This chapter focuses on the legal framework for the use of AI in courts in Croatia and Slovenia, which results from their legal traditions as well as their membership in the Council of Europe and the EU. It also aims to discuss AI systems, either operational or in development, in both countries, and to evaluate their impact on fundamental rights and ethics. The findings demonstrate that while both countries experience a slow but gradual introduction of AI initiatives, in Slovenia this is happening without pre-existing or rigorous regulatory oversight.

This chapter examines how artificial intelligence (AI) can address inefficiencies in India’s judicial system, focusing on Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) cases. Analysis of 220,000 cases reveals significant regional disparities in processing and outcomes, reflecting broader systemic challenges. Despite digital infrastructure investments, we identify a disconnect between data collection and data- driven decision-making. We propose an AI-powered dashboard to provide real-time case tracking, identify bottlenecks, and improve resource allocation. While implementation faces challenges related to data quality and privacy, successful deployment could serve as a model for judicial reform in India and globally.

Methadone maintenance therapy arose as a treatment for opiate use in the mid 1960s. At the time, neither drug use nor treatment for it were considered disabilities. When Vincent Dole, the Rockefeller Institute metabolic researcher who was one of the progenitors of methadone maintenance therapy (MMT), asked, ‘What kind of disablement does a drug produce?’ (Courtwright et al., 1989, p. 334), this was a prescient question.1 Dole’s team stabilised patient-subjects on methadone, hoping to displace reliance on shorter-acting opiates, and explored dosages that would enable ‘cooperative relationships with patients’ (Courtwright, et al., 1989, p. 336). Opposing detoxification and abstinence as the sole basis for treatment, Dole saw opioid use disorder as a metabolic condition that required ongoing pharmacological stability. Contrasting the stabilising effects of one opiate (methadone) to another (heroin), Dole emphasised that drugs should be judged in terms of their social effects – did they improve or undermine capacity for stable relationships with family members, treatment providers or employers? Did they produce ‘disablement’ or did they instead ‘enable’ capacities for productive citizenship? Such questions dominated the social contexts into which methadone maintenance was inserted. Making stable, productive citizens was adopted as the goal of methadone maintenance.

This chapter examines the intersection of militarism, climate change, and Islamic environmental ethics from a transnational perspective, arguing that the military-industrial complex is a structurally overlooked but significant contributor to global ecological degradation. It critiques the exemption of military emissions from international climate protocols and highlights the disproportionate environmental burdens placed on Muslim-majority countries. Drawing on Quranic principles such as khalīfah (trusteeship), mīzān (balance), and ‘adl (justice), the chapter presents a theological framework that calls for demilitarization and ecological justice. Through case studies from Iraq, Gaza, and Afghanistan, as well as analysis of Islamic legal tools, eco-fatwas, grassroots movements, and green finance instruments, the chapter outlines a holistic response rooted in Islamic teachings. It concludes by advocating for a reconceptualization of national security and climate action that centers spiritual responsibility, ecological stewardship, and transnational solidarity.

The failure to recognize and establish legal environmental rights and norms is perilous for the health of the planet and its populations. Using another source of obligations, such as faith-based approaches for ecological harmony and environmental protecti on, can work to realign delicate ecosystem balances. This article considers ancient and medieval sources from the teachings of Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Zoroastrianism, Daoism, Shintoism, Sikhism, and others to provide new directions for existing environmental challenges

Islamic environmental law presents a comprehensive approach to ecological preservation, grounded in religious principles and ethical responsibilities. This research explores the Islamic legal framework for environmental protection, positioning humans as stewards (khalifa) of nature rather than absolute owners. The study illuminates how Islamic jurisprudence integrates environmental conservation into a holistic system of social and spiritual responsibility. The research examines key institutional mechanisms within Islamic law for environmental management, including land reclamation (Ihia’ Al-Arad Al-Mawat), natural reserves (Al-Hima), protective zones (Al-Harim), and charitable endowments (Al-Waqf). Central to this approach is the principle of prioritizing collective welfare over individual interests, with a strong emphasis on preventing environmental harm and promoting sustainable development. The paper critically analyzes the potential for implementing Islamic environmental principles in contemporary legal frameworks, particularly in Muslim-majority countries. It advocates for a renewed environmental governance model that synthesizes religious ethics, scientific understanding, and proactive institutional strategies to address ecological challenges.

This chapter concludes the book by revisiting its key findings and by reflecting on their meaning from a broader perspective. The first half of the chapter consists of a summary of the rise and fall of the classical doctrine of civil war as explained in the preceding chapters. The second half assesses the overall legacy of the classical doctrine in the light of modern legal theory, and observes how the classical law was hardly better able to overcome the problems of indeterminacy and recognition than current principles are. Yet this does not mean that the classical doctrine would have been meaningless, as its practical utility may have been based precisely on its limited effectiveness and inevitable ambiguity.

Legal futurists have urged judiciaries to experiment with automated legal systems. However, for many aspects of legal systems, there is a common sense that their translation into computation would be inappropriate. The simultaneous malleability of legal systems and prevalence of constitutive practices within them, should lead to a two-level consideration of (1) what aspects of a liberal legal order are crucial, and (2) for those that are crucial, what is lost when that aspect is either partially or fully automated. In legal decision-making, some patterns of action are merely instrumental to achieving ends, while others are essential, or constitutive: the activity should no longer even be considered part of a liberal legal order when the practice ceases. Administrative processes that are simply incidental and instrumental to the legitimate resolution of a case are well primed for automation. Other practices are essential and intrinsically important, and properly resist being converted into machine-readable code. Distinctions between incidental and constitutive, or instrumentally and intrinsically important, aspects of law, should both bound and guide legal automation.

Appearing at the tail end of this volume, I begin with a brief meditation on the coda. A (musical) ending, the vulgar form of cauda (tail or privy member), figure of our fallen state, the coda may also be a whip or goad to inspiration or even exaltation. Attempting to turn my posterior position to good ends, I have, in the place of an ending, used the chapters here as provocations and inspirations. Recognizing in them a more expansive account of legal performance than my own, I point to how they unbind law and performance from the rigid definitional strictures on which I have relied, how they challenge the boundaries between text and performance, performance and law, law and world, world and fiction (the veritas falsa of theatre and the falsitas verus of law), how they show the methodological Über-Ich (with its rules and dogmas) to be unseated by an ontological Id that scoffs at its laws. That force – like the comedic cauda in the courtroom – answers legal solemnities with impudent laughter and other “minor jurisprudences of refusal,” creating heterotopias, wild zones, rehearsals for alternative futures.

Can AI adjudicative tools in principle better enable us to achieve the rule of law by replacing judges? This chapter argues that answers to this question have been excessively focused on ‘output’ dimensions of the rule of law – such as conformity of decisions with the applicable law – at the expense of vital ‘process’ considerations such as explainability, answerability, and reciprocity. These process considerations do not by themselves warrant the conclusion that AI adjudicative tools can never, in any context, properly replace human judges. But they help bring out the complexity of the issues – and the potential costs – that are involved in this domain.

Artificial intelligence (AI) has started to make its way into Spanish court practice, especially in criminal justice. Furthermore, this trend has been accompanied by two new regulations: the EU AI Act, the world’s first comprehensive law on the topic, and the Spanish Royal Decree-Law No. 6 of 2023. At present, there are already several AI-based tools used by Spanish courts and the application of them proves highly beneficial, in particular in certain areas of criminal justice. Nevertheless, AI use can pose serious problems related to conflict with different fundamental rights of the accused. Therefore, its use should be considered with great caution.

Negligence is the most intellectually and morally challenging of all the torts. It was called into being by the social, political and economic changes in society that were brought about by the Industrial Revolution of the 19th and early 20th centuries. It continued to expand in new directions because of the more sophisticated financial systems and market economies that developed in its wake, and is now grappling with the existential questions of the 21st century, such as climate change and the digital revolution. These changes continue to make it possible for people to harm others in ways that were inconceivable in earlier times. The need for this form of tort liability grew out of the perceived inability of the older causes of action to deal with new, more devastating and potentially more widespread mass harms that new technologies could cause. The birth of negligence in the 1930s (and its subsequent expansion during the rise of the welfare state) was accompanied by a deeply felt fear of its limitless scope – a fear that still dominates the debates over the tort’s future to this day – and one that may never be resolved because of the inherent features of this tort.

Artificial intelligence (AI) increasingly intersects with judicial processes, raising new challenges for courts and judges. One significant concern linked to this development is the ability of judges and court personnel to understand, evaluate, and critically engage with AI systems. The EU Artificial Intelligence Act adopted in 2024 addresses this directly, requiring public bodies using AI to ensure their staff possess a ‘sufficient level of AI literacy’. This chapter argues that enhancing AI competence among judges and court personnel is essential to safeguarding the right to a fair trial, legal certainty, and the rule of law in an increasingly digitalised legal environment. After providing a brief overview of AI literacy obligations in the EU AI Act, the chapter offers insights into how national judicial training institutions could integrate AI literacy into their curricula.

The Framers’ design provided for a separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial functions to be performed in each case by different public officials. The design also provided for some overlap in functions as a means for allowing each branch to protect itself against the other two. The overlap of powers has proved effective, but a combination of overreach and willing yielding of powers on the part of Congress and the expected aggrandizement by the executive and undue deference on the part of the judiciary have created numerous opportunities for political factions to exercise influence.