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The virtues whose function is to regulate impulses, emotions, thoughts, and habits in the interest of larger purposes, including ethical ones, are courage, patience, perseverance, and self-control. They have a different grammar from the virtues of caring. Because they are not concerns, they are not defined by the motives or reasons for action or emotion that such concerns supply. Instead, they are differentiated by the kind of impulses that they manage. The situations they address are not outward, like the ones to which the virtues of caring respond, but are states of the self. Thus, self-control is the paradigm. They contribute to our integrity, our self-possession, and our freedom as authors of our character. They don’t in themselves have moral worth, are often used for non-moral purposes, and may even be used for evil. But in the context of good character they function in support of the virtues of caring.
Here we return to discrete Markov processes, but this time with continuous-time processes. We first consider, study, and solve specific examples such as Poisson processes, divergent birth processes, and birth-and-death processes. We derive the master equations for their probability distributions, and derive and discuss important solutions. In particular, we deepen the theory of Feller for divergent birth processes. In the end we formally study the general case of Markov processes in the stationary case, writing down the forward and the backward Kolmogorov master equations.
Genealogical inquiries – most broadly – give us an account of why we have become self-estranged, so far from being at home with ourselves, so that we might yet become more self-aware. For this reason, as I show in this Introduction, genealogical investigations hold out a distinctive promise: to bring into reflective awareness the systems that organize our subjective experiences but do not even threaten to cross “the threshold of consciousness,” as Nietzsche puts it (GM I 1). I then set out the main claims of the book: Nietzsche’s genealogical work aims to render us less obscure to ourselves, to liberate us from those value systems that no longer serve our interests, and to show us how we might come to feel differently about ourselves, even less prone to shame. How is this to be achieved? This book provides an answer to that question.
Chapter 1 establishes that the criminal law, as a form of public law, is subject to social justice scrutiny like any other public institution, and so has a duty to offset social injustice where it arises. This duty applies to criminal law doctrine, and excuse doctrine, in particular, as the language of culpability evaluation. A core challenge to advancing social justice at this site is highlighted through the criminal law’s apparent passivity to forms of social injustice through the depoliticisation of its doctrine. Drawing on literature that reignites the political credentials of criminal responsibility attribution, the chapter seeks to erode the impunity of culpability evaluation from social justice interrogation. Moreover, it introduces the concepts of vulnerability and recognition with a view to forging a pathway for the Real Person Approach to blaming people, which manifests in doctrine through the Universal Partial Defence.
We investigate whether, in Swedish national registers, social and psychiatric outcomes for six major psychiatric and substance disorders – drug use disorder (DUD), alcohol use disorder (AUD), major depression (MD), bipolar disorder (BD), anxiety disorder (AD), and schizophrenia (SZ) – reflect the primary genetic risk for each disorder and the level of genetic heterogeneity.
Methods
We utilize Genetic Risk Ratios – defined as the ratio of the genetic risk for secondary disorders to the genetic risk for the primary disorder – derived from Family Genetic Risk Scores. Poor social outcome was defined by a common factor of four variables: receipt of social welfare, sick leave, early retirement pension, and residence in a socially deprived area. Psychiatric outcome was defined as days of inpatient psychiatric hospitalization.
Results
With poorer social outcomes, the primary genetic risks rose robustly for all disorders except SZ, as did the secondary genetic risks for DUD, AUD, and attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder. With poorer psychiatric outcomes, available only for BD and SZ, the primary genetic risks increased sharply. Overall, MD, AD, and BD became substantially more genetically heterogenous as their social outcomes became poorer, while for AUD, DUD, and SZ, the increase in heterogeneity was more modest. By contrast, with poorer psychiatric outcome, genetic risks for SZ became substantially more genetically homogeneous, with a similar but less robust trend seen for BD.
Conclusions
Despite important differences between our primary disorders, social and psychiatric outcomes are often robust indices of genetic risk and can reflect the levels of genetic heterogeneity.
Practice single-best-answer questions on contagious organisms, representing all presentations and conditions listed by the GMC in their content map for the MLA AKT, and referred to by the keywords in this book. All questions are specifically tailored to the level of knowledge required for foundation clinical practice in the UK, and comprehensive in breadth, separating out the different conditions and presentations listed by the GMC, and covering them all. Not only are correct answers provided, but also explanations for all the available answer options. Every question is supported by an individual topic in the companion book which is specifically authored to cover the knowledge required for foundation clinical practice in the UK.
After looking at Aggrey and the African Association (AA), the second chapter continues the examination of the intellectual strands that wove together to inspire the future leaders of the AA to promote an African identity and build the African nation. It examines the intellectual biographies of the early AA leaders and how they came to conceptualize the African continent and people. This is done by examining geography lessons in missionary schools and tracing out encounters with South Asians and other East African political figures such as Harry Thuku of Kenya, Prince Akiiki Nyabongo of Uganda, and an African-American named F. Burgess. By recreating the issues and ideas that shaped the formation of the AA, I argue that there was a clear continental, and not territorial, vision from the start.
What does it mean to live a good life? Philosophers through the ages such as Aristotle, Plato, Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Nietzsche have wrestled with what it means to be a good citizen and live a good life. More recently, Howard Gardner applied his thinking to the skills that future generations need to synthesise and communicate complex ideas, respect human differences and fulfil the responsibilities of work, life and citizenship. He identified ‘five minds for the future’, one of which is the ethical mind. To be ethically minded calls upon citizens to know their rights and responsibilities, actively contribute to the good of society and foster citizenship within and between communities. Communities encompass the family, educational setting, workplace, nation and global community. It is through contributing to others as active and informed citizens that meaning is acquired.
The Chernobyl children and their networks of concern are one of the reasons why a nuclear accident that was initially branded ‘typically Soviet’ in many parts of the world came into focus as a transnational disaster. These children brought the reality of Chernobyl into the everyday lives of hundreds of thousands of people in Europe and North America. They were living proof of the characteristic distress and fears associated with the accident. Far removed from the scene of the disaster, abstract headlines were replaced by the stories of actual individuals – albeit not always ones that confirmed the ideas and expectations of the children’s hosts.
Chapter 8 draws on sociological literature in debating whether law – however drafted – is capable of solving the complex problem of discrimination against people who look different. It argues that, although we should not expect too much of law in tackling the complex social problem of appearance bias, strategically targeted laws can sometimes play a part in changing attitudes, norms and behaviours. While prohibitions on discrimination are important for remedial purposes, other types of legal and social reform may be better placed to create the conditions for greater inclusion of people with visible differences.
The concept of post-Kantian perfectionism clarifies the mutual polemics in the Hegelain School, contrasting Feuerbach’s naturalism, which combines pre- and post-Kantian motifs, with the more exigent Kantianism of Bruno Bauer; and it elucidates sharp disagreements with anti-perfectionists like Max Stirner. The concrete historical situation comes under scrutiny of post-Kantian perfectionist thinking. French Revolutionary factions and the contending parties in the German Vormärz express distinct views of freedom and follow different developmental trajectories. Civil society too reveals its inner dynamics. Rejecting Leibniz’s pre-established harmony and Wolffian mutuality, but also markedly differing from Kant and Schiller, the non-compossibility of interests in civil society is the theoretical innovation here. The irreconcilable opposition of interests, central to Marx, is not a view original with him. In Bauer, autonomy means divesting oneself of particular interests to the extent that they inhibit institutional transformation.