We investigate why conservative online news media are often seen as niche, whereas liberal outlets have ideologically broader audiences. We examine two explanatory mechanisms for this asymmetry. The behavioral explanation focuses on differences in homophily, where one ideological camp would be exposed to more cross-cutting content due to more diverse networking preferences. The structural explanation highlights how a platform’s user base places some in the minority, naturally exposing them to more cross-cutting content. We analyze network exposure and sharing of news media content among 420,000 US Twitter users in 2022, prior to Musk’s acquisition of the platform. We find that conservative users, as the minority, were overexposed to cross-cutting media content through their network contacts, while liberal users, as the majority, were underexposed. Consequently, liberal media were shared across party lines, while conservative media were overlooked by liberals and circulated mostly within a tight network of conservative accounts. This apparent paradox suggests that although conservatives primarily engage with their own media, liberal outlets attract a broader audience, including many conservatives. By combining observational data with simulated benchmarks, we find that the structural mechanism plays a primary role in the observed asymmetry, as exposure to liberal content extends farther into conservative online communities.

The European Union has placed the Circular Economy (CE) as a central strategy to advance fair and sustainable GDP growth. Yet, the mechanisms through which CE could decouple growth from social and environmental harms remain underexplored. This study assesses the macroeconomic, social, and ecological implications of CE policies in France by applying an extended version of the EUROGREEN model. The model is grounded in Ecological Macroeconomics, calibrated on historical data, and simulated over the period 2014–2050 under a business-as-usual (BAU) baseline. A “sequential scenario” methodology is adopted to evaluate alternative CE pathways: (i) a Techno-Optimistic Circularity (TOC) scenario featuring substantial improvements in material efficiency and recycling; (ii) two socially-oriented circularity scenarios that combine moderate technological progress with innovative social policies like reduced working time (C2C) and a Job Guarantee(JG) financed through a wealth tax (SEC); and (iii) a Post-Growth scenario (SCD) characterised by lower consumption and material throughput, supported by a Piketty-style financial wealth tax. Simulation results reveal persistent trade-offs between economic growth, social equity, and environmental sustainability. Growth-centred technological and social circularity scenarios do not achieve sufficient levels of decoupling between economic activity and material use, whereas post-growth pathways deliver balanced outcomes across material extraction, employment, and inequality. Overall, simulation outcomes reveal that growth-oriented circularity strategies cannot combine social equity and long-term sustainability goals. Instead, it seems that integrated policy packages combining technological innovation, social policies, and consumption reduction can reconcile CE ambitions with the pursuit of well-being within planetary boundaries.

The use of real monetary incentives has long defined experimental economics, setting it apart from disciplines like psychology, where hypothetical choices are common. While full-payment and hypothetical designs represent two clear extremes, random-payment incentive schemes – where one of several decisions is randomly selected for payment – have become a prominent approach in economics. Yet the behavioral validity of random-payment schemes remains underexamined: Do they more closely resemble fully incentivized tasks or hypothetical ones? We compare full-payment (participants paid for every decision), no-payment (participants not paid for any decision), and random-payment (participants paid for one randomly selected decision) incentive schemes, using five standard economic games to measure social preferences (Dictator Game, Ultimatum Game, Trust Game, Public Goods Game, and Prisoner’s Dilemma). Results from Experiment 1 (n = 1,501), with £1 stakes, indicate no significant differences between incentive schemes in any of the games included or a composite measure of prosocial behavior. In Experiment 2 (n = 750), with £10 stakes, results were largely in line with Experiment 1, suggesting no consistent behavioral impact of incentive schemes at increased stakes. The one notable exception was responder behavior in the Ultimatum Game, where participants in the full-payment condition were less likely to reject offers compared to those in the no-payment condition, with random-payment falling in between. Our results challenge the rigid disciplinary norm that real stakes are essential for valid measurement and invite a more nuanced consideration of how and when different incentive schemes are necessary or appropriate in behavioral research.