The close relationship between the “Shiji jie” (Exposition of Historical Records) chapter of the Yi Zhoushu (Remaining Zhou Documents) and the “Wangzheng” (Portents of Destruction) chapter of the Han Feizi has long been recognized, but prior to this, the precise nature of the connection has been unexplored. This article presents a comparative study structured around an annotated translation of these two texts. The “Shiji jie” describes how King Mu of Zhou fell asleep and dreamed of a set of instructions for how to avoid the mistakes made by other dynasties and states that led to their decline and fall. This “mirror for princes” text is thought to have inspired Han Fei to create his own version, which has traditionally been read as a series of abstract warnings, describing situations which could lead to disaster for the monarch. This article argues that what Han Fei was actually doing was presenting a series of riddles for the reader to guess, each of which alludes to a specific historical event. The “Wangzheng” thus reframes the “Shiji jie” in terms of both style and content, creating a new literary work.

Mao’s violent collectivization and forced labour campaigns during China’s Great Leap Forward (1958–1962) led to as many as 45 million deaths in what is widely regarded as the worst famine in human history. Drawing on a corpus of over 300 interviews with famine survivors, I apply a mixed-methods approach to examine the impact of mass state repression on how such survivors speak about a repressive regime that remains in power. Exploiting variation in county-level mortality rates, I find that interviewees exposed to more intense state violence do not publicly voice more explicitly negative attitudes towards the state, but they do possess more latent negative sentiments. Furthermore, I use the establishment and subsequent dissolution of communal canteens – a key repressive institution through which the state functioned as the sole food distributor during a time of extreme scarcity – as an analytical lever to show that although some survivors may be unwilling to express grievances directly against an enduring regime that perpetrated mass violence, they readily express negativity towards a long-dead institution.

This article situates the Manchukuo Red Cross Society (MRCS) within the historiography of the Kwantung Army’s project to create an independent state in Northeast China, friction with Japanese interest groups already established in Manchuria, and the participation of ordinary Manchurians in state-sponsored organizations. It argues that the Kwantung Army’s sponsorship of a Manchukuo “national” Red Cross society reflected the accelerating pace of the Shinkyō government’s institutional development and pursuit of international recognition as a sovereign state. It also shows that the MRCS project encountered, and only partially overcame, opposition from on the one hand, the Japanese Red Cross Society (JRCS), which, since the Russo-Japanese War had established a strong institutional presence in Manchuria that it was reluctant to relinquish and, on the other hand, from the Geneva-based International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), whose president deferred to the Swiss Foreign Ministry and overrode senior staff in refusing the MRCS membership status. Nevertheless, once established, the MRCS developed into a multi-ethnic and multi-national humanitarian organization that mobilized both the Chinese population and the Japanese immigrant community, engaged with local governing authorities, and enlisted thousands of common people in the movement, and to this extent, furthered the Kwantung Army’s nation-building project.

This study investigates the political consciousness, identity, and cultural resilience of Okinawan emigrants to mainland Japan, focusing on the Hyogo Prefecture Okinawan Association. Using surveys and interviews, it highlights how Okinawans navigate migration challenges while preserving their heritage. Key findings reveal a strong affinity for Okinawa among members who were first-generation Okinawan, while younger generations showed a shift toward broader Japanese identification. Cultural practices, such as Okinawan cuisine and traditional events, have remained essential but were less common among younger members. Most respondents opposed the concentration of US military bases in Okinawa, though views on economic dependency and base removal were divided.

This article examines legislative waffling behavior—where legislators reverse their position between bill sponsorship and floor voting—in the South Korean National Assembly from 2004 to 2020. Using multilevel logistic regression analysis of 21,292 bill-legislator observations across four legislative terms, we develop a novel theoretical framework that disaggregates waffling into three distinct strategic types: dissent (voting against), abstention, and no-show (strategic absence). Our findings challenge US-based theories by revealing that minority party members in Korea exhibit significantly higher rates of waffling across all types, with the effect particularly pronounced when bills are passed as chairman’s substitutes in majority-controlled committees. We demonstrate that ideologically extreme legislators are more prone to waffling, while main sponsors maintain greater consistency throughout the legislative process. The analysis of committee control structures reveals complex dynamics where minority party members face heightened waffling pressures even in committees they control, suggesting that formal institutional authority cannot fully overcome broader power imbalances in consensus-based systems. These findings highlight how Korea’s distinctive institutional features—including proportional distribution of committee chairs, mixed electoral system, and consensus-oriented legislative culture—create fundamentally different incentive structures for legislative behavior compared to majoritarian systems, underscoring the importance of developing context-specific theoretical frameworks for comparative legislative studies.

Two new folios from the Old Khotanese epic Buddhist poem the Book of Zambasta have recently come to light. One folio contains the word dīñu which is thrice attested elsewhere in both Old (dīñi, dīña) and Late Khotanese (dīñä) and has been puzzling. The new attestation provides context which helps to establish the approximate meaning of the word. It also provides a new shape (-u) which establishes the morphology. Most shapes (-u, -i, -ä) attest a second singular imperative middle of dīñ- “to overthink”. This finding improves the translation of several passages. dīñ- appears to be a denominal verb from *dīnā- “thought”, cognate to Avestan daēnā- “view, vision” and related to Vedic dhī- “think, reflect”. The semantic development appears to be “see” → “think” → “overthink”.

This article sheds light on the understudied significance of Islam, Communism, and global politics in defining what constituted an acceptable “religion” (shūkyō 宗教) in wartime Japan. An analysis of the Japanese Imperial Diet’s debates on the place of Islam in the Religious Organizations Law of 1939, which defined state-sanctioned religious organizations, reveals that Muslim attention from around the world, international politics, the global spread of Communism, and the relatively short history of Islam in Japan, affected politicians’ decision not to mention Islam as a religious organization in the law. While previous literature on the Religious Organizations Law has not adequately addressed the significance of international and non-Euro-American transnational influences, this article argues that lawmakers viewed the power of transnational Muslim and Communist networks as crucial when defining both officially acceptable “religion” and the Shrine (jinja 神社), or Shrine Shinto, as the national core to be protected under this law. The debates surrounding Islam offer fertile ground for examining the significance of global affairs in determining acceptable forms of “religion” in Japan, as well as the broader implications of what Japanese state officials called “religion” and “thought” (shisō 思想) in wartime Japanese and world politics.