the basic concepts of simple versus complex words. Students learn the distinction between word tokens, word types, and lexemes. We end with a brief introduction to the difference between inflection and derivation.

In this chapter, Alfano connects the Nietzschean constructs of instinct, drive, and type. He argues that a drive is a disposition to engage in a characteristic pattern of actions and evaluations. Drives are distinguished from preferences and desires in that preferences and desires aim at outcomes whereas drives aim at activity. As such, drive-motivated behaviors can lead to consequences that the agent does not prefer. Instincts, according to Alfano, are innate drives, but not all drives are instinctual. A person's type, in the Nietzschean framework, is the full constellation of her instincts and other drives. Different people embody different types, which turns out in the next chapter to be crucial to understanding Nietzsche's person-type-relative unity of virtue thesis.

In this chapter, Alfano connects the Nietzschean constructs of instinct, drive, and type. He argues that a drive is a disposition to engage in a characteristic pattern of actions and evaluations. Drives are distinguished from preferences and desires in that preferences and desires aim at outcomes whereas drives aim at activity. As such, drive-motivated behaviors can lead to consequences that the agent does not prefer. Instincts, according to Alfano, are innate drives, but not all drives are instinctual. A person's type, in the Nietzschean framework, is the full constellation of her instincts and other drives. Different people embody different types, which turns out in the next chapter to be crucial to understanding Nietzsche's person-type-relative unity of virtue thesis.