This chapter aims to provide a comprehensive and critical examination of how Mainland China and Hong Kong cooperate to regulate cross-border securities market misconduct, and based on the examination, make suggestions for improvement. While the Mainland–Hong Kong cooperation has produced good achievements, there remain many important issues which can be broadly divided into two categories: substantive rules on the definitions of market misconduct and penalties for such misconduct; enforcement mechanisms in relation to information exchange, regulatory architecture and extradition arrangement. This chapter suggests that the substantive rules be harmonized to the extent possible and the enforcement mechanisms be unified as a long-term goal. Despite its peculiarities, the Mainland–Hong Kong case can contribute to the international discourse on the regulation of cross-border securities misconduct.

According to Dazai Shundai, the most effective way for feudal domains to amass wealth and resolve their fiscal difficulties is to promote the production of crops and other products for which the domain’s soil and geography provide a particular advantage. Domain governments should then manage trade in these products with other regions in order to maximize profits for the domain, rather than allowing private merchants to dominate this trade. From the perspective of traditional Confucian teachings it is not ideal for rulers to pursue profit through commerce, but this is an acceptable emergency measure to deal with a time of crisis.

I revisit how my practice of adda instituted a counter-hierarchical, shared practice of knowledge making which helped to show the diverse locations and experiences that produce a field of Indian feminist jurisprudence. I recount how my performances of adda helped to carve out specific conversations—in authors’ texts and lives—to show how these are conscious experiences of law that account for the diverse organisations of mutual law–life relations in an Indian post-colonial context. I draw this book to a close by reaffirming that the field of Indian feminist jurisprudence is a diverse body of knowledge that is produced out of the disparate lived practices of varied groups of people who live different lives and relate with law differently; and that the performances of emplaced conversations help us attend to, and recognise, such differences in law-life relations.

These guidelines regarding the recruitment and use of agents (here referred to as the development of informants) show how, after years of uncertainty, one operational component responsible for the security of critical infrastructure responded to the demands of China’s central government for a revival of agent work. Subjects covered in the guidelines include the principles and demands to guide recruitment, the scope and qualifications of targets, deactivation, authority to recruit, running, record keeping, and more. Some minor modifications aside, there is no alternative paradigm at work here, and what the guidelines propose differs little from what had been the case prior to 1967. As far as HUMINT is concerned, the Cultural Revolution (1966–1969) had now become something more akin to an aberration than, as originally intended, ‘a new stage in the development of the socialist revolution in our country, a deeper and more extensive stage’.

The political and economic fortunes of Indonesia’s food parastatal, Bulog, have swayed amid the country’s fluid democracy. Nominal reforms to realize the agency’s autonomy have failed to keep powerholders from exploiting Bulog, signaling continuity with the New Order (1967-98). This chapter examines the post-Soeharto import regime via the wider context of political elite control in order to fund political party activities, which began under the abbreviated yet democratic presidencies of B. J. Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid. President Megawati Soekarnoputri binged on rice imports to benefit her political allies financially before drastically cutting imports to bolster her pro-farmer image before presidential elections. Her successor, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, did likewise, but in reverse order. President Widodo sought to bypass the corruption-plagued Bulog in managing some of his anti-poverty programs to improve their efficiency. Jokowi also turned to the army to enhance food security via rice production through the building of massive army-directed food estates in the country’s outer islands.

Chapter 1 sets the historical backdrop to the Green Revolution. First, it chronicles why the Green Revolution was deemed necessary in the first place, most notably due to the lack of technological breakthrough in rice production and the related meager public support for food-crop agriculture. Through this exploration, the chapter demonstrates the instructive point that the politicization of rice did not begin with the Green Revolution. Instead, it has a long history. But previous attempts at boosting paddy yields, for example, for a variety of reasons had failed. The chapter is arranged by case study. It starts with a careful look at pre-Green Revolution developments in the Philippines, followed by Malaya/Malaysia, and Indonesia. The narrative is organized chronologically within each section, which roughly starts with the early 20th century under colonialism and ends with the early independence period in the 1950s and early 1960s.

Shundai addresses the transition from feudal agrarianism to an urbanized commercial economy in early modern Japan. He accepted the inevitabile growth of commerce, but sought to counteract its disruption of traditional hierarchies through a series of institutional reforms to solidify state power, including policies to shift control of commerce from the ascendant merchant class to the ruling samurai class. Shundai draws on the views of Ogyū Sorai (1666–1728), who defined the Confucian Way as a set of techniques for rulership derived from the sage kings of ancient China, as opposed to the metaphysical theories and focus on personal moral cultivation promoted by Zhu Xi (1130–1200) and his Japanese followers. Shundai’s samurai authoritarianism owes much to Sorai, but he is innovative for his pragmatism and flexibility, as reflected in his willingness to employ non-Confucian methods of governing and to adapt Confucian ideals to contemporary reality. After Shundai, writers on political economy in early modern and modern Japan developed increasingly ambitious visions of state-managed economic growth, presenting such policies not merely as a pragmatic compromise, but as an unalloyed good.