THE DESTRUCTION OF GALEN'S LIBRARY

The great fire that consumed the Temple of Peace in early AD 192 also destroyed a large part of Galen's personal library, along with his drugs and instruments. It robbed him of rare tracts by others as well as copies of several of his own books. Some of them, such as On Prognosis, he may never have been able to retrieve or recompose during the rest of his long life. For a scholar-physician who expressed himself so much through books, and whose authority depended in part on book-learning, this was undoubtedly a great blow. From being able to hand out copies of his own and others' writings to his friends and to doctors in need, he was reduced to depending largely on the generosity of others to make good what had been burnt in the fire. The loss of his library would, indeed, have caused him enormous grief, so he claimed, had not his philosophical training, in part inherited from his father and grandfather, allowed him to maintain his equanimity even in the face of such a disaster. Others, he noted, showed less self-control – and paid for it. Callistus the grammarian, who had also lost his books in the fire, could not sleep, fell into a fever and died of grief.

What does he mean by the first generation of the soul? Since the soul is a plurality and the first of the things that are composite, it has been put together not from an infinite number, but out of [parts that have] a definite number. And since these things are not ill proportioned but rather have been harmonised, numbers and harmony have been plausibly assumed in its generation. But since it includes as well all the first principles of all proportion and all harmony – this being the soul of the cosmos – not a single proportion has been left out. Because the compos ite is divine, the more divine of the kinds [of harmony] was assumed, i.e. the diatonic, for this [harmonic system] is inspired. Because Being, Sameness and Difference have all been assumed from the start, the soul has been established as a whole prior to the parts, but now through the generation of the soul we have the whole in the parts. For the Demiurge has divided and unified it through proportions, and through the circles he has provided for the wholeness of the parts in each one. It must also be accepted that the Demiurge in the Timaeus acts in conjunction with all the other creators, for he divides [the Circle of the Same] into seven in the manner of the Titans and unifies things in a manner that is Apollonian. In as much as he has the character of Hephaestus, he forges and shapes bodies, while he demarcates the patterns of risings and settings [among the heavenly bodies] and has written the laws of fate in as much as he has the character of Necessity.

Since it is necessary for <the things> in the generation of the soul to have a point (skopos), what is said must be referred either to the soul's essence or to the things that are administered by it. Or, if possible, they should be referred to both, for the things in the cosmos are due to those things that subsist in the soul in an essential way (kat’ ousian).

It is necessary to inquire into what the means are, what multiples are, what a super-particular ratio is and what a super-partient ratio is, what the semi-tone is, what the seven portions are [in the division of the Circle of the Different].

The soul's powers, Tim. 36c6–d7

He made the circle of the Same revolve horizontally towards the right, but the circle of the Different along a diagonal toward theleft. (Tim. 36c6–8)

The different powers of the two circles

General interpretation

Since it remains to discuss the powers of the soul, the dialogue goes into these matters and deals with the Demiurgic differentiation of them from one another, for the power (dynamis) comes after the essence (ousia), while the activity (energeia) has third place, as we said earlier [125.12– 22]. Plato has also shown this to be so, calling it the rotation (Tim. 36c4) of the Same and the rotation of the Different, but not the essence of these things. He produces various powers from these two circles, and subsequent to this communicates to us what sort of activities they have. He has done the same kind of thing in the Phaedrus when he spoke about the horses, the better one and the worse one.

Well then, what does he say here about the powers of the World Soul? First, as we said, he divides the universal powers into two – I mean the power of the Same and the power of the Different, the one being analogous to the Limited, the other to the Unlimited. Next he divides [the circle of] the Different in accordance with other distinc tive properties and takes it into smaller numbers and unifies the plurality through Sameness. After this he allocates the superior and more divine things to the superior powers, but the things that are further deteriorated to the inferior powers. So to take an example, if you will, the movement to the right has been allocated to the circle of the Same, but movement to the left to the circle of the Different. Also, one gets to move horizontally, while the other gets movement along the diagonal. Furthermore, in the table of opposites, the series that includes the Same, the Right, the Square, and the Rational [number] (to rhêton) has been assigned to the superior member, while the remaining one similarly gets their opposites: the Different, the Left, the Oblong, and the Irrational. So the general intention behind the text at hand is something like this.

THE BACKGROUND TO PROCLUS’ COMMENTARY ON THE WORLD SOUL IN TIMAEUS

Proclus’ treatment of the composition of the World Soul and the harmonic ratios within it is the most in-depth portion of the surviving commentary. Proclus expends 216 pages of text on the 86 OCT lines from Timaeus 34b2–37c5. This yields a page-to-line ratio that slightly outstrips the effort that Proclus expends on the Demiurge and his model (Tim. 27c1–31b3) in Book II of the Timaeus commentary. (To be precise: 2.51 pages/line versus 2.39 pages/line.) The interest of the latter passage to a Platonist is obvious; we are talking about nothing less than the identity of the Demiurge and the nature of the Intelligible Paradigm to which he looks in creating the visible cosmos. It is true that Proclus must also contend with what he takes to be seriously mistaken views of this part of Plato's text, viz. those previous interpreters who suppose that Plato describes here a creation of the cosmos in time. Hence a great deal of time and effort go into refuting the views of previous interpreters, such as Plutarch and Atticus.

Naturally, the subject of the World Soul is equally interesting to a Platonist. However, I think that Proclus’ level of effort on the World Soul is largely determined by the difficulties of detail in Plato's text that had already generated a considerable literature. Proclus engages at length with these alternative interpretations and in the course of doing so tells us a great deal about such figures as Severus and Theodore of Asine. Indeed, the longest and most detailed testimonia that we possess about the latter come from just this portion of Proclus’ commentary. Thus in order to put Proclus’ work into some sort of context, we need to consider it against the backdrop of the history of interpretations of Timaeus 34b–37c. The following remarks will add little to the work of Baltes and Brisson, but they will perhaps be sufficient for shedding some light on Proclus’ relation to the previous tradition.

In the middle of it he placed Soul, extending it throughout the universe and then covering the body externally with it. (34b3–4)

The order of Plato's treatment of the question

God brings forth all things all at once (athroôs) and throughout eternity. For it is through his very being and through his eternal thinking of wholes that he engenders all the things that result from him – the totality of things both hypercosmic and encosmic: intellects, souls, natures, bodies and matter itself. If you ask me, demiurgic creation exhibits this ‘all at once’ aspect more than the Sun's illumination does. In the latter case, the entire light (to holon phôs) proceeds simultaneously from the Sun. But even though the Sun imitates the Father through visible (emphanês) creation, this is clearly inferior to the Father's eternal and invisible (aphanês) production. Therefore, as we said, though all things have come about from the act of creation eternally and all together (homou), nonetheless (homôs) the order of effects is still preserved; for all things proceed all together and each with its own order since there was present in that which produced it an eternal intelligence and an order prior to the things that have been ordered. Hence, even if all things result at once from one thing, nonetheless some of them are of primary worth while others have a lesser value. Some have proceeded to a greater, others to a lesser degree. Some have been joined together by the Demiurge through unification (kath’ henôsin), others through connection (kata synaphên), and still others through participation (kata methexin). So intellect is capable of being connate with intellect through unification. But soul naturally is able to be connected to intellect, while body is only able to participate; for example, even those things at the far end of the earth share in the radiance of the Sun.

Among all the things in the cosmos – intellect, soul and body – although it is the case that all of them have proceeded all at once, there nonetheless exists among these things the order which comes down from the Demiurge, and for this reason [Timaeus’] account at one time starts from above in the mode of procession and ends at the limit of creation,

Psychic linearity, Tim. 36b6–c1

So then, he divided this entire composite in two lengthwise strips, affixing each to the other, middle to middle, like an X. (Tim. 36b6–c1)

Mathematical interpretation

First it is necessary to speak about this in a mathematical fashion, determining what sort of shape the soul has. Then it is necessary to introduce the consideration of the facts so that we may provide ourselves with the receptivity to be well directed by our imaginative capacity (phantasia) toward a knowledgeable apprehension (epistêmonikê antilêpsis) concerning what is said here.

We must therefore conceive all these numbers as having been inscribed along a monochord, just as those who study harmonics customarily do. Let it have these numbers inscribed through its whole depth, and let the monochord be divided lengthwise. Now surely all the ratios will be present in each of the pieces. For if the division had been made across the width, then it would necessarily have been the case that some of the numbers would be found here, while others were there. But since the strips were taken lengthwise, all the numbers would be in all the strips, and the same numbers will be present in each of the portions. For this is obvious: that it is not the same thing to divide the length and to divide lengthwise. The latter signifies that the strip runs through the whole length, while the former implies that someone cuts the length. So therefore let the monochord be divided lengthwise in this manner and let these two lengthwise strips be affixed to one another at the point midway along the strips – not entirely right angles (for the circles will not be at right angles) – and so that the straight lines have been thus bent around so that the end points have again been joined. Now surely two circles come into being, and these have come to be in such a way that one is on the inside and the other is on the outside, and they are at an angle to one another. Now one of these is called the circle of the Same and the other is the circle of the Different. The one corresponds to the equator while the other corresponds to the circle of the ecliptic.

The soul's divisible and indivisible Being

Between the divisible Being that is always the same and the divisible Being that comes to be in the case of bodies he compounded a thirdspecies (eidos) of Being from both. (35a1–4)

Lexis for Tim. 35a1–4

By the indivisible Being he means that which is intellectual and participates in eternity with respect to the entirety of itself. But by divisible he means that which is in the realm of bodies, inseparable from extension, and which has been allotted an existence (hyparxis) that is entirely temporal. He has made this clear by calling the first that which is always the same, while he calls the second that which comes to be. He has done this in order that the soul should not only be simultaneously indivisible and divisible, but also in order that it may be called intelligible and the first among the things that have come to be. For eternal everlastingness (aiônios ädiotês) is one thing, while an eternity that has its existence (hypostasis) in being co-extensive with an unlimited time is another. The sort [of eternity] that is mixed from both is yet another thing, which is surely what there is in the case of soul. For soul is unchanging with respect to its essence, but it is changed with respect to its intellection (noeŝis). It is eternal with respect to the former, but temporal with respect to the latter. And it is clear that something of this sort necessarily pertains to the soul's existence (hyparxis), else it would not naturally manifest in its activities the defining characteristic of genesis and temporal extension. It seems to me that in a manner quite amazing Plato spotted this fact and indicated so by saying not only that the Demiurge made the soul to be a intermediate between the indivisible Being and that which is in relation to bodies, but by also saying that it is an intermediate between that which is always the same and that which comes to be. For how would it otherwise be fitting to write a generation of the soul (psychogonia) if there were in no way a genesis or composition in the soul?

The soul's harmony

With each of them remaining a mixture of Sameness, Difference and Being, the Demiurge began to divide them as follows: (Tim. 35b2–3)

Interpretation of Tim. 35b2–3

For if all [the genera that constitute the soul] are in all, and the whole is homoiomerous with itself, then there would be no segregation of the unity from the continuity. After all, if in the case of bodies those that are similar are naturally conjoined without an intermediary, then surely to an even greater degree this will be so in the case of incorporeal natures. All the “parts”, as it were, are unified and the whole has been subordinated to the one. Nor will the parts be mixed up through the disposition of the whole, nor will the wholeness be removed because of the differentiation of the parts. One may also infer from these things that, with respect to all of its own parts, the soul is both divisible and indivisible; for if all of its parts participate in all the intermediate genera, then there is nothing one might take from it that is not constituted out of these genera.

With an eye to these facts, the ancient philosophers drew various inferences about the soul – that it is wholly Being, and Life and Intellect, and that whichever one of these three you assume, the remaining ones follow, since all the things in it run through all the others, and the soul is entirely single and its unity is completely perfect, and the part is consubstantial (homochrous, cf. 163.4) with the whole in its case. If each of the many parts of the soul is a certain substance (ousia tis), and if the parts are so many in number, then the soul's Being (ousia) will be equal in number to the parts, and likewise for the Sameness and the Difference. Each [of the three genera] is a single thing in Intellect (this is because Intellect is indivisible, for it is not the case that one part of Intellect is Sameness, while another part is Difference). But in the case of the soul, each [of the genera] <is many>, for the soul has been divided in accordance with substantial number and its parts have been harmonised with one another, making the soul one from many and a ‘whole from the parts’.

Between the indivisible Being that is always the same and the divisible Being that comes to be in the case of bodies he compounded a third 25 form of Being from both. (35a1–4)

Introduction

First, it is necessary to (1) state the reason why Plato provides a genesis of the soul when its origins are ungenerated according to him. Next, it is requisite to (2) divide the whole psychogenesis in respect of the manner in which it takes place; (3) to indicate the sense in which the soul is an intermediate; (4) to speak about these genera from which both the soul and other things have been established; (5) we must undertake to say how mixing of these kinds takes place in the case of soul; (6) to explain what sort of thing the divisible and indivisible kinds of Being are; (7) to make the individual words of Plato's text understandable and show that they are entirely consistent with what was said before. Should we come to be able to apprehend these things in words (tôi logôi), then we will have realised the goal of the present inquiry in the manner that is consonant with our abilities.

Why Plato speaks as if the soul was generated when its origins are ungenerated

Theophrastus’ objection

Let us therefore begin from the first point because some of the ancient philosophers rebuke Plato and say: ‘he incorrectly searches for a principle of a principle and a genesis of an ungenerated thing. For if we look for the causes of the things that are primary and set our minds on the genesis of things that are self-subsistent (authypostatos), we shall fail to see that we shall be going on to infinity and have no end of our inquiries. For just as the person who thinks that all things are capable of demonstration actually does away with demonstration itself, so too the person who seeks after causes in this manner entirely overturns all the existent things and the order in which they they proceed from some definite principle’ (Fortenbaugh (1992), fr. 159).