On 15 January 2021, Malaysia requested consultations with the European Union, France and Lithuania pursuant to Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), Article XXII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994), Article 14 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) and Article 30 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) regarding the measures and claims set out below.

This chapter describes how dependence on coffee and other primary commodities exacerbated foreign dependency, especially during fluctuations in global primary commodity prices. The chapter discusses the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s (RPF) origins, including the key paradigmatic ideological foundations of the party while discussing the civil war and the 1994 genocide. The chapter ends by outlining three periods of the evolution of political settlement under RPF rule. Between 1994 and 2000, RPF loyalists were rewarded, while there was increased concentration of power among Tutsi RPF members. In the 2000s, until the early 2010s, RPF leadership centralised control among a smaller clique within the RPF, with increasing elite fragmentation characterising this period. In the third phase after the early 2010s, there has been increased external reliance, and the visible threat of transnational coalitions, comprising RPF dissidents and disenchanted domestic elites, has emerged but been contained.

This chapter analyses the political economy of Rwanda’s financial sector. It presents the evolution of Rwanda’s national banking sector and the ways the Rwandan Patriotic Front has sought to mobilise domestic resources to invest in strategic sectors. It provides an overview of how African financial sectors have been transformed in varied ways through adapting to three kinds of financial sector reforms: policies influenced by the market-led consensus, developmentalist strategies and the influence of offshore sectors. Rwanda, in its attempt to transform Kigali into a financial sector while mobilising state-driven investments for strategic investments and adopting ‘best practice’ financial sector reforms, encapsulates the contradictions associated with being influenced by these three sets of policies concurrently. Next, the chapter describes how the Rwandan government has innovatively mobilised domestic resources to fund strategic investments. Innovations include its pension fund, the Rwanda Social Security Board. The chapter concludes by discussing how elite vulnerability has constrained the capacity of the Rwandan government to concentrate resources and financial expertise in one specific financial institution, thereby inhibiting the effectiveness of strategic investments.

This chapter describes the evolution of agriculture sector policies during the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) rule. Most Rwandans still live in rural areas, and agriculture continues to employ most Rwandans. Prior to RPF rule, the Grégoire Kayibanda and Juvénal Habyarimana governments presented their parties as prioritising rural interests, as well as the production of cash crops for export (particularly coffee). However, since the RPF assumed power, policy priorities have shifted to diversifying agriculture exports (including producing higher-value coffee and tea) and encouraging the market-oriented commercialisation of agricultural production. The RPF’s attempts at reorganising rural society has been characterised by rural resistance and increasing inequality. However, there have been some successes, which have been driven by RPF-affiliated firms, sometimes in partnership with philanthropic investors. Successes include upgrading primary commodities and diversifying agricultural exports. However, agrarian policies have also been marked by increased land differentiation and rural inequality. Ultimately, sustained structural transformation is inhibited by elite vulnerability. The chapter highlights that there are few signs of the emergence of leading domestic agrarian capitalists.

This dispute concerns the United States' compliance with the adopted recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in United States – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Ripe Olives from Spain. The European Union claims that the United States has failed to comply with the adopted findings of the panel report concerning the incompatibility of Section 771B of the US Tariff Act of 1930 (Section 771B) "as such" and "as applied" in the Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Countervailing Duty Order of 1 August 2018 on ripe olives from Spain, with Article VI:3 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994) and Article 10 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement).

This concluding chapter reiterates the main contributions of the book. Growth in most African countries has been characterised by a transformation from low-value agriculture to low-value services. As a result, structural transformation has remained largely elusive within Africa. Services has been the fastest-growing sector on the continent. Rwanda is unique among rapidly growing African countries in explicitly focusing on becoming a services hub. Using the case of Rwanda, this book shows that contemporary late development, which is more dependent on services, results in more transnational forms of dependence and political contestation than experienced in prior experiences of late development. The book ends with thoughts about the future of Rwanda. It argues that in the immediate short term, any instability will depend on what happens in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In the long term, Rwanda’s political stability depends not on the government’s capacity to contain domestic popular mobilisation alone but on the capacity of transnational coalitions of dissident elites and external actors capitalising on existing horizontal inequalities to challenge the Rwandan Patriotic Front rule.

Chapter 3.7 reviews priority-setting. Priority-setting is about taking explicit decisions on where limited public resources should be allocated. Vertical priority-setting focuses on choices for particular sets of health conditions or population groups whereas horizontal priority-setting looks more broadly across types of care, such as primary or secondary care, and broader investments. Key learning includes that

• Defining a health benefits package that is affordable and accessible by all implies a horizontal approach to priority-setting.

• Countries cannot progress towards UHC without horizontal priority-setting and without some form of collective funding and procurement mechanisms.

• Horizontal priority-setting is highly context-specific. Countries may need to reorganize financing and procurement mechanisms to overcome barriers to progress.

• Increasing the total resources for health benefits packages (HBP) can help with the introduction of more horizontal approaches.

• Improving procurement can also support the move towards horizontal priority-setting whether through national efforts (such as better data gathering and use) or international initiatives (i.e. harmonizing regulation across countries or global investment in health security).

• Local capacity is key in supporting the pooling mechanisms, HBP design and regulation which enable horizontal priority-setting. Donors can usefully support health systems strengthening by investing in capacity-building and information sharing.

• Strong political will and cooperation between stakeholders is critical in progressing towards appropriate priority-setting for UHC and in designing, financing and implementing a comprehensive health benefits package.

The chapter re-examines the works of Hamilton, List, Rae and Carey, who had all read the WN and rejected DoLfg analysis and its free-trade message, but admitted its validity when natural advantages in production exist. But manufactures involve acquirable advantages. Free trade in such goods precipitates uneven development, leaves the lagging countries with disarticulated SPs and deprives them of a better share of the ‘universal opulence’ that global DoLop yields. The four made attempts to extend Smith’s discussion of why DoLop could raise productivity. They believed that technology could not readily be transferred. Instead, acquirable advantages had to be obtained purposefully to correct the disarticulation in the lagging countries’ SPs and emulate the pattern of DoLop that England had achieved. Contrary to mainstream economists’ representation, they did not simply advocate trade protection to breed an infant industry. Policies involve multiple trade and non-trade instruments, and additional efforts to purposefully acquire technologies (e.g., technology piracy, attracting immigrants). The goal was to transform a country’s SP to serve the domestic market as well as promote exports.