Most religious traditions and movements have majorities of women, but most are led by men and are based on deeply embedded patriarchal assumptions. That underlying reality is played out in multiple different Christian traditions and shapes the subsequent contests for power, representation, and influence. This chapter is animated by a primary question from which other questions naturally flow: What are the characteristics of the religious networks constructed by women and to what extent do they function differently from those built largely by men? In attempting to answer that question, I identify five different kinds of networks representing different varieties of female leadership and participation. It is important to state that this typology should not be read as either an ascension or declension narrative about women’s agency and the role of patriarchy in shaping that agency.

Conservatives claim that progressive taxation in America is unfair to the more affluent because it punishes them for working hard and redistributes their income to less affluent people who are lazy, and therefore don’t deserve it. It is true that some of the revenue collected from corporations and the more affluent pays for programs for the less affluent. But this ignores that even poor people pay taxes. It ignores that most people who receive government transfer payments are children, elderly, disabled, and working people, not slackers. And it ignores the many tax breaks, loopholes, subsidies, and bailouts that the affluent and corporations receive from government – a hidden welfare state – that costs taxpayers billions of dollars annually. In fact, cutting taxes and therefore spending on social programs can exacerbate inequality and undermine social cohesion and political stability, none of which is good for the economy or society. These arguments are supported by cross-national and US historical data.

Locke held that any number of persons might join together to form a government. He imposed no limitation on the knowledge or reasoning that joiners might make use of. It is likely that Locke imagined that governments typically arose by consensus among private landowners, who then by a majority vote chose the procedure by which the legislative power was to operate. It is safe to say that Locke did not favor a wide suffrage or democracy. Locke also did not insist on any strict separation of executive and legislative powers: Of necessity, the executive must have a “prerogative power” to further the common good even if contrary to legislation. The notions of an independent judiciary and judicial review of legislation are nowhere found in Locke. Locke did, however, advocate reform of the composition of Parliament to make it more representative. And he was defensive of the rights of commoners against enclosures – so, logically, he may have favored a wider franchise.

Rawls expounded “a theory of justice that generalizes and carries to a higher level of abstraction the traditional conception of the social contract.” His theory applies to society’s basic structure, a system of productive cooperation over generations. The state of nature was reconfigured as an “original position” which “incorporates certain procedural constraints on arguments.” The “parties” in the original position have general knowledge but no knowledge specific to themselves: their strengths, weaknesses, values, desires, social position, and so on. The “parties” choose principles that will maximize their fund of “primary goods,” or all-purpose means – means useful to all, whatever their particular interests, talents, etc. Two principles would be chosen: a maximum-equal-liberties principle, and a principle governing the distribution of opportunities, wealth, and income. These are in “lexical” order: equal basic liberties, then fair equal opportunity, then the “difference principle,” viz. distribute so to maximize the resources of the least-advantaged class. The chapter describes the “fact of reasonable pluralism” the social contract must accommodate, and the “well-ordered society” the social contract is to stabilize “for the right reasons,” securing the three great achievements of the tradition: toleration, limited government by popular consent, and “the winning of the working classes to democracy.”

Chapter 20 reflects on the evolving landscape of climate litigation, circling back to some of the insights emerging from the Handbook’s various chapters, and speculates on its future trajectory. The editors begin by underscoring the remarkable progress that has been made in climate litigation, highlighting the significant role it has played in shaping legal responses to the climate crisis. They emphasise that the journey of climate litigation is far from over and that the field is poised for continued advancements and innovations. In particular, the editors shine a light on new frontiers for strategic litigation, including loss and damage cases that promote climate justice and considerations of ethics, fairness, and equity; claims against private polluters, particularly major corporate greenhouse gas emitters; more diverse litigation against governments that target the insufficient ambition, inadequate implementation, and lack of transparency in climate policies; litigation defending biodiversity through a climate lens; and inter-State climate lawsuits.

This chapter focuses on two other key elements of the global financial crime regime beyond AML rules, namely CTF and targeted financial sanctions, and the challenges that they present. In particular, it discusses the shift from excluding criminal funds towards excluding specified persons themselves – be that designated terrorists or otherwise sanctioned persons – from the legitimate economy. The chapter first discusses the history of CTF measures and targeted sanctions. Then, it considers the challenges presented by targeted exclusion, which arise in the context of CTF as well as being inherent to the operation of targeted financial sanctions. Finally, the chapter parses out the difficult case of coerced payments, including criminal ransoms, terrorist ransoms and ransomware payouts.

Chapter 14 on Intergenerational Equity sheds light on how this principle, which posits a responsibility to ensure that future generations inherit a habitable planet, has been invoked in climate cases to date. The authors examine how this principle has been interpreted and applied across different jurisdictions, highlighting the notable contributions of jurisprudence from the Global South in shaping the development and understanding of the principle. Through an examination of leading cases from around the world, they illuminate how courts in these jurisdictions have infused their decisions with a consideration for future generations, thereby advancing a more inclusive and long-term perspective on climate justice. The authors distil instances of emerging best practice where the principle of intergenerational equity has been invoked to guide legal reasoning and judicial decisions in climate cases. They underscore the potential of this principle to shape future climate litigation, particularly as the impacts of climate change increasingly span across generations.

This chapter explores ivory production and craftsmanship in Late Antiquity, examining its material properties, artistic significance and sociopolitical functions to trace the evolution of ivory carving from the fourth to the sixth century. From a technical perspective, the chapter argues that late antique ivory carving was not a rupture from earlier traditions but rather a continuation with distinctive adaptations. In terms of provenance, it highlights the importance of elephant ivory, particularly from North and East Africa, prized for its durability and aesthetic appeal. Ivory was widely used in diplomatic gifts, religious artefacts and luxury objects, including consular diptychs, book covers, furniture inlays and pyxides. The discussion also addresses the role of ivory in elite gift-giving and political symbolism, emphasising how consular diptychs functioned as commemorative objects that reinforced civic and imperial identity. Additionally, the chapter examines economic and geopolitical disruptions, particularly the Byzantine–Sasanian wars and the rise of Islam, which altered ivory trade routes and contributed to the decline of large-scale production. Despite these challenges, this study documents how ivory carving remained a vital artistic tradition, reflecting the adaptability of late antique artisans and the evolving cultural landscape of the period.

Humans seek not happiness but “power after power,” says Hobbes, and so we are perpetually at odds. We are equals in cunning and therefore equally insecure and equally error-prone. Our language contains “words of inconstant signification,” which means we must ever disagree about right and justice. Reason requires us to submit our disagreements to an arbiter – a “Common Power” – lacking whom we must be perpetually at war or on the verge of war with one another over things that matter.

The original-position setup and argument for Rawls’s two principles are the focus of this chapter. Economic inequality is inevitable because the parties accept economic inequalities that benefit all classes. The equal basic liberties can be of unequal worth to persons, under the difference principle. But the political liberties (and they alone) are guaranteed to be of “fair value,” that is, individuals equally motivated and adept are to have roughly equal political influence. Universal adult suffrage is an inadequate measure to prevent money distorting political results. The difference principle in its “general form” could endorse Mill’s plural voting scheme, and would be indifferent to substantive political inequality if, on balance, the least advantaged realized a greater worth of their basket of primary goods. Robert Nozick’s objection to Rawls’s attention to patterns of wealth distribution is taken up, and Rawls’s ambition to render unequal distributions as acceptable as a matter of “pure procedural justice” is explained. John Harsanyi and Kenneth Arrow objected to the difference principle as applied to wealth and income. Rawls’s answer depends on establishing the lexical priority of the equal basic liberties, the argument for which was made toward the end of Rawls’s monumental A Theory of Justice.