Warfare did not evolve in a linear fashion. This is most obvious on the physical level: the weapons and armies of polities across time and space have fluctuated in sophistication, so that early European medieval armies had more in common with ancient Israelite or Greek contingents than with the Roman war machinery, and, up to the nineteenth century or even the twentieth, raiding warfare in some parts of Africa or the islands of south-east Asia was akin to patterns of pre-Columbian warfare in the Americas, prehistoric warfare in Europe and ghazis and booty expeditions in Europe and around the Mediterranean. Where warfare’s aims went beyond mere raiding, for much of world history, the paucity or even absence of relevant sources has made it difficult to reconstruct political–strategic aims. We also encounter vast varieties conditioned in part by hard factors such as climate, geography and resources. We have encountered and possibly not always avoided the danger of squeezing cultural differences into a Procrustean bed of Western concepts and languages. Yet some striking patterns have emerged. Not only Indo-European cultures, but also Mongols and Chinese, came up with a strategic aim of establishing a universal monarchy, or defending against the imposition of such an overlordship. The forming of alliances for common strategic purposes and the defence of allies or clients is another widespread pattern, strategic co-operation counterbalancing long-term hostilities. The distinction between client states and allies was often blurred. Non-kinetic tools of strategy were also employed widely, from giving gifts, to tribute payments (again a distinction often difficult to make), to marriages to confirm peace treaties or cement alliances. And most cultures seem to have had some rules or code of honour with regard to the conduct of war which in many contexts imposed limits on the pursuit of strategic aims.

Chapter 14, Aqnxiety within Germany at climax (July 11 - July 23). In this chapter tension reaches its climax as the Darmstädter und Nationalbank (Danatbank) fails on July 13. Without help from outside of Germany, the German government declares a bank holiday and introduces exchange controls, effectively ending the gold standard in Germany. The New York Fed and Harrison declines to intervene and the BIS does not have the resources or the inclination to intervene. Norman’s position that the situation goes back to the Versaille Peace agreement and is now a matter for governments strengthens. A conference in London is unable to come up with new solutions and meanwhile sterling comes under pressure. The fear of contagion beginning in early May is now a reality.

The strategies devised throughout the interwar years and applied in Europe at the beginning of the Second World War were related to the consequences of the Great War. Due to the Third Reich’s aggressive foreign policy, war broke out in September 1939. Germany’s grand strategy consisted in proceeding one front at a time and launching bold onslaughts destined to lead the enemy to the negotiation table. By signing the agreement of August 1939 with the Reich, the USSR expanded its territory and bought time. Italy tried to wage a ‘parallel war’ but failed and had to resort to German help. Britain and France stuck to a defensive strategy of checking the enemies’ offensives on the European continent, building up their forces with US support and finally counterattacking. Britain held on until the US went to war in December 1941, while the USSR narrowly managed to face the first German onslaught. From 1942, the Allies steadily implemented a broad strategy of pushing back the enemy forces on land, at sea and in the air, imposing unconditional surrender on the Axis powers. The latter’s total defeat and the emergence of new superpowers and weaponry paved the way for new strategic perspectives.

Offering two case studies – the economic transformations of Sohar and Duqm – this chapter grounds the book’s argument about Oman’s global labour market in material cases of spatial transformation and the integration into global value chains through which both commodities and labour circulate. The chapter argues that millennial citizen expectations take shape in these developments, from the interaction of ostensible outcomes of economic globalisation, neoliberalism, and government responsibilities of governing hydrocarbon windfalls. Citizen reactions emerge from their perceived right to, or exclusion from, these returns. The chapter further substantiates two points through these cases. First, both neoliberal reform and oil wealth explicitly or implicitly make promises to populations about an improved economic life, which, when unrealised, results in disenfranchisement and discontent. Second, capital needs labour and pursues supplies from the global labour market not only because it is cost effective but deliberately because it is both flexible and controllable. It seeks to avert potential labour disruption and secure seamless operations. Together, these findings show the ways Omani labour organises and the power of labour through the threat of its resistance.

Following a critical review of the ‘missing Yemenite children’ saga, this chapter explores the meanings and changing relevance of ethnicity in contemporary Israeli society. Persistent ethnic inequality is reviewed, and processes of social mobility and significant rates of intermarriage are considered. Ethnicity’s changing meaning is described, and the ‘symbolic ethnicity’ of recent generations is outlined and discussed.

The objective of this Critical Guide is to provide a series of in-depth studies on the Essays of David Hume, as well as an account of the state of scholarship. In Hume’s lifetime, the Essays acquired considerable éclat throughout Europe and North America; they influenced the writings of such diverse figures as James Madison and William Paley, and they have since become a staple of undergraduate and graduate curricula in history, politics, and philosophy. Yet the Essays have received comparatively modest attention in the scholarship of Hume’s life and thought. The early tradition of Hume’s intellectual biography, pioneered by J. Y. T. Greig and Ernest Campbell Mossner, subordinated the Essays to Hume’s Treatise and Enquiries as monuments of Hume’s contribution to the history of philosophy. This tendency diminished in the 1970s and 1980s, when Duncan Forbes, J. G. A. Pocock and Istvan Hont placed the Essays at the heart of their studies of Hume’s political thought and political economy. The significance of the Essays in James Harris’s Hume: An Intellectual Biography (2015) bears witness to the importance that the work has since acquired in general reconstructions of Hume’s intellectual commitments. However, there is no ‘critical guide’ to Hume’s Essays in any language, with recent studies having focused more restrictively on Hume’s political economy. This book is intended to address this absence by providing scholars and students with a wide-ranging and accessible overview of the Essays. The recent publication of the Clarendon Edition of Hume’s Essays (E (C)) is timed propitiously. The extraordinary editorial work of Professor Beauchamp and Professor Box has provided an unparalleled resource for the interpretation of the Essays, with a rich apparatus and a granular account of the complex history of the work’s publication. This Critical Guide has benefitted enormously from their labours.

Chapter 8, Surrounded with trouble (June 5 - June 10). The BIS board decides to grant a second credit to the BIS, but only after a prolonged discussion and it is made conditional on the placement of the Austrian government loan. There is increasing concern about the schilling as capital flows out of the country and the government issues take increasing priority, without being placed. At the same time, Germany’s reparations issues become ever more present as the German Chancellor Brüning meets with Prime Minister MacDonals at Chequers. Shortly before, Brüning published a statement saying that the burden on the German people has reached its limit. The international creditors too become increasingly nervous about the Austrian situation.

Chapter 6 is a history of emancipation in New York that stresses the combined importance of economic and legal pressures on slavery in areas of Dutch control. The gradual legal freedoms slaves gained after the Revolution served as a foot in the door towards eventual emancipation. When slaves were routinely given the ability to choose new masters, to seek work on their own, and to make money on their own (with some repayment to the slave owners), they made a crucial first step into a world of freedom. Voluntary slave manumission and self-purchase emancipations were the result of a process of negotiating the terms of slavery’s demise one person at a time. This dispersed, on-the-ground struggle was shaped by statutory law, as others have recognized, but, arguably, it was the common law that demonstrated and determined New Yorkers’ changing attitudes about slaveholding. Courtroom decisions about interpreting the states’ laws on slavery guaranteed that the freedoms won through slaves’ negotiations with their enslavers would be protected by the courts.

The imperial Guptas became the dominant power in India during the fourth and fifth centuries. Though the focus of this chapter will be on Gupta military strategy, I will occasionally peep into grand strategy and tactics. This is because superior tactical elements (horse archery and armoured lancers) allowed the Gupta emperor Chandragupta II to follow an aggressive military strategy. Also, non-military issues which are part of grand strategy (like the fiscal crisis in the mid-fifth century) forced the Gupta emperor Kumaragupta to adopt a passive defensive policy. First, we lay out the scope and objectives of the chapter and analyse the sources available to us for chalking out Gupta strategy. Second, we explore the offensive military strategy which enabled the Guptas to rise from a petty regional polity to the most formidable power in the subcontinent by AD 415. Third, the spotlight is shone on the failure of Gupta defensive strategic policies against the Huns after AD 467. The fourth section discusses the shortcomings of military and non-military strategies followed by the Gupta emperors in maintaining coherence within their domain. The empire was dependent on the co-operation of the samantas (feudatories) and landlords. Further, continuous success against external enemies was essential for maintaining royal supremacy. When the emperors failed against external invaders, then the internal props of royal power started disintegrating. The last section discusses strategic failures against both external and internal enemies which resulted in the collapse of the empire in the last decade of the fifth century.

Chapter 3 examines the political negotiations and debates that took place within Romania’s transitional governments concerning the process of drafting and adopting the restitution legislation. It shows that while a few Romanian politicians supported a full and rapid restitution, others were reluctant to do so and even displayed antisemitic prejudice. Most of the politicians agreed to adopt restitution laws because they saw them as requirements of the allegedly philosemitic Allies and, thus, useful for improving Romania’s standing at the peace conference. Some ministers supported specific categories of beneficiaries and devised various strategies aiming to help them keep the Jewish assets.

Writing about the policy goals and strategies of one war is difficult enough; writing about three wars, the generically named Gulf Wars, compounds the problem. This chapter will explore the goals and higher strategies of the belligerents in the three wars. The Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988) was launched by Iraq in order to throttle the revolutionary regime in the new Islamic Republic of Iran and take advantage of a balance of power that had changed drastically in its favour after 1979. Operation Desert Storm (1991) was the outcome of Iraq’s deteriorating socio-economic conditions and Saddam Hussein’s insatiable ambitions. It pitted Iraq against an international coalition led by the United States, in the latter’s effort to reverse Iraq’s occupation of its tiny but rich neighbour, Kuwait. Finally, Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003) was an outgrowth of US determination to overthrow Saddam Hussein, once again involving Iraq fighting the US and a much smaller coalition of partners. The chapter explores the background to each war, addresses the goals and strategies of the belligerent sides, and concludes with a discussion of the outcome of each war. It does not delve in detail into operational or tactical matters but focuses on the grand strategies, goals, decision making and, to some extent, the military strategies.

Rome transitioned from being a central Italian city state with predominantly local concerns of peer-polity competition and survival to the conquest of Italy and then to pre-eminence in the Mediterranean and beyond. The context in which strategic decisions were made varied considerably as Rome’s capacity for military and diplomatic action developed, the nature of the threats that it faced changed and its international horizons and opportunities expanded. Equally, the development and formulation of strategic priorities rested on a complex interplay between the state’s political and religious institutions and authorities and individuals and interest groups, making consistent and coherent long-term strategic policy almost impossible. For the most part, the Roman state proved adept at acting opportunistically to enhance its power, in response to external events and internal impulses. Its objectives therefore were not static but arose in a complex competitive inter-state environment of dangerous rivals to Roman power. A fundamental element in their success lay in the evolution of the structural capacity of the Roman state for military mobilisation, of both its own population and that of allies. Despite a predominantly militia army of annually raised legions and annual magistrates, Rome displayed a formidable ability to prosecute warfare within diverse theatres of operation, by land and sea, and to employ an effective mix of coercion and generosity to obtain support, co-operation, and collusion from allies and to undermine the resolve of enemies.