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This article examines the paradoxical effects of international legal accountability processes on the international law of intelligence. In response to increasing exposure of their intelligence activities, liberal democracies have shifted from a national security culture of secrecy to one of legal rationalisation, offering legal justifications to defend and legitimate contested practices. Rather than improving compliance, accountability processes have enabled states to strategically reshape legal norms to accommodate their preferred policies. Focusing on how legal justifications affect international law’s constraining function, the article analyses the effects of legal justifications on three dimensions of legal norms: obligation, precision and delegation. Intertwining doctrinal legal analysis with International Relations scholarship on rhetorical and justificatory approaches to international law, it identifies four causal mechanisms through which strategic legal justifications decrease law’s constraining power on state behaviour and facilitate norm evasion. The article demonstrates how strategic uses of international law for legitimation purposes can gradually alter legal norms without formal changes to legal texts or institutions, ultimately decreasing international law’s constraining power. Shedding light on the limits and risks of legalisation as a regulatory strategy, these findings raise important questions about the effectiveness and adequacy of legal accountability strategies, particularly strategic litigation, in inducing behavioural change.
This chapter explains how the book fits into the key debates in the historiography of madness studies. It also explains how the book serves as a useful case study in transatlantic imperialism. The chapter considers the extensive published work by historians on the asylum and the family, exploring its contributions, its analytical strengths and weaknesses and also how more recent research on the asylum has led to a reconsideration of the history of madness in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The chapter then explores a more recent body of work that challenges the centrality of the asylum in studies of madness, emphasising family and community care, the enduring practices of boarding out, home care and myriad local responses prior to and during the growth of asylum provision. Finally, the chapter argues that a transatlantic and legal perspective on the history of madness offers a major contribution to the field of madness studies and the historiographical debates that the field has engendered.
We conducted an exploratory cross-sectional analysis of ethical principles and practices in forty-one published research papers with empirical data on HIV prevalence, incidence, or risk factors in humanitarian settings. We identified ten key concepts pertinent to ethical principles and applications, and presented recommendations to inform future HIV prevention research.
This chapter traces the history of lunacy investigation law from 1320 to 1890 in England. This body of law included trials in lunacy, chancery court proceedings, proceedings in guardianship and trials of traverse. Verdicts of non compos mentis in these trials meant that individuals were mentally incapable of managing their person or property. Included in this legal approach to madness was the appointment of a guardian who would oversee the care and management, as well as the material wellbeing, of those deemed to be non compos mentis. The law also provided for the restoration of control over property and person in cases where individuals could successfully convince the courts that they had regained their ability to control property rationally – trials of traverse. This chapter argues that the development of lunacy investigation law for the preservation of property in the face of irrational behaviour was central to the definition of and response to madness for centuries in England. It was a socio-legal context for understanding and responding to madness that would eventually be situated in parallel with laws that signalled a growing emphasis on institutional confinement and inspection in England and, later, in parts of North America.
This chapter evaluates how families used lunacy investigation law as a strategic response to the unsettling circumstances created by the mad behaviour of their relatives. This included the management of the mad and their property, the safeguarding of inheritance and the regulation of marriage. However, the interventions of legal authorities in these trials, along with the competing interests of family members, did not always make the resort to lunacy investigation law as satisfying an option as families often hoped. For their part, the Lord Chancellors considered themselves as the arbiters of this social and economic cohesion, the law of lunacy investigation being an imperfect legal instrument through which they attempted to impose their broad outlook. But these principles were at times inconsistent with the wishes of family members, who often had more specific pecuniary interests in mind. The chapter also shows how lunacy investigation trials highlight the relationships of gender and class in England. Although the law structured family fortunes in gender-specific ways, trials in lunacy highlight how madness could both affirm and complicate conventional relationships between men and women.
This chapter probes the relationship between the well-entrenched legal process of lunacy investigation law – along with the customs of community care and understanding that revolved around it – and the lunatic asylum as it emerged as a purpose-built institutional response in New Jersey. This analysis reveals a range of reactions to the asylum from family and community – from outright rejection, to ambivalence, to some sense that treatment there had a positive effect. On the one hand, it is clear from these examples that the asylum was but one of many alternatives in nineteenth-century communities in New Jersey. However, it is also clear that, over the course of the century, especially after the opening of the New Jersey State Lunatic Asylum in 1848, the asylum was an increasingly popular option for those considered to be mad in New Jersey. This ‘warming up’ to the asylum was partly the result of asylum psychiatrists promoting their institutional response as a better bet for the insane and their families. By the mid-1800s, a new hybrid process of lunacy law also facilitated the admission of increasing numbers of patients to the asylum.
The conclusion reiterates the main themes of the book, emphasising what is significant about the book in terms of both historiography and methodology. This study helps us to ‘get out’ of the asylum in our investigation of the history of madness – not because the asylum was unimportant but, rather, because the asylum’s long shadow becomes shorter, and more geographically specific, when one is able to uncover pre-asylum understandings of and responses to madness that continued to thrive long after the asylum’s introduction. This study also helps to establish the importance of civil law in the response to madness over a considerable period of time in a transatlantic context. The conclusion also draws attention to the continuing relevance of the relationship between civil law and the consideration of mental capacity and guardianship as evidenced by the United Nations’ recent declarations about the rights of people of unsound mind.
This case note analyses the General Court’s judgment in Arysta Lifescience v EFSA (Case T-222/23), which addresses the tensions arising from the disclosure of the lists of co-formulant in the context of the EU risk assessment of pesticides. The decision consolidates the General Court’s interpretation of “information relating to emissions into the environment” under Article 6(1) of Aarhus Regulation, confirming its applicability to the list of co-formulants contained in representative products.
In the literature, the Rule of Law (ROL) is mainly explained, and its value justified, by reference to its support for a liberal conception of human agency. As such, the connection between the ROL and legitimacy is normally considered contingent if the conception of the ROL is thin. It can be rendered necessary, it seems, only by a substantive conception that incorporates other political ideals, notably democracy. Without recourse to such a move, this article defends a necessary ROL-legitimacy connection by exploring the ROL’s contribution to the task of pacification, which, I argue, is inherent in the claim of legitimacy. My interpretation re-orients the ROL’s foundational value from the liberal conception of human agency to politically inspired fear and summa mala. The paradigmatic shift is in line with the realism approach to political theory which derives and explains moral claims in political theories from considerations of basic political necessity.
This paper examines Health System Resilience (HSR) through a political science lens, arguing that the capacity of health systems to become resilient is shaped not only by technical capabilities and available resources but also by the political theories underpinning health systems and health policy. While HSR has gained prominence in health research as a concept, its integration with political theories remains limited – particularly within political science literature. Drawing on a scoping review, the paper finds that political dimensions – such as governance and leadership, institutional path dependency, and power dynamics – are rarely and unevenly addressed in the literature. Most sources adopt a fragmented view of policy and politics, infrequently identifying the Political Determinants of Health (PDoH) systematically or analysing them through robust political theory. As a result, resilience is often depoliticised and treated as a managerial issue rather than a contested political process. In light of these findings, the paper proposes new opportunities to scrutinise how HSR is shaped by the interplay of actors, ideas, and institutions. In doing so, it contributes to developing a political science of health that fosters stronger interdisciplinary engagement. The paper calls on political scientists to engage more proactively with public health scholarship to support politically informed and more effective resilience strategies.
This paper revisits debates about the right to communicate from the late 1960s to early 2000s, examining how different actors engaged with this concept in reaction to imminent technological changes and their implications for society. It explores how these actors advocated for or contested this concept at different international forums such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to advance different agendas for the international order. In telling the story of the right to communicate, this paper adopts a historical-materialist approach, examining discursive struggles as reflective of and conditioned by material and social relations and their contradictions, and reflects on the question of the promise and perils of human rights for social change, considering not only the malleability of rights language but the material conditions of which human rights concepts are reflective and constitutive.
This article distinguishes isolationist and integrationist accounts of the legal-economic nexus. Isolationists deny the possibility of integrating different theoretical perspectives, while integrationists try to unify different accounts. Leading legal theorists have recently presented isolationist efficiency-, liberty-, and democracy-centred accounts of the market. It is argued that the legal–economic nexus is an integrationist concept, requiring an integrationist understanding of the constitutive role of law in the economy – a common view within the Law and Political Economy movement. Two integrationist strategies are presented: structural integrations and epistemic translations. Using them, an integrated consumer-centric account of the market is offered: consumers are not mere instruments; they are the lead actor, with all the entitlements in terms of powers, rights, and responsibilities that this position of authority entails.
Strikes against public policies have often been classified as illegal political strikes. Nevertheless, the concept of social movement unionism (SMU) describes how trade unions in some countries have become active players in social struggles, alongside social organizations and protest groups, by using political strikes. Although the International Labor Organization (ILO) prohibits purely political strikes, it recognizes the legitimacy of protest strikes concerning public issues. In this respect, the article combines the notion of global constitutionalism with the concept of SMU to explore the issue of political strikes in times of social or democratic struggles. Global constitutionalism regards certain international principles as paramount, offering them a status akin to constitutional law. Drawing on the intersection of the theory of SMU with the concept of global constitutionalism, the article suggests that strikes against governmental policy, framed as part of broader social protests, can effectively oppose controversial public policies. The article claims that protest strikes should be recognized as legitimate exercises of workers’ freedom of association, based on the application of relevant ILO principles through global constitutionalism.
On grounds of ethnographic fieldwork conducted in Uttar Pradesh and Delhi between 2021 and 2023, this paper analyses 20 cases of police violence, which occurred during the December 2019 protests against the Citizenship (Amendment) Act. I argue that majoritarian practices of policing, through legal and extra-legal mechanisms, “unmake” the victims of violence. Instead, police procedures frame victims as perpetrators. The unmaking of the victims and subsequent criminalization occur through layers of discursive, procedural, investigatory, and legal strategies employed in everyday policing. In a Kafkaesque turn in law and society, I identify the omissions, exclusions, and invocations that result in a devastating deprivation of justice.
The writer, Chimamanda Adichie, was sent out of an Nsukka chapel for wearing a short-sleeved blouse. The TV presenter, Funmi Iyanda, was harassed by police for wearing a knee-length dress. Nigeria’s response to a suit at the ECOWAS Court of Justice brought by an actress, Dorothy Njemanze, included that she “dress[ed] naked or half naked”. Firdaus Amasa was initially denied call to the Nigerian bar because she wore a hijab beneath her lawyer’s wig, and several young women have been decamped from the mandatory National Youth Service Corps programme for wearing skirts instead of trousers and shorts. Analysing the above incidents, alongside the Supreme Court’s decision in Lagos State Government v Abdulkareem, this article finds that though it is easier to enforce women’s rights to choose their dress when religious liberty is engaged, the constitutionally guaranteed protection against degrading treatment is one thread that runs across all instances of policing women’s dress. Consequently, prioritizing dignity rights for Nigeria’s womenfolk will shield them from indignities associated with policing their dress choices.
This article examines the role of the African Union’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) in strengthening compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL), a dimension of its mandate that remains largely unexplored in the literature. The article argues that although this mandate is explicit and carries significant normative potential, its implementation remains limited, fragmented and inconsistent. To demonstrate this, the study proceeds in three steps. First, it analyzes the normative foundations of the PSC’s IHL mandate through an interpretative and systemic reading of its constitutive texts. Second, it critically assesses the Council’s concrete practice, highlighting the limits and inconsistencies of its actions and instruments. Third, it identifies avenues for improvement, emphasizing the need to institutionalize compliance monitoring, to structure PSC decisions with greater precision and gradation, and to make fuller use of available legal mechanisms and partnerships. The central argument is that the PSC holds under-utilized legal and institutional tools which, if fully mobilized, could significantly enhance its effectiveness in fulfilling its IHL-related mandate and establish it as a key regional actor in the promotion of respect for IHL and the protection of victims of armed conflict.
The article discusses the unfolding of the anticorruption campaign in Romania, from pre-accession to present day. Its argument is that the risk-induced anticorruption paradigm has produced effects that have been from the very beginning irreconcilable with liberal-constitutional normativity. To generate results, normative understandings regarding fundamental rights, institutional autonomy, and judicial independence were subordinated to the policy imperatives and manipulated to achieve them. In the long run, normative considerations resurfaced as a backlash, in equally distorted and instrumental forms. I argue that a single-minded pursuit of policy imperatives thought conducive to risk-abatement has not only not reduced or managed the risk of corruption but also has generated more intractable, systemic threat patterns. Some of these paradoxical, unintended consequences are not contained, resulting in normative spillover within the common constitutional area. The first part of my paper discusses the politicisation of the judicial system. A second substantive section analyses the protracted saga of judicial salaries and pensions and repeated attempts to manipulate the retirement conditions in order to generate personnel and policy changes. A third probes into the dialogues between the CJEU, the Romanian Constitutional Court and the High Court of Cassation and Justice regarding the statute of limitations and its implications.