This chapter charts the origins of the classical law of civil war. It observes the doctrine’s roots in the old Roman ius gentium and argues that the classical doctrine itself was born in the early modern period alongside the European colonial empires and the Westphalian understanding of the law of nations. The chapter then illustrates this process by examining in detail the impact of insurgent prize jurisdictions and belligerent counter-revolutionary actions on foreign diplomacy during the Dutch Revolt (1566–1648) and the English Civil War (1642–1651).In light of these events, the chapter summarises the key doctrinal developments of the law of civil war in the writings of Grotius, Gentili, and their contemporaries, and the crystallisation of the classical doctrine of civil war in Emer de Vattel’s Droit des gens. The chapter concludes here, having set the scene for the legal debates of the age of revolutions.

The first two chapters of this book explained that the law of torts is an evolving body of rules shaped by principles and policy considerations and animated by two different conceptions of justice. It is held in a constant state of tension by individuals and communities’ shifting allegiance between competing interests, goals and values. This means that the law of torts is more than just a set of rules, principles and policies; it is also an ongoing culture of argument that has been developed to manage this inbuilt tension. So, if you want to be successful as a torts student you need to supplement your knowledge of the law by mastering this culture of argument. The first part of this chapter will help you to understand how to use the basic building blocks of the law (rules, principles and policy) to construct effective legal arguments. The rest of the chapter will show you how to structure your legal arguments and apply the law to solve practical legal problems.

Integrating algorithmic tools into judicial systems prompts critical questions on public trust, due process, and fairness, alongside inherent risks of the pursuit of ‘technical fix’. In response to growing demands for transparency and consistency, Taiwan has introduced algorithmic and AI-powered sentencing tools, representing significant steps toward reforming sentencing practices and improving judicial accountability. However, their implementation has encountered formidable challenges, including low adoption rates, judicial misunderstandings, algorithmic biases, and insufficient regulatory frameworks. This chapter explores these issues within Taiwan’s historical and legal context, providing an in-depth analysis of empirical data and judicial practices. By situating Taiwan’s experience within the global discourse on AI in judicial systems, the chapter illuminates the complexities of integrating AI into a civil law tradition while striving to maintain judicial independence. Taiwan’s approach offers insights for jurisdictions worldwide, contributing to broader discussions on leveraging AI to enhance justice without compromising foundational legal principles and values.

In drafting a constitution for the democratic republic of the United States, the Framers took elaborate measures to control the hazards of minority and majority political factions. The Framers’ conclusion that factions are inevitable is confirmed by the partisan nature of modern American politics.

The increasing reliance on algorithmic and AI systems by judges is reshaping the judiciary and its way of working in numerous ways. One aspect that has remain under- examined is how the judicial duty to state reasons may be affected. This refers to the obligation of judges to provide reasons whenever they rule in a case. In fact, the duty constitutes an essential component of the rule of law and the right to a fair trial, and fulfils important normative goals, such as legitimacy, transparency, and accountability of the judicial decision-making process. The chapter therefore first provides a concise conceptualisation of the duty, including its underlying normative goals. It then examines how and to what extent the judicial duty to state reasons can be impacted whenever judges rely on AI systems, focusing on the impact of such systems on the underlying normative goals of the duty. The chapter concludes with some reflections on how the duty can be safeguarded in the age of automation.

There is no officially recognised ‘Code of Tort Law’. The law of torts has to be distilled from two sources: case law and statutes. It has been formed primarily by the decisions of the common law judges who have developed the law case by case over hundreds of years. To an increasing extent, it has also been shaped by the acts of parliaments, which have responded to the perceived shortcomings of the common law. The role played by each of these two law-making institutions is different, and the range of choices open to them varies. This chapter will explain how these different roles allow different goals to be taken into account when the law is shaped into an integrated system that best serves the needs of the community – and again, remember that this is not an immutable objective standard, but rather one that is dictated by evolving relations of power and influence in our communities and societies.

The Permanent Court of International Justice (1919–1946) may be seen as an unprecedented institutional experiment. Its impact and output have been substantial, and consequently its legacy might equally be called fundamental. This chapter seeks to demonstrate the veracity of the foregoing statements, situating the Court in its contemporary context while building on similar scholarly ventures that were undertaken previously. In contrast to earlier inquiries, the study reflects rather more broadly on the institution’s positioning, especially on how it interacted with the principal organs of the League of Nations. It begins by placing a focus on the Court’s inception, from an idea to fully settled status. Thereafter, the chapter analyses the environment within which the Court functioned, and the interplay with its League interlocutors. Next, a review is undertaken of a series of leading pronouncements, both judgments and advisory opinions, concentrating on those verdicts that have obtained a genuinely enduring value. Drawing from these analyses, an assessment is made of the Court’s overall contribution to the multilateral order against the background of interwar-era politics followed in turn by a brief series of concluding observations.

What was the place of international law in the League of Nations? Drawing up the balance from the many perspectives on this question offered in the Handbook, the Conclusion first and foremost acknowledges the complex reality observed in many chapters of an oftentimes messy interplay between politics and law, a reality that defies any generalizing account of either ‘failure’ or ‘progress’ achieved through the League. Instead, it points at three overarching developments that can be discerned: (1) the continuing impact of ‘peace through law’ ideals throughout the League years in spite of their suppression during the Paris Peace Conference; (2) the imperial, civilizational but also geographical differences the League of Nations and its international law helped sustain but also contested from the perspective of (legal) equality; and (3) the transformation of international law into a prerequisite of global governance which prevailed also after the League of Nations collapsed.

The field of drug studies is increasingly challenged by the rapid digitalisation of drug markets, raising the importance of reconsidering how drug laws and policies respond to the role of technologies in the drug trade, and their social impact. This chapter considers the famous case of Maximilian Schmidt, who was accused of setting up Germany’s largest digital drug shop under the alias Shiny Flakes and became the subject of media stories and Netflix TV productions. The case offers an opportunity to explore how the move to digitally mediated drug supply has altered the ways in which phenomena such as the ‘dealer’ and ‘dealing’ are constituted in socio-technical and legal contexts.1 Research shows that digital drug markets pose serious challenges to jurisdictional and regulatory frameworks and governments require costly and laborious police operations to adapt to the rapid development of these markets (EU Drugs Strategy 2021–2025, 2021; UNODC, 2022). Following the transition of drug markets and traditional dealer activities to digitally mediated formats, it has become important to consider how drug dealers and dealing are constituted and handled in law, and whether the technological means of dealing are reshaping how questions of responsibility, ‘harm’ and entrepreneurship are being understood.

An animating question in The Human Condition is what makes life meaningful and defeats futility. This chapter reconstructs Arendt’s answer. It explains why she finds the life of contemplation unsatisfactory and why the life of labor and consumption can’t be satisfying on their own terms. Neither can the life devoted to making. The artisan “could be redeemed from his predicament of meaninglessness only through the interrelated faculties of action and speech.” The chapter analyzes Arendt’s concept of action, and then returns to the Case of the Missing Morality. It argues that the very thing that makes action meaningful – that it matters to our peers – means that their moral judgments are defining characteristics of action. Her occasional assertions that action is inherently amoral are therefore a mistake. Her moral judgments about Eichmann caused her to recognize this and turned her to issues of moral judgment and legal accountability.

Chapter 3 offers an overview of the role of international law in the International Labour Organization (ILO) during the first quarter-century of its existence. The chapter focuses on three kinds of international ordering conducted in, by, and through the ILO: the ordering of class relations through the systematic construction of international labour law; the ordering of inter-polity relations, arising from the extension of the ILO’s activities to non-metropolitan states and territories; and the ordering of international institutional relations. The chapter shows how international law was deeply implicated in each of these forms of international ordering and, in turn, transformed through them in a variety of ways. It examines the expanding range of legal activities conducted in and through the ILO; considers its role in reproducing civilizational hierarchies as its focus widened beyond Europe; and details its contributions to the development of international organizations law. The outcomes of the ILO’s normative work were often ambivalent, simultaneously advancing workers’ rights while reinscribing racialized distinctions. Yet in many ways the ILO was, for better or worse, at the vanguard of international legal ordering throughout this period, and highly influential on the international order that emerged after the Second World War.