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This chapter provides a critical analysis of the material scope of NIAC and is divided into seven sections. The first explores the material concepts of NIAC pursuant to both CA3 and APII, and explores how the drafters understood these concept and how it has been interpreted in practice. Second, it examines the concept of NIAC contained in Additional Protocol II of 1977, looking at how its distinct identity emerged, as well as its specific material elements. The second section explores some of the legal and operational challenges that arise from the existence of two categories of NIAC, and in particular how the activation of APII can fragment the applicable legal regime, resulting in fluctuating levels of protection during NIAC. The fourth section undertakes a comparative analysis of the material scope and associated threshold of NIAC pursuant to the Tadić definition of NIAC (CA3) and that contained in APII, in order to identify areas of convergence and divergence. The fifth section explores how developments in both customary and conventional IHL applicable during NIAC have influenced its material scope and, in particular, the level of organization armed groups require in order to qualify as a Party to a NIAC. Following from the conclusions of sections four and five, the sixth section assesses the continued relevance of the distinction between CA3 and APII NIACs in practice.
Creative engagement with the Arthurian myth has been prolific in the modern period and shows no sign of abating. This chapter provides a panoramic shot, an overview of how and where the Arthurian myth surfaces in texts in English in Great Britain and Ireland from 1920 to the present. Additionally, it provides close-ups, more detailed readings of selected works that capture the critical concerns of modern artists and their audiences, foregrounding especially trauma and the impacts of war and industrialised culture; expressions of the interconnectedness between all living things, often in response to contextual ecopolitical crises; and human interactions, including tragic relationships and empowering female networks. The discussion breaks materials into broad categories that are loosely determined by form – poetry, prose and drama – and moves between foundational works and newer narratives. Where possible, the discussion foregrounds Arthuriana that has previously received little or no attention, especially works by women.
The twentieth century saw a considerable number of rewritings and adaptations of the Arthurian legend, in as many styles and purposes as there were writers, cultures and national heroes. Two main and sometimes paradoxical tendencies appeared: a quest for a supposedly deeper historical knowledge, and a need to popularise Arthurian themes. As Nazis launched their own quest for the Holy Grail, a subsequent need to re-enchant the world was expressed throughout the century. By adapting medieval texts to insist on their modernity for a contemporary readership, authors, artists and creators insisted on the universal aspects of the Matter of Britain, using it to emphasise the disillusionment in our modern Western societies, or on the contrary to expose the alleged wonders of an immutable human nature. The twentieth century confirmed this wide malleability, as Continental Europe regularly found in King Arthur a symbol of its own preoccupations.
Abraham Lincoln was elected to congress as the solitary Whig congressman from Illinois, and proceeded to join his Whig colleagues in the house of representatives in condemning president Polk's conduct of a war with Mexico, in advocating the use of tariffs, and in abolishing the slave trade in the Distfrict of Columbia. He was only marginally successful in these Endeavors, and the Unpopulrity generated by his Oppoistion to the war in Mexico ended any prospect of a renomination to congress. He attempted to win a patronage appointment from newly-elected president Zachary Taylor, but failed even in that effort. He returned to the; Ractioce of law in Illinois, participating ocasionally in Whig politics, until the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska act rejuventaed his political energies in oppositionm to the extension of slavery into the Kansas and Nebraska territories.
The book offers a critical and comprehensive examination of the concept of NIAC, including its normative foundations, threshold of activation, and corresponding personal, geographical, and temporal scope of applicability under International Humanitarian Law. It identifies and critically examines some of the most controversial aspects of modern NIACs, including notions of a 'global battlefield' and 'forever war' and provides practical guidance on identifying NIACs in real time. It is essential reading for international law academics, students and practitioners. This title is part of the Flip it Open Programme and may also be available open access. Check our website Cambridge Core for details.
Integrating AI into military decision processes on the resort to force raises new moral challenges. A key question is: How can we assign responsibility in cases where AI systems shape the decision-making process on the resort to force? AI systems do not qualify as moral agents, and due to their opaqueness and the “problem of many hands,” responsibility for decisions made by a machine cannot be attributed to any one individual. To address this socio-technical responsibility gap, I suggest establishing “proxy responsibility” relations. Proxy responsibility means that an actor takes responsibility for the decisions made by another actor or synthetic agent who cannot be attributed with responsibility for their decisions. This article discusses the option to integrate an AI oversight body to establish proxy responsibility relations within decision-making processes regarding the resort to force. I argue that integrating an AI oversight body creates the preconditions necessary for attributing proxy responsibility to individuals.
This article investigates the profound impact of artificial intelligence (AI) and big data on political and military deliberations concerning the decision to wage war. By conceptualising AI as part of a broader, interconnected technology ecosystem – encompassing data, connectivity, energy, compute capacity and workforce – the article introduces the notion of “architectures of AI” to describe the underlying infrastructure shaping contemporary security and sovereignty. It demonstrates how these architectures concentrate power within a select number of technology companies, which increasingly function as national security actors capable of influencing state decisions on the resort to force. The article identifies three critical factors that collectively alter the calculus of war: (i) the concentration of power across the architectures of AI, (ii) the diffusion of national security decision making, and (iii) the role of AI in shaping public opinion. It argues that, as technology companies amass unprecedented control over digital infrastructure and information flows, most nation states – particularly smaller or less technologically advanced ones – experience diminished autonomy in decisions to use force. The article specifically examines how technology companies can coerce, influence or incentivise the resort-to-force decision making of smaller states, thereby challenging traditional notions of state sovereignty and international security.
In this article, we maintain that the anticipated integration of artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled systems into state-level decision making over whether and when to wage war will be accompanied by a hitherto neglected risk. Namely, the incorporation of such systems will engender subtle but significant changes to the state’s deliberative and organisational structures, its culture, and its capacities – and in ways that could undermine its adherence to international norms of restraint. In offering this provocation, we argue that the gradual proliferation and embeddedness of AI-enabled decision-support systems within the state – what we call the ‘phenomenon of “Borgs in the org”’ – will lead to four significant changes that, together, threaten to diminish the state’s crucial capacity for ‘institutional learning’. Specifically, the state’s reliance on AI-enabled decision-support systems in deliberations over war initiation will invite: (i) disrupted deliberative structures and chains of command; (ii) the occlusion of crucial steps in decision-making processes; (iii) institutionalised deference to computer-generated outputs; and (iv) future plans and trajectories that are overdetermined by past policies and actions. The resulting ‘institutional atrophy’ could, in turn, weaken the state’s responsiveness to external social cues and censure, thereby making the state less likely to engage with, internalise, and adhere to evolving international norms of restraint. As a collateral effect, this weakening could contribute to the decay of these norms themselves if such institutional atrophy were to become widespread within the society of states.
This article prefaces our Special Issue on “AI and the Decision to Go to War.” We begin by introducing the prospect of artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled systems increasingly infiltrating state-level decision making on the resort to force, clarifying that our focus is on existing technologies, and outlining the two general ways that this can conceivably occur: through automated self-defense and AI-enabled decision-support systems. We then highlight recent, on-going developments that create a backdrop of rapid change and global uncertainty against which AI-enabled systems will inform such deliberations: (i) the widespread tendency to misperceive the latest AI-enabled technologies as increasingly “human”; (ii) the changing role of “Big Tech” in the global competition over military applications of AI; (iii) a conspicuous blind spot in current discussions surrounding international regulation; and (iv) the emerging reality of an AI-nuclear weapons nexus. We suggest that each factor will affect the trajectory of AI-informed war initiation and must be addressed as scholars and policymakers determine how best to prepare for, direct, and respond to this anticipated change. Finally, turning to the pressing legal, ethical, sociotechnical, political, and geopolitical challenges that will accompany this transformation, we revisit four “complications” that have framed the broader project from which this Special Issue has emerged. Within this framework, we preview the other 13 multidisciplinary research articles that make up this collection. Together, these articles explore the risks and opportunities that will follow AI into the war-room.
Suicide is not simply a typology of violence. All forms of violence are interrelated, and preventative action should tackle the common antecedents to all. Understanding what these are, and how they differ between regions and cultures, is key to developing effective violence prevention strategies that extend beyond suicide. In this chapter we discuss the relationship between suicide and other forms of violence including analysis of data from the World Health Organization. We then consider factors influencing volume and direction of violence including gender, poverty, drug and alcohol misuse, adverse childhood experiences, war, and natural disasters. Before finally moving on to preventative action that considers all forms of violence under the same framework. Throughout the chapter real-world examples will be given for important concepts with particular reference to self-immolation in South Asia and the Eastern Mediterranean Region as it is the authors’ area of research expertise.
The fragments on the ancients and the moderns are continued. Arguments are presented for and against the role played by the ancients in establishing a modern culture of genius and taste. The effect of writing on oral poetry is discussed together with the invention of paper, printing, and copper engraving. These had an important effect on poetic expression and public culture, and the advantages and disadvantages are weighed. The Middle Ages ended with the Reformation, the discovery of new lands, changes in the financial system, in war, and class relationships. German literature is discussed in relation to other European traditions, and its shortcomings and merits are considered. In conclusion, it is argued that comparison of the national poetic traditions is difficult, perhaps futile, and that every nation should value its own tradition.
War and peace underwent radical changes in early modern Europe. Warfare itself, along with diplomacy and peace-making, changed dramatically during this period, but so too did the discussion of war and peace within the discursive domain of moral and juridical-political thought. Fundamental shifts in the early modern discussion of rights of war and peace occurred because previous assumptions were radically challenged by concrete events and experiences (such as the Reformation or the discoveries and occupation of new continents by Europeans). This in turn led to new ways of moral and political thinking which sought to find answers to these new challenges.
This article tackles head-on a question that is often thought to defeat pacifism: ‘How then would you react against a Nazi invasion?’ That multiple wars are still recurrently justified as necessary to confront yet another ‘Hitler’ makes tackling this question critically relevant far beyond pacifist circles. On the Nazi context specifically: the question comes too late if pitched in 1939; militarism did not deter Hitler; there were actually many examples of nonviolent resistance against Nazis; even Hitler was mindful of public opinion; and the fight ‘against Nazis’ claimed many non-Nazi German victims too. More generally, and adding theoretical depth: pacifism need not entail a single absolute rejection of violence in all scenarios; nonviolent resistance has been proved to be effective; war-readiness has a corrosive constitutive impact; the Nazi question tends to assume that the application of retaliatory violence is controllable; and to presume that violence is the only option is absolutist and idealistic. Far from delivering a conclusive victory, the Nazi question, carefully considered and discussed, exposes cracks in conventional thinking about violence and war and provides opportunities to unpack and clarify multiple arguments advanced by pacifism.
Reviews the empirical and conceptual findings, makes forecasts about the future likelihood of the use of force in each category of conflict, the role of learning and non-learning in the decline of war, why the great powers are still more committed to the use of force than other states, and the prospects for weaning them from violence.
What should we make of the dramatic appearance of the Leveller leader John Lilburne in Hatfield Level in 1651, at the height of a decade of anti-improvement riots? This unusual contact between central radicalism and rural unrest destabilises binaries between a zealous minority driving civil war conflict and indifferent provincial subjects. Fen projects instead expose the pluralism of political ideas in seventeenth-century England. These crown-led ventures polarised notions of justice and became entangled in the events and debates propelling the English civil wars. In Epworth Manor, commoners across the social spectrum asserted an inalienable ‘just right’ to wetland commons in the face of royal and republican coercion. The strength of customary politics extended far beyond the parish, becoming a powerful means to articulate opposition to improvement in conflicts that moved between wetlands and Westminster. Central governors ultimately struggled to exercise a monopoly over legitimacy or violence in Epworth, where collective action across almost a century repelled efforts to turn their commons into theatres of state power and national productivity.
An overview and justification of the project, differentiation from previous book on war, description of research methods and data set, and discussion of theoretical and empirical premises.
The modern world has been shaped by imperialism, a practice engaged in by all great powers and some lesser ones. Empires are history but their consequences are not. Their dissolution has given rise to a multitude of new states, restored independence to formerly independent units, and reduced the size and influence of former metropoles. Decolonization, whether peacefully or violently accomplished, has given rise to a series of new conflicts among successor states, among neighboring states, and between metropoles and former colonies. We might lump these conflicts together as post-imperial. If so, many kinds of conflicts would fit under this rubric. They could encompass colonial and postcolonial conflicts, rump states, partitioned countries, and arguably other categories as well like revenge and regional rivalries. I have accordingly opted for a finer-grained analysis.