Practical wisdom is caring understanding of the good in the situations of a human life. Our emotions are rational to the extent that we care about the real good and are truthful about the facts. The two main kinds of virtues – the virtues of caring and the enkratic virtues – embody different aspects of practical wisdom. On the one side, in compassion, generosity, justice, and sense of duty, we care about and understand our good in its varieties and aspects. On the other side, we know about and know our practical way around ourselves, our shortcomings and the ways they may be mitigated and repaired by use of courage, patience, perseverance, and self-control. The virtues of caring form a coherent ensemble and overall picture of the good, a practical wisdom by which we see our situations in the perspective of a whole life.

In The Secret Life of Copyright, copyright law meets Black Lives Matter and #MeToo in a provocative examination of how our legal regime governing creative production unexpectedly perpetuates inequalities along racial, gender, and socioeconomic lines while undermining progress in the arts. Drawing on numerous case studies – Harvard’s slave daguerreotypes, celebrity sex tapes, famous Wall Street statues, beloved musicals, and dictator copyrights – the book argues that, despite their purported neutrality, key rules governing copyrights – from the authorship, derivative rights, and fair use doctrines to copyright’s First Amendment immunity – systematically disadvantage individuals from traditionally marginalized communities. Since laws regulating the use of creative content increasingly mediate participation and privilege in the digital world, The Secret Life of Copyright provides a template for a more robust copyright system that better addresses egalitarian concerns and serves the interests of creativity.

Traditionally there has been much cheap sniping at Italy’s strategic planning in 1915: unduly ambitious, naïve, megalomaniacal. Staff plans for warfare were undeniably disconcerting. The prime peculiarity was a lack of precise planning or analysis. In the first draft of plans for war against Austria-Hungary, a mere 8-page summary that Cadorna presented in August 1914, the strategic objectives of the future campaign were sketchily alluded to; there was no trace of any precise schedule. In other respects, Cadorna was much more acute. He rightly predicted a long and expensive war and did his utmost to persuade ministers to mobilize Italian industry forthwith and bring it under state control. His intuitions were frustrated, however, by the civilians’ total aloofness from military matters. Never as in the period of Italy’s neutrality was the absence of a coordination mechanism between politicians and generals felt so disastrously. Roberto Bencivenga, at that time already attached to Cadorna’s secretariat, eloquently testified to the lack of any collaboration between cabinet and army Staff. Worse, the top military brass were deliberately kept in the dark about political decisions.

Kansas’ tumultuous, violent early years drove the development of a distinctively intrusive, inexpert model of reform. The KCIR was a clear elaboration upon this historical pattern. Constitutional restraints left the state persistently underfinanced. The conflicts of the Bleeding Kansas period catalyzed political and mob violence that persisted until the 1890s. Progressive Republicans, the dominant political force in Kansas from the 1890s through the 1920s, thus developed an aggressive program of regulation of economic and personal conduct, a program not reliant on rational administration, for which there was no fiscal capacity or expertise, but upon an expansive legal conception of regulatory (or flatly coercive) interventions justifiable by appeal to the public interest. These reforms were often ineffective or too bold to withstand scrutiny in the US Supreme Court. The state’s leaders, like Governor Allen, had considerable first-hand experience with the difficulties, and in many cases the violence, of settlement: Their commitment to the state’s forceful variant of progressivism rose from deep and genuine fear of social disorder.

Practice single-best-answer questions on blood, representing all presentations and conditions listed by the GMC in their content map for the MLA AKT, and referred to by the keywords in this book. All questions are specifically tailored to the level of knowledge required for foundation clinical practice in the UK, and comprehensive in breadth, separating out the different conditions and presentations listed by the GMC, and covering them all. Not only are correct answers provided, but also explanations for all the available answer options. Every question is supported by an individual topic in the companion book which is specifically authored to cover the knowledge required for foundation clinical practice in the UK.

The history of Sino-American relations is presented in broad strokes in this chapter, showing two punctuations indicated by the Chinese intervention in the Korean War and Richard Nixon’s trip to Beijing. These events marked the sharp and sudden breakthroughs in these countries’ relations to be followed by a period of "business as usual" at a new level introduced by these punctuations. Thus, Sino-American relations can be demarcated by different epochs, including a new one that we have entered recently. The history of these epochs is characterized by lulls and lurches.

Around 1900, scholars commonly marked modern history from the French invasion of Italy in 1494. The size of the army that crossed the Alps – about 30,000 men – and its use of field artillery to batter down the curtain walls of ancient towns was, supposedly, unprecedented. As France’s claims in Italy were subsequently challenged by Spain and the Holy Roman Empire, the duchy of Milan and other Italian states collapsed, or changed hands, with astonishing abruptness. Today, it is no longer clear that the campaigns of the Wars of Italy (1494–1559) were so sharply differentiated from those of the last phase of the Hundred Years’ War (1415–53). But the political cataclysms of our own time seem to confirm Niccolò Machiavelli’s insights into the precariousness of power at the turn of the sixteenth century. No boundary was sacred, and no government lacked a portfolio of ideas for expansion, to be tested if circumstances seemed ripe. Since a power dominant in a given region often worked to keep things as they were, one might distinguish between ambitious governments eager for war and cautious governments concerned to preserve what they had. Any move by a hegemonic power was taken by its rivals as an attempt to reduce them to abject servitude.

Chapter 5 explores the stakes of touching, tasting, smelling, and hearing books. Writers connected bookish words with sensory language to conceptualize the process of mediation.

This chapter, together with the succeeding one, highlights the essential role that resource mobilization played in the rise and fall of the CCP and KMT from 1921 to 1945. Using a wide range of party and government archives during the Republican Era, I trace the scale and sources of financial revenues mobilized by these two parties. These novel data provide new insights on the financial undertakings of both parties throughout this era. I reveal that the KMT benefited from its elite mobilization infrastructure in urban and coastal China and consistently maintained a more robust fiscal foundation than the CCP prior to the Sino-Japanese War, hence establishing its dominance in China’s political landscape. On the contrary, the CCP relied on meagre financial support from the Comintern and ad hoc expropriation of rural elites, struggling to mobilize a consistent flow of financial resources.

Ottoman wars from the mid-fifteenth century through the end of the eighteenth century fundamentally changed the geopolitics of Southeast Europe, West Asia, and the Middle East. The Ottomans emerged in West Asia Minor toward the end of the thirteenth century. Known as “Turks” in contemporaneous Europe, the Ottoman ruling elite incorporated people of a wide variety of ethnic origins who considered themselves the followers and descendants of Osman (d. 1324?), the dynasty’s founder. Those loyal to the dynasty of Osman used the Turkish designation of “Osmanlı” (Turkish, “of Osman”), which over time came to be rendered in English as “Ottoman.” Within three generations after Osman’s death, the Ottomans had either conquered or subjugated into vassalage most of the preexisting polities and rival dynasties in the Balkans and Asia Minor. Timur Lenk’s victory over the Ottomans near Ankara in 1402 temporarily checked Ottoman expansion. Still, the dynasty recovered, and by 1453 Sultan Mehmed II (r. 1444–46, 1451–81) sealed the Ottomans’ status as a formidable military power by conquering Constantinople, the capital of the thousand-year-old Byzantine or Eastern Roman Empire. Expansion through conquest continued well into the sixteenth century. Ottoman battlefield victories under Sultan Selim I (r. 1512–20) against the Safavids of Persia (Chaldiran in 1514) and the Mamluks of Syria and Egypt (Marj Dabiq in 1516 and Raydaniyya in 1517) and under Sultan Süleyman (r. 1520–66) against the Hungarians (Mohács in 1526) resulted in spectacular Ottoman territorial gains in eastern Anatolia, Azerbaijan, Syria, Egypt, and Hungary.

The KCIR was extensively debated in social scientific and legal journals. It was also seriously considered in the era’s most powerful legal professional organizations as a general model for managing industrial disputes. However, support for and hostility to the KCIR cut across established ideological alignments: there was no setting where it did not provoke strong disagreement among influential figures. In economics, a heterogeneous group of institutionalists friendly to the KCIR were rebuffed by Kansas officials, while a coherent group of Wisconsin-connected economists articulated a strong case against it. In law, an ideologically diverse group of leading scholars and practitioners nearly succeeded in winning the Kansas Industrial Court Act’s formal endorsement as a uniform law. But an emergent alliance of academic reformers and elite corporate practitioners succeeded in banning its discussion in key organizational settings. The KCIR controversy hastened the end of the legal profession’s involvement in social legislation and helped extinguish American interest in labor courts.

This chapter explores the rap debates of philosophical aesthetics, where early academic discourse on rap was at its most active. Rap aestheticians (led by Richard Shusterman) accentuated rap’s nature as an “art form”. The chapter examines the key issues within this debate, including the aesthetic experience of rap, flow (Mtume ya Salaam), the need for public support (and Herbert Grabes’ criticism of this position), and rap’s affinities with the Harlem Renaissance (Marvin Gladney). Rap’s engagement with other cultural practices, like driving and everyday culture, was discussed very early within philosophical aesthetics. Right from the beginning the debate was very international, with many of the authors coming from the Nordic Countries (Esa Sironen, Stefán Snaevarr, Martti Honkanen). It argues that there is still a lot to learn from aesthetic discussions on rap, and these philosophical debates are an interesting historical phenomenon, which rap scholars should know more about.

Yet another memoryless correlated discrete process is considered, recurrent events. These are classified in different ways, and a whole theory is developed to describe the possible behaviors. Special attention is devoted to the proof of the limit probability theorem, whose lengthy details are reported in an appendix, so as not to scare readers. The theory of recurrent events is particularly useful because many properties and mathematical theorems can be straightforwardly translated in the more general theory of Markov chains.