Continuing the previous discussion, this chapter discusses Arendt’s view of group identity. She argues for a political or speech-act theory of identity ascriptions. In times of persecution, she explains, it would be an evasion for her to answer “Who are you?” with anything other than “I am a Jew”; in other contexts, that answer would be a pose. This helps explain her well-known dictum, “If you are attacked as a Jew, you must defend yourself as a Jew”: Persecuted groups “can resist only in terms of the identity that is under attack.” Understanding group identity in this way helps explain Arendt’s initial attraction to Zionism, but also her eventual break with the Zionist movement. The danger of this political conception of identity politics is that it seemingly imposes no humanitarian limits on what one can do to resist the persecutor, a danger foreseen by the Nazi theorist Carl Schmitt. The chapter formulates Arendt’s answer to Schmitt’s challenge, based on her “idea of humanity.”

This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the history and developments of AI in courts. In particular, through the lens of legal informatics, we explore four phases in the development and evolution of AI in courts: judicial information retrieval, human-made models of judicial reasoning, machine learning for judicial prediction, and large language models for courts. For each of these, we explore the opportunities and challenges in their implementation and adoption within the judicial system.

Vicarious liability is a form of strict liability that operates to make one person legally liable to compensate a plaintiff for a tort that has been committed by another person. Non-delegable duty is slightly different, because it does not impose liability for the tort committed by another person, but rather it imposes liability directly on the ultimate defendant (D2) for their own tort (which is constituted by combination of the harm-causing conduct of another tortfeasor (D1) and D2’s own failure to comply with a personal duty owed directly to the plaintiff). So, while the two doctrines are similar in that they both focus on the harmful conduct of one person (D1) that is ultimately paid for by another person (D2), vicarious liability imposes liability on D2 for the wrongdoing of another, whereas the doctrine of non-delegable duty imposes liability on D2 for their own wrongdoing.

The Nordic countries became members of the League of Nations in 1920. This changed the international position of the five Nordic states considerably and also had legal reverberations. During the League’s function, a substantial number of jurists from the five Nordic states contributed to the diverse discourses on the legal dimensions of the organization, its character, and its many functions. The legal expertise on international law grew out of the nineteenth-century inter-Nordic union conflicts that prepared the Nordic jurists formodern international law at the beginning of the twentieth century. The legal scholars were often both jurists and politicians and their legal reasoning and political considerations were intimately intertwined. This chapter studies for the first time the many contributions from over thirty Nordic lawyers that were involved with the legal issues of the League system.

The judiciary must reflect the diversity of the population it serves to ensure justice is both impartial and perceived as fair. This chapter examines how AI in courts influences judicial diversity and legitimacy. While AI can uncover unconscious biases and enhance case analysis, judicial diversity remains essential to prevent AI from reinforcing existing prejudices. The chapter also explores identity awareness and institutional legitimacy. Like other democratic institutions, courts using AI must uphold representativeness. AI can foster collaborative constitutionalism by incorporating diverse perspectives in constitutional debates, helping address concerns about judicial legitimacy when unelected judges overturn decisions by elected representatives. Finally, the chapter considers how judges’ engagement with AI- driven social media affects transparency and public trust. As these technologies shape perceptions of the judiciary, they must be carefully managed to support judicial diversity and legitimacy. This is particularly important for judges from diverse backgrounds, who face greater risks of digital harassment, potentially undermining institutional trust and judicial integrity.

Moving beyond the structural antagonism of criminal law, this chapter explores the subject positions of actors in scenarios of sexual harm. If the sex offender emerges as a felon bearing the head of a wolf, the victimized white child emerges as the exemplary figure of vulnerability. While tropes of vulnerability are mobilized to justify paternalistic state coercion, they are also a powerful reminder of humans’ interdependence and mutuality. Thinking with vulnerability as an analytical category focuses attention on the lingering traumatic effects of sexual assault, as well as the severe punitiveness toward sex offenders. Addressing sexual violence does not require draconian penalties; conversely, addressing carceral expansion does not necessitate minimizing sexual violence. Centering vulnerability may allow us to rethink the foundations of our social contract in ways that acknowledge both our precariousness and the sovereign violence that holds us in its thrall.

Chapter 20 explores the role of the League of Nations frameworks in the internationalization of human rights, with a focus on refugees, stateless individuals, and minorities. The League Covenant did not explicitly address human rights, but it did consider some humanitarian issues, such as the rights of populations in Mandated territories, stateless refugees, and minorities in specific regions like Danzig or Upper Silesia. Despite this, human rights were not a significant factor in shaping international law during the interwar period. Jurists, who were mostly male and aligned with national interests, favoured other issues like state sovereignty, international peace, and collective security. However, in 1929, the Institute of International Law (IIL) adopted a ’Declaration of International Rights of Man’, based on a project by the exiled Russian jurist André N. Mandelstam, that integrated gender equality. The aim was to submit it to the General Assembly of the League in 1933 in order to conclude a ’World Convention on human rights’. These efforts aimed to universalize human rights at a time dominated by colonialism, civilizational discourse, and inequality. The chapter delves into these initiatives within the IIL and their attempts to push for broader human rights legislation in the League of Nations.

This chapter introduces the EU AI Act and examines how it will apply to artificial intelligence (AI) used by judicial authorities. The chapter gives an overview of key regulatory concepts of the EU AI Act and discusses its risk classification, particularly which AI systems used by judicial authorities would fall under the category of high- risk AI systems and which other provisions could be relevant for the use of AI by judicial authorities. The chapter investigates practical examples of how the provisions are expected to apply in practice and which obligations follow for judicial authorities, including which exemptions could apply. The author also provides context and rationale for the relevant provisions and their evolution during the legislative process.

This chapter discusses the integration of AI into the judicial systems of Lithuania and Poland. It provides a historical context, outlining the progress of both countries in digitalisation and AI readiness. The chapter notes relevant political and planning documents and then focuses on the current state of AI in non-judicial and judicial activities within the courts of Lithuania and Poland. The authors present technological solutions used for case assignment, case handling, and document processing, anonymisation of judgments, voice-to-text transcription, and tools developed for automating press release preparation. The chapter then explores the potential for AI in judicial decision-making, considering the prospects for partial and full judicial automation and identifying scenarios where AI could play a more significant role without compromising the quality of judicial outcomes. It highlights the Polish pilot project ‘Digital Judge’s Assistant’, and discusses the stringent regulations under the EU AI Act 2024 and the GDPR that govern the use of AI in judicial processes.

Chapter 17 explores the implication of the failure to establish a proper legal sovereign in the Mandates under Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The tension was never resolved between the Mandatory power exercising the attributes of sovereignty and actually possessing it, notably on the all-important issue of maintaining ‘public order’. Repression as interpreted politically through the Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC) thus shaped Mandatory rule. Three examples show dialogue between the PMC and the Mandatory powers articulated sovereignty as a system of legal practice. The repression of the Bondelswarts rebellion of 1922 and the Great Syrian Revolt of 1925–27 muddled the distinction between Class C and Class A Mandates. The repression of the Arab revolt in Palestine of 1936–38 exemplified legalist tensions within the Mandate system that had been there all along. Neither the PMC nor the Mandatory power (Britain) could either construct sovereignty over a unitary Palestine or partition it. As Europe veered towards war in 1939 and as the League itself started to disintegrate, ‘public order’ in Palestine came to exist for its own sake, disconnected from any resolution of the political stalemate.

Many in the founding generation believed that a virtuous citizenry would protect against abuses of power in a democracy. But their experience during the period of the Articles of Confederation revealed the limits of republican virtue as a check on abuses of power and underscored the challenge of limiting the opportunities for minority and majority factions to impose their will on their fellow citizens.

This chapter examines the adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) tools and digital solutions within the Estonian justice system, highlighting its pioneering approach to digital transformation following independence in 1991. The initial section explores the factors behind Estonia’s rapid digital transition, emphasising the centralisation of support services and the development of a unified public-sector digital infrastructure that has significantly influenced court operations. The Estonian judiciary employs integrated information and communications technology systems that utilise shared data storage, enabling efficient digital and remote court proceedings. These advantages were particularly evident during the Covid-19 pandemic. While AI and machine-driven decisions are restricted to support functions, excluding substantive judicial roles (no ‘robo-judges’), efforts are ongoing to enhance data-driven practices and automation in court proceedings. However, a key legal challenge lies in aligning digital court processes with the constitutional mandate for public justice.

The founding generation condemned political parties as the archetypal manifestation of political factions. Yet they quickly sorted themselves into the Federalist and Jeffersonian Republican parties. As the Framers anticipated, the nation has experienced growing partisanship and a winner-takes-all, majority rules, understanding of the political process. A result has been what might be called a soft tyranny of the ruling majority faction.