6.1 [411] This is the right moment to state again the words of the God-breathed scripture. For it said: “Death and life are in the power of the tongue; those who control it will eat its fruits.”1 For, although it is possible for those who wish to think well to derive benefit from the goods of the tongue, provided that it were somehow to be attuned to orderliness and the duty of speaking words that would earn everyone’s admiration for having used it best, [nonetheless] some redirect their own words towards what is inappropriate. Their perverse and wicked words have even reached such a point that [412] they think nothing of those things that exceed the bounds of every vice, they let loose their wanton tongue against God, and they take up their weapons against the ineffable glory. The inevitable result of these actions will certainly be that they are convicted for the most extreme vices.

8.1 [532] Although the clever Julian undertakes a war against the ineffable glory1 and lets loose the arrows of his own understanding against matters that transcend [our] intellect, nonetheless they all miss the target.2 For he lies and boasts and makes mention of the God-breathed scripture, pretending indeed to know what is in it, but he is exposed as in fact understanding nothing at all, as an examination of the actual facts would demonstrate for us. For those who have recently been gathered together into “a holy people”3 by their faith in Christ and who are also doers of good works and experts in radiant and admirable pursuits, these he has called defiled, extremely disgusting, pitiable, disreputable, good for nothing, and every other term of abuse like this!4 Moreover, as if this tirade against us was not enough, [533] in still other ways too he tries to prove that we do not realize just how demented we are, nor indeed do we know how to walk straight down the path of truth, but that we, so to speak, jump off5 the highway, disregarding the commandment delivered through Moses – and this entirely – and diverging from the views of Moses and the holy prophets who came after him. So he again writes as follows

The so-called ‘Constitution of 1782’ has always been an important symbol in Irish history. By amending Poyning’s Law and repealing the Declaratory Act, the changes of 1782–83 meant that the Irish House of Lords regained its judicial functions, and the Irish Parliament could initiate its own legislation. But whether these changes constitute a significant constitutional change which touched a ‘principal part of a constitutional framework’ and raised ‘an important question of principle’ is necessary to determine. By analysing the economic legislation of the Irish Parliament, in particular the legislation on infrastructure, linen laws and the Dublin Paving Board, this chapter argues that the legislative independence did not influence the subsequent legislation of Grattan’s Parliament. The significance of the constitutional change lies in the symbolic importance for the contemporaries rather than in the legislative changes themselves, which had little effect internally in Ireland or externally in the relationship with Great Britain.

Dark patterns are the subject of a surge of regulatory interest in the EU. Much new legislation in the areas of consumer law, data protection and competition law include provisions on dark patterns. Businesses use dark patterns to increase their revenue at the expense of consumers who purchase products they may not need, spend more time or give up more personal data than they would otherwise. Instead of focusing on the more normative issue of when dark patterns should be considered harmful, the chapter compares the different legal frameworks applicable to these practices and asks to what extent the increasingly fragmented EU regulatory landscape can offer effective overall protection against dark patterns. While useful complementarities may arise when parallel sets of rules target different concerns or protect different values, there are also risks of inconsistencies that may lead to either under- or overenforcement due to the fragmentation of the overall regulatory framework. The chapter submits that three needs result from the state of play and offers suggestions to improve the enforcement against dark patterns based on the current EU regulatory framework.

During the 1730s, the nawab of Bengal, Shuja Khan, warned the Mughal court in Delhi against the renewal of the EIC's commercial rights, the most important of these being the duty-free trade farman granted by Emperor Farukhsiyar in 1717. According to him, although it had previously been possible for the Mughals to maintain control over them, the EIC had now become exceedingly entrenched in Bengal and could undermine the very imperial framework that had allowed and facilitated their presence in the first instance. The nawab made a rather stark assessment of the Company's affairs, stating:

As subsequent events were to prove, Shuja Khan was not wrong. While conventional narratives of Britain's imperial art usually commence with the late eighteenth century, imaginative visions of India had begun to permeate English visual arts earlier on. However, colonial overtures until that point take on a layer of meaning that remains to be fully explored.

The medieval common law offered few public law remedies, the chief being the negative principle that the king could do no wrong: he could not be sued, but his unlawful actions or commands were void. A new chapter began in the sixteenth century with the development of habeas corpus as a means of challenging imprisonment. Since government rested ultimately on the power to lock people up, here at last was a means of reviewing abuses of authority. Habeas corpus was augmented in the seventeenth century by mandamus and certiorari, to review encroachments on other kinds of liberty. Though the new remedies were used to challenge imprisonment by prerogative courts and other governmental actions, the judges sought to make them palatable to the crown by representing them as the exercise (on the king’s behalf) of a higher prerogative. They were ‘prerogative writs’, capable (in Coke’s words) of correcting ‘any manner of misgovernment’.

This chapter addresses the factors outside of medical care that are responsible for health outcomes: social and structural determinants of health (SDOH). It outlines economic stability, education, health access, neighborhood, built environment, and community context (including income inequality and racism) as some of the upstream drivers of the health-income gradient. These SDOH are framed in economic terms as a local public bad. Managers therefore must take SDOH into account if they are aiming to optimize health outcomes and costs for their population, especially if they are in a population-based or capitated payment system. The evidence about what actions to take is still developing, but some interventions are reviewed including Medicare’s direct contracting model, Medicaid’s section 1115 waivers, community health workers, meal delivery programs, and screening and referring to community organizations. Larger actions such as disparate impact monitoring and changing payment incentives and risk adjustment will need to be taken in the future.

Provisions in consumer contracts that deprive consumers of recourse in the event of a product failure effectively cancel the insurance that the law would otherwise provide to consumers who are injured by sellers of consumer products. This redistributes wealth from the poorest consumers to richer consumers because richer consumers can afford to self-insure against the risk of product failure whereas poorer consumers cannot. It follows that consumer sovereigntist arguments that consumer indifference to consumer-unfriendly contract terms suggests that consumers prefer the lower prices that come with such terms are misleading here. The interests of rich and poor consumers diverge with respect to these contract terms and the fact that rich consumers may carry the day in the market does not imply the consumers as a group prefer these terms. Accordingly, the European approach to consumer law, which treats democratically elected governments regulating consumer contract terms as a more authentic reflection of popular will than the purchase decisions of consumers in markets, may be more appropriate when it comes to the regulation of consumer contracts.

The conclusion outlines key points in the book. On a Kantian-Kierkegaardian account, thought experiments lead to presentations that justify calling a thought experiment an experience, though not an empirical or sensory one. Without a sensible object, we can nevertheless have givenness, or presence, but not existence. Cognition, for that reason, is not necessarily truthful: although object-directed, cognition on its own does not justify belief in any particular object’s existence. My conclusion that thought experiments provide cognition rather than knowledge echoes Michael Stuart’s claim that thought experiments increase understanding. Cognition is a common basis for knowledge in Kant, but it is not the same thing as knowledge. The conclusion also draws implications for how we understand faith (religious belief) in Kierkegaard and how thought experiments make sense of the complexity of reality.

The experience of being tied up in Tehran while eating tangerines, and what it signifies as narrative, metaphor, and theoretical intervention. The chapter combines a personal story about a home invasion with an analysis of social and property relations in the space of the local neighborhood. The author establishes her identity as an arous farangi (a “foreign bride”), meaning both an insider and an outsider in the Iranian cultural community. In parallel, analysis of the history of the burgled house and the changing geography of its residential neighborhood reveals the complex transformations in Iranian class positions and urban spatial organization since the revolution. Whether tragic or absurd, the experience of being tied up in Tehran sets the narrative and interpretive paradigm for the rest of the book.

Chapter 4 analyzes several common features in New Religious Movements that turn violent – a millennial and apocalyptic worldview, totalistic organizational rules, isolation, and real or perceived persecution – and how these features can help make sense of the infusion of violent expectations in the sectarian movement of the Dead Sea Scrolls as represented especially in the Rule of the Community.

Sir John Ross was appointed Lord Chancellor of Ireland in 1921, being the last to hold that office with its abolition in 1922. Ross was born and raised in Londonderry, before proceeding to Trinity College, Dublin. Briefly an MP in the 1890s, Ross was chiefly interested in the law. Called to the Irish Bar in 1880, he took silk in 1891. His career as a Chancery barrister, and later a judge, led him to the Irish woolsack. As a result of the Government of Ireland Act 1920, his role as Lord Chancellor was very different to that of his predecessors. However, as Lord Chancellor he took no back-seat role, hearing cases in the newly established High Court of Appeal for Ireland up until his office was abolished. Ross also served as Speaker of the short-lived Senate of Southern Ireland. He retired to Northern Ireland, where he died in 1935.

The Introduction reflects on Hegel’s unique approach to social and political philosophy, the distance that separates him from other modern thinkers and the contemporary reception of his ideas. Although the charges of conservatism and intolerance raised by Hegel’s early critics have since been discredited, the current tendency to regard him as a social-minded liberal fails to capture the true depth of his political thought. And this failure follows, it is argued, from the tendency to read the Philosophy of Right in a linear or horizontal manner, as a progression in which each dialectical stage is merely completed or expanded by subsequent ones. Introducing the book’s main thesis, the chapter claims that only a vertical reading, which recognizes the progression’s transformative nature, can do justice to Hegel’s overall argument. Moreover, anticipating the critical reconstruction of the Philosophy of Right undertaken in the book’s second part, it is claimed that such a reading leads beyond Hegel’s own political and economic views, towards a more progressive vision of modern society.