Apuleius, On Interpretation 13.193.16–20

However, Ariston of Alexandria and some of the more recent Peripatetics add five other moods besides those with a universal conclusion (three in the first figure and two in the second), in place of which they infer particular [conclusions]. But it is completely absurd to conclude less when more is granted [i.e. to have a conclusion weaker than the premisses allow].

Aratus, Philosophy, in Paris, suppl. gr. 645 fol. 197r., ed. C. Kalbfleisch, Jahrbuch f. d. klassische Philologie suppl. 23, 1897, 707

(1) Problem: that there should be another syllogistic figure, in addition to these [three], seemed impossible to Aristotle and his associates. For it is impossible that, among three terms, the middle term should be arranged in relation to the two extremes in any other relation besides those stated. Theophrastus [93 FHS&G] and Eudemus [fr. 18 Wehrli 1969a] added certain other combinations to the first figure besides those set out by Aristotle; and about these we will speak in what follows. Some of the more recent [thinkers] thought that these constituted a fourth figure, referring the doctrine to Galen as its father. To establish this they use an argument like the following: if it is possible for the middle term to be arranged in relation to the extremes in some other relation besides those stated, there will also be another figure of the syllogism besides those that have been stated. But the first: therefore the second. (2) The minor [premiss of their argument] is shown [as follows]: it is possible for the middle term, in the reverse way to the first figure, to be predicated of the major term, and to be the subject of the minor, for example: ‘every human being is an animal; every animal is a substance; so some substance is a human being.’ The major term is ‘human being’, because it is the predicate in the conclusion, and the minor [term] is substance, because it is the subject in [the conclusion]; and ‘animal’, which is the middle term, is predicated of ‘human being’ [in the major premiss], but is the subject [in the minor premiss] of ‘substance’, which is the minor term.

Aristocles, On Philosophyf4.10 Chiesara, reported by Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 14.18.19

And when [the Pyrrhonian Sceptics] say that all things are unclear, it is worth asking from where they actually learned this. For they must first know what the clear is; for on this [basis] at least they would be able to say that things are not like this. For it is necessary to know the positive statement first, and [only] then the negative one. But if they do not know what the clear is like, they cannot know what the unclear is, either.

Aristocles, On Philosophyf6.9–10 Chiesara, reported by Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel 14.20.9–10

(1) But since even now there are some [the Epicureans] who say that every sensation and every impression is true, let us say a little about them also. These people seem to be afraid that if they said that some sensations are false, they would not have a criterion or rule that was firm or reliable. (2) But they do not see that thus they are immediately saying that all opinions, too, are true. For we naturally judge many things by these. But none the less they judge that some [opinions] are true, others false. (3) Next, if someone considered, he would see that not even of the other criteria is any free from falsity always and throughout, I mean, for example, a balance and compasses, and the like. But each of them is sound when it is in one condition, faulty when it is in another, and when it is used in one way it gives the true answer, in another way a false one. (4) Indeed, if every sensation were true, they ought not to be so different. For they are different when close at hand and far away, in the sick and the healthy, in craftsmen and in laymen, in the wise and in the foolish. (5) It would be altogether absurd to say that the sensations of the mad are true, and of those who mis-see and mis-hear. For it would be simple-minded to say that the person who mis-sees either sees [the object] or does not see it; for one could reply that he sees [it], but [does so] incorrectly.

Simplicius, On Aristotle’s Categories 134.5–7

But perhaps, they say, Andronicus did better, making place and time categories in their own right and ranking Where and When beneath these.

Simplicius, On Aristotle’s Categories 342.21–5

One should note that Aristotle made time and place [types] of quantity and When and Where categories in their own right; but Archytas, and Andronicus following Archytas, ranked When beneath time and Where beneath place and thus established the two categories [of time and place], themselves too preserving the number of kinds as ten.

Macrobius, On the Dream of Scipio 1.14.20 (Critolaus, fr. 18 Wehrli 1969b)

Critolaus the Peripatetic [teaches] that [the soul] is constituted of the fifth substance.

Tertullian, On the Soul 5.2 (Critolaus, fr. 17 Wehrli 1969b)

Nor do I speak only of those who fashion [the soul] from things that are clearly corporeal, as Hipparchus and Heraclitus do from fire, Hippo and Thales from water, Empedocles and Critias from blood, Epicurus from atoms (if atoms too produce corporeities from their coming-together), as Critolaus and his Peripatetics do from some fifth substance (if it too is a body, since it includes bodies), but I adduce also the Stoics, who call the soul spirit, virtually [agreeing] with us, in that breath and spirit are very close to each other, but nevertheless will easily persuade [us] that the soul is body.

Philoponus, On Aristotle’s Categories 5.15–20

Next is the third heading, where in Aristotle’s writings one should start. Well, Boethus of Sidon says that one should start from the treatment of physics, since this is more familiar and knowable for us, and one should start from the things that are more clear and knowable. But his teacher, Andronicus of Rhodes, examining [the issue] more exactly, said that one should first begin with logic, which is concerned with demonstration.

Elias, On Aristotle’s Categories 117.17–25

Let us investigate three things, where to start on Aristotle’s writings, where to end, and the route between. We make this investigation not only because of the number of [the writings] but also because of the disagreement among the ancients; for some said that one should begin with physics, some with logic, others with ethics, others from mathematics. Boethus of Sidon says with physics; Andronicus of Rhodes, the eleventh of the successive heads of the Aristotelian school, said with logic, and of the Platonists some with ethics, others with mathematics.

Aëtius 1.29.2 (Dox. 325b5–15)

(1) [Aristotle says] . . . that there are four causes in the whole according to which everything is constituted: intelligence, nature, necessity and chance. And each of these is double, one sort being in human affairs and the other in other things. Some things are fulfilled in every case, others for the most part, others differently at different times. (2) Fate is not a cause, but a manner [tropos] of cause, which attaches in a way to the ordered things that belong to necessity. (Sharples 2007b, 597)

Anonymous, On Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 149.33–150.4

(1) Having said that deliberation is concerned with things that can be done and depend on us–for these alone are left–[Aristotle] added as an indication that of the things mentioned the cause of some is nature, of others necessity, of others chance (placing the spontaneous too under chance), and of others intelligence. These are the things that come about through a human being and have a human being as their origin; and for this reason they are also up to us. (2) Fate too would be said to be placed under nature according to these men. For what is fated is neither inevitable nor necessary. (Sharples 2007b, 596)

Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods 1.33

(1) Aristotle in the third book of his On Philosophy introduces great confusion, disagreeing with his teacher Plato: for now he attributes all divinity to intellect, now he says that the world itself is a god, now he puts some other [god] in charge of the world and assigns to him the role of ruling and preserving the movement of the world by a certain rolling back, then he says that the heat of the heaven is a god, not understanding that the heaven is a part of the world which he himself elsewhere has designated as a god. (2) But how could that divine awareness be preserved in such rapid motion? Where are all the gods [we speak of], if we count the heaven itself as a god? And when he wants god to be without a body, he deprives him of all awareness, and [so] of wisdom. Further, how can [god] move if he does not have a body, or how, if he is always moving himself, can he be peaceful and blessed?

Stobaeus, Selections 1.1.29b (35.5–6 Wachsmuth) = Aëtius 1.7.21 (Dox. p. 303.6–7) = Critolaus, fr. 16 Wehrli 1969b

Critolaus, and Diodorus of Tyre, [said that god is] an intellect from impassible aither.

Arius Didymus (?), Fragments on Physics 3 (Dox. 448.13–28)

(1) Aristotle sometimes says that these principles are two, the matter and the form, which he also calls shape and actuality [entelekheia] and the-what-it-was-to-be and the being/substance [ousia] according to the account, and the activity/actuality [energeia]. This is how rich and many-named the form is for him. (2) The form is different from the shape in so far as the former extends through the depth, while the latter is on the surface; the one is like the whiteness in painting, while the other gives form to the substance [ousia] of milk. But the same is also called form inasmuch as the one gives form to the matter and the other gives it shape. (3) He called it actuality [entelekheia] either because it is present completely [entelekhōs] or because it makes each of the things that participate in it complete [teleion]. For the bronze is not yet a statue, except potentially, but when it has been fashioned and has taken on the appropriate shape it is said [to be a statue] in actuality; for then it has received its completion [telos]. (4) He called it the what-it-was-to-be because it gives the capacity of being to each of the things that are; and being according to the account because it is different from the [being] according to the matter, as the statue [differs] from the bronze and the cup from the silver and whatever statue it might be from the stone. For that by which these go beyond the matter, from which they have been crafted, is the being according to the account. (5) He called it activity/actuality because none of the beings could be active/actual without having first been given form.

Stobaeus, Selections 1.13.1b (138.9–12 Wachsmuth 1884) = Aëtius 1.11.4

They say that Aristotle indicated each [cause] by using expressions such as the following, saying that that from which was the matter, that by which the agent, that according to which the form, that on account of which the end.

This Introduction and the chronological table that follows it are intended to give readers who may not be familiar with this period of Peripatetic philosophy a guide to the major trends and developments, and to introduce some of the philosophers who will be considered in the following pages. The actual ancient evidence relating to some of the identifications and dates will be found below in Chapter 1, ‘People’.

Aristotle’s school, the Lyceum, has been regarded both in antiquity and by modern scholars as entering a period of decline after its third head, Strato. This impression may in part be the result of tendentious representation in the ancient evidence, but in so far as it is accurate, the fundamental reason for the decline seems to be, not that Aristotle’s works were no longer available (below, 2), but that the Lyceum had never had an agenda that was philosophical in the narrow sense of that term predominant in antiquity, as promoting a way of life and an attitude towards its events. From Aristotle himself onwards, the concern of the school had largely been with the collecting and analysis of information on a wide range of topics, and it thus suffered from the double disadvantage that, on the one hand, it did not have such a clear evangelical message to propound as did the Epicureans or the Stoics (for the message of Nicomachean Ethics 10, that the highest human activity is theoretical study for its own sake, was probably of no wider appeal in antiquity than it is now), and, on the other, that such research was being carried on elsewhere, above all in Ptolemaic Alexandria. The notion of Aristotelianism as a distinctive philosophical system, in a sense closer to modern understandings of ‘philosophical’, is in no small part the result of a process that had its beginnings in the period considered in the present book.

Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods 2.44 (Aristotle, On Philosophy, fr. 24 Rose 1886)

Aristotle, too, is to be praised for judging that all things that move are moved either by nature or by force or by [their own] will. The sun and moon and all the stars move; but things which are moved by nature are carried either downwards by their weight or upwards by their lightness, and neither of these applies to the stars, because their movement is round in a circle. Nor can it be said that some greater force brings it about that the stars move contrary to their nature; for what greater [force] can there be? So what is left is that the movement of the stars is voluntary.

Cicero, Academica Posteriora 1.26

Aristotle thought that there was a fifth kind [of element], from which were stars and minds; it was unique and unlike the four which I mentioned above.

Stobaeus, Selections 1.8.40b (103.7–8 Wachsmuth 1884) = Aëtius 1.22.6 (Dox. p. 318.22–4) = Critolaus, fr. 14 Wehrli 1969b

Antiphon and Critolaus [said that] time [is] a thought or a measure, not something that subsists [hupostasis].

Pseudo-Archytas, On Universal Logos or the Ten Categories 30.9–16 Thesleff

(1) [Time] always was and will be, and the present moment [the ‘now’] will never cease becoming different again and again, different in number but the same in kind. (2) But [time] is different from other continua, since of a line and an area and of place the parts subsist, while of time the [parts] that have come to be have perished, those that are coming to be are perishing, and those that will come to be will perish. (3) And for this reason time either does not exist at all or does so in an obscure way and with difficulty. For how could that really exist of which the past no longer exists, the future does not exist yet, and the now is without parts and indivisible?

Cicero, On the Orator 2.155

[Scipio the younger, Laelius and Furius] said that the Athenians did something most welcome both to them and to many of the leading citizens, in that, when they sent envoys to the senate about their most important concerns [in 156/5 bc], they sent the three most distinguished philosophers of that age, Carneades and Critolaus and Diogenes [of Babylon]; and so these, while they were at Rome, were frequently listened to both by themselves and by others.

Cicero, On Ends 5.14

Critolaus wished to imitate the early [Peripatetics], and indeed he is closest [to them] in seriousness, and his style is free-flowing; but not even he holds to the principles of his ancestors. Diodorus, his pupil, adds to moral virtue [honestas] freedom from pain. He too has a position of his own; and since he disagrees about the supreme good he cannot truly be called a Peripatetic. It seems to me that our Antiochus follows the opinion of the ancients most carefully; he teaches that it was the same for Aristotle and for Polemo.

Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors (Adversus mathematicos) 2.12 (Critolaus, fr. 32 Wehrli 1969b)

So just as I would not say that there is an art of burglary which instructs one that this is how one should burgle, or of thieving [which instructs one] that this is how it is appropriate to thieve and snatch purses (for these things are false, and neither appropriate nor scientific principles), just so one should not suppose that rhetoric exists as an art, tossed about on precepts like these. At any rate the followers of Critolaus the Peripatetic, and much earlier those of Plato, with this in mind abused [rhetoric] for being established as a false art rather than an art.

Quintilian, Education of the Orator 2.15.19–20, 23 ((2) = Critolaus, fr. 26 Wehrli 1969b)

(1) But those who did not regard everything as the orator’s subject matter introduced more careful and lengthy distinctions, as was necessary; among them was Ariston, the pupil of Critolaus the Peripatetic, whose conclusion is ‘the knowledge of how to identify and carry out persuasion of the public through speeches in civil disputes.’ Being a Peripatetic he does not, like the Stoics, regard this knowledge as a virtue; by including persuasion of the public he is actually rather disparaging of the art of oratory, which he does not think will persuade learned people at all . . . (2) Some people have thought that [rhetoric] is neither a power nor a science nor an art, but Critolaus [thought it] experience in speaking (for this is what tribē means), Athenaeus an art of deception.