Evidence for discussing grand strategy in the Roman Empire is extremely limited. In reaction to Luttwak’s thought-provoking book, ancient historians have tended to focus on limitations in the information available to emperors and hence their capacity to determine priorities. Kagan’s reformulation of Luttwak’s thesis to use troop movements as a proxy for strategic decision making does not adequately take into account the personal and cultural considerations that often influenced rulers, and in particular that suppression of internal rivals took priority over external threats. That said, grand strategy remains a useful tool for investigating imperial decision making, especially for emperors such as Augustus and Diocletian, both of whom had to stabilize the empire after protracted bouts of civil war and enjoyed long reigns. It is also relevant to the later empire (after AD 300) when rulers regularly had to balance threats and opportunities on different frontiers against the more limited resources that were available.

The rise and the survival of the Ottoman Empire for six centuries is one of the most important event of the European and Middle Eastern histories. At the apex of the Ottoman conquests in the mid-1500s, Süleyman the Magnificent pushed deep into Hungary and Mesopotamia, as well as making the empire the master of the eastern Mediterranean Sea. Later sultans advanced into southern Russia, Caucasia, Persia and north Africa. In concert with these military successes, the empire transformed itself into a sophisticated administrative entity of great strength, which encouraged diversity, culture, learning and religious activity. The Ottoman high tide reached the gates of Vienna in 1683, only to fail because of faulty command decisions and internal deficiencies. While the Ottomans were trying to counter the military reverses, the forces of the socio-economic revolutions in the West and rapidly evolving market economies added new stresses to it. A new generation of sultans and members of the governing elite evolved, who were convinced of the need for modernisation and westernisation (both terms have been used synonymously and interchangeably) and were committed to change in order to keep the empire intact. They did achieve some results but they failed to stop the interventions and machinations of the Great Powers, which sought to benefit from the empire’s collapse. The Ottoman Empire gained notoriety as the ‘Sick Man of Europe’ and additionally became a target for the forces of ethnic nationalism that fought to dismember it. The First World War became the swan song of the empire. For the first time since the 1680s, the Ottoman Army consistently defeated its European enemies. But it was too late. The empire, bankrupt and blockaded, could not match the resources of its enemies and surrendered.

In chapter 4, Foreign creditors (May 16 - May 25) the actors deal with the problem of raising an Austrian government bond loan, while at the same time Credit Anstalt’s foreign creditors are getting involved. Conflicts begin to disappear between Austrian actors and central bankers and international creditors, and it becomes increasingly clear to the latter that the situation may well be more problematic than they imagined in the first place. On the Austrian side talks of a moratorium upsets central bankers and creditors who favor a guarantee. It’s getting increasingly difficult for the central bankers to emplot a narrative that can make sense of the situation and enable action to dodge the crisis. The fear of contagion becomes widespread, adding to the uncertainty.

As a result of the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, Palestinian Arabs who had been the majority population became a minority and now amount to 20 percent of the Israeli population. Although discriminated against by the state, they also have found avenues for socioeconomic upward mobility, including recent trends of professionalization. Jews and Arabs live in separate towns and urban neighborhoods, and soccer teams and matches are a limited zone of ‘integration’. Overall, the pattern of majority–minority relationships is described as ‘coexistence’ with periodic outbursts of conflict.

In this first global history of strategic practice, we define strategy making (following K. Kagan) as making choices, prioritising means in pursuit of political ends in the context of armed conflict, actual or threatened. The usage of the term took a long time to spread from the East Roman Empire to the Occident, and most civilisations discussed in these volumes did not have a distinct word to describe what they were doing in the modern sense. Yet by applying Kagan’s definition, we see evidence of complex reasoning and prioritisation of means and ways; even the greatest empires could not pursue unlimited ends. Our volumes bring together experts on each individual civilisation and period to explore analogous dimensions of strategy making: who are the enemies, and why? What means are available to them? What are the political strategic goals? And the central questions: how were ultimate and immediate goals formulated, and how were they linked up with military means? What were the enablers and limitations, in terms of geography, resources and other means, which produced distinctive approaches? But also, was there a transfer of ideas and methods? How were they translated, adopted, enacted, imitated and emulated in warfare around the world?

This book seeks to present an understanding of some of the major social, political, and cultural trends that have lately been shaping (or perhaps better, reshaping) Israeli society. Rapid change is a cardinal feature of nearly all contemporary societies, and Israel is hardly an exception. Indeed, many Israelis take a certain pride and marvel too at the scope and speed of change in their own compact, highly differentiated society and culture.

The many years of service evident in the careers of some ladies-in-waiting who received annuities for decades while continuing to complete responsibilities in the royal household demonstrates that the opportunities of court service were valued by many. Such service offered one of the only salaried professional positions available to women in later medieval England, and for many was a true career. Families sought to promote their daughters at court because female servants could seek to gain not only remuneration but also intangible patronage opportunities for themselves, their families, and their associates. Employment in elite households enhanced servants’ loyalty, built and deepened relationships, and also heightened the status of the royals and nobles who bestowed rewards. Including gender in the analysis helps us to recognize the porous boundary between domestic life and political life at the royal court, and, in an era when politics was all about access to the decision-making monarch, female courtiers enjoyed and benefitted from such informal routes to access. Although in service, and always answerable to the needs and commands of their queens and aristocratic employers, understanding the history of ladies-in-waiting underscores how they nevertheless found ways to exercise agency and access political power in medieval England.

In chapter 2, central bankers and their world, I first present the most important protagonists and a few other actors. They include Montagu Norman and Harry Siepmann of Bank of England, George L. Harrison of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Francis Rodd of the Bank for International Settlements. I discuss their background and worldview as they were headed into the 1931 crisis. Having presented these main actors and a few others, I proceed to present their world and how they saw it in 1930 and early 1931. The world was already in the midst of the great depression and private bankers as well as central bankers and other decision-makers were aware that they were dealing with crisis and radical uncertainty that might bring about the end of the gold standard and capitalism. I discuss the actors view of the "present world depression" and how they viewed the gold standard and their options as they got ready for trying to save the world from economic disaster.

The material of central interest to this book belongs to the ancient historical world of the Middle East, specifically to what I have previously and continue to classify as science in Assyro-Babylonian cuneiform texts. Cuneiform texts were my point of departure, but they led me down an unexpected path for the historiography of premodern science in the direction of the anthropology of science. As a consequence, in contrast to previous emphases on historical epistemologies reflected in historical bodies of knowledge, my interest shifts here to historical ontologies reflected in the worlds of the scribal compilers and practitioners of those bodies of knowledge. The shift in emphasis toward ontology, I will argue, can be theorized in terms of worldmaking, best approached by means of an anthropology of premodern science.

This chapter examines the promotion of entrepreneurship and business startups in Oman and its rhetorical targeting of youth and women. Although innovation is part of the promotion agenda, entrepreneurship is often focused on encouraging citizens to create their own private sector job. The chapter focuses on the experiences of young people in internalising entrepreneurship promotion discourses and in starting personal businesses. It illustrates two key tensions – first, the tension between rentierism embedded within authoritarian governing structures, on the one hand, and the logic of neoliberal capitalism, on the other; and second, the tensions between rhetoric and realities of youth and female empowerment narratives. Entrepreneurship is expressed and promoted as an empowering activity, and at times is experienced as such, but can also be used to legitimise or reconstitute patriarchal and authoritarian structures to accommodate the market. The space of entrepreneurship promotion is both a key tactic of labour market bandaging, and a distinct illustration of rentier neoliberalism

The Asia–Pacific War was caused by the expansionist ambitions of Imperial Japan, which by the 1920s had secured Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria. This strategy led to war with Nationalist China in 1937, and to provide fuel and supplies Japan seized the oil-rich Netherlands East Indies and Malaya. When the Japanese moved into southern Indo-China in 1941 the United States applied an oil embargo. Japan struck first at the US fleet at Pearl Harbor, hoping to form a defensive ring around its captured territories and reach an acceptable peace. But having been humiliated at Pearl Harbor, the United States would never have agreed to a negotiated peace.

The Allied strategy was largely reactive. To deter Japan, Britain applied the faulty Singapore Strategy. The US planned to advance gradually across the central Pacific, but were thwarted by Japan. Although the Allies’ overall strategy was to ‘beat Hitler first’, the United States continued to pursue and control the war in the Pacific. Given the industrial power of the United States, it was inevitable that it would prevail in the largely maritime war. By 1945 Japan was being strangled by the Allied blockade and conventional bombing. The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 forced Japan’s surrender.

Chapter 5 is framed by issues of cultural, epistemological, and ontological likeness, difference, and pluralism at the heart of anthropology. It brings these ideas to bear on cuneiform intellectuals’ vehicles of worldmaking through their classification of things and their particular form of astronomical model-making.

Here we lay the ground and define the parameters of this project. Definitions of strategy are discussed, giving the rationale for the one chosen to guide our work: Kimberly Kagan’s definition that sees evidence of strategy where prioritisation and choices about means of pursuing political aims at the level of the state (or higher social entity) have been made. This allows us to identify strategic decision making even when no documents have survived that contain explicit articulations of such reasoning.

One can divide sources regarding Byzantine strategy into three main categories: sources dedicated to the exposition of strategy, tactics and logistics, i.e. military manuals and administrative documents;' Byzantine historical narratives; and non-Byzantine historical accounts written in various dialects such as Slavic, Arabic and Armenian. Still, there is an ongoing debate whether military manuals reflected current tactical and strategic practise. Equally uncertain is the extent to which Byzantine historians employed military manuals or idealised biographies as models in order to present favoured figures in an ideal light. The emperor was usually the one who set priorities and objectives, assisted by advisers as well as by treatises on strategy and logistics. Sometimes, however, high-ranking military officers, the strategoi, local commanders who executed military and political authority over their districts, also took the initiative to undertake operations. The Byzantines faced various peoples: Slavic and Turkish peoples and polities threatened and occupied its Balkan frontier; Arabs, Turks and Armenians dominated the eastern frontier (Asia Minor, Syria, Mesopotamia and Armenia), and the Normans, Crusaders and various pirates threatened Greece, Thrace and the islands of the Aegean and the Ionian Gulf. The objectives of the Byzantines varied according to the period. Defence and survival were among the dominant ones; others included retaliation, devastation of the enemy’s potential through raiding and acquisition of booty, marching deep and showing the flag in order to achieve more favourable treaties, the reconquest of lost key cities and fortresses, and, rarely, the total elimination of enemy polities. The Byzantines relied greatly on money and diplomacy to achieve their goals. When these were not enough, they would mobilise their army and navy comprising indigenous professional and semi-professional troops, as well as foreign and allied troops. The main priority in terms of strategy was to conduct military operations, as far as possible, on only one front at a time. The latter was chosen with various goals in mind: the control of major cities, fortresses, routes and mountain passes; the establishment of a client ruler; acquiring of a quick victory in order to enhance the emperor’s image; and acquiring an acknowledgement of the emperor’s overlordship in order to adhere to Byzantine political ideology which saw the emperor as the supreme ruler of the world and the legitimate claimant to the Roman Empire. It is interesting to note that religion seems to have played a lesser role than realpolitik and political ideology. When fighting their wars, the Byzantines mostly adhered to the advice found in military treatises, but there were also occasions when the neglect of such matters brought devastating defeats.