According to legal positivism, legality is socially constructed. Traditionally, the view maintains that legal validity is based on social conventions rather than morality. Critics, most notably Ronald Dworkin, argue that it cannot account for theoretical disagreement over criteria of legal validity. In this article, I examine how theoretical disagreement bears on legal positivism by presenting a specific version of Dworkin’s Argument from Theoretical Disagreement (“ATD”) as applied to positivism, his primary target. I review leading positivist strategies for accommodating or avoiding the problem. I then challenge the ATD’s underlying assumption—shared by orthodox positivists—that conventional recognition of valid law requires agreement on interpretive criteria. Instead, I argue that practitioners conventionally recognize valid law in common in ordinary legal practice through closure procedures rather than interpretive consensus. Finally, I show how this account supports a more accurate reconstruction of legal reasoning, argumentation, and practice than Dworkinian and existing positivist alternatives.

Nicolas Gérard is a Senior Political Affairs Officer at the United Nations (UN) with over twenty years of experience in international security and human rights. As the Chief of the Monitoring, Reporting and Regional Partnerships Unit, he currently plays a leading role in the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, where he heads the monitoring of grave violations against children in armed conflict. Previously, he held key positions at UN Headquarters and in the field, including a posting in Togo and tenures with the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs and the UN Institute for Disarmament Research.

This article challenges the widespread framing of minority rights and democracy as opposing principles within the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). It argues that both share a common foundation in political equality and autonomy, and that their protection is historically, theoretically and practically intertwined. It argues that the ECtHR”s practice should recognize this connection more clearly and more openly, rather than treating democracy as a rationale for deference that undermines minority rights. Drawing on comparative constitutional law, particularly representation-reinforcement theory, it argues that the ECtHR might adjust and rethink some of its concepts to that purpose, in particular its procedural approach and the concept of vulnerability, and it might experiment with communication to better safeguard structurally disadvantaged groups while at the same time strengthening and respecting democratic processes. By situating minority protection within a broader democratic project, the paper proposes ways for the ECtHR to strengthen legitimacy, counter democratic backsliding and resist far-right efforts to weaponize ‘democracy’ against politically vulnerable groups.

The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the AAT), which was established by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (the AAT Act), has now been functioning for more than 16 years. From very modest beginnings (see the 25 jurisdictions conferred pursuant to the Schedule to the original AAT Act), the Tribunal has had conferred upon it an increasingly wide range of review jurisdictions (presently in excess of 240), encompassing major areas of governmental decision-making. Many of these decisions were previously unreviewable on the merits. Others were reviewable before separate specialist tribunals operating independently of each other, or before the High Court (and other courts exercising federal jurisdiction) in procedures by way of statutory appeal or collateral attack that were little utilised.

This lecture considers conserving and upholding Anishinaabe law as it relates to the more-than-human world. It suggests that we must continually renew our broadest legal commitments to protect and preserve what sustains us. Protecting clans and the animals from which they derive is close to the heart of Anishinaabe law (ode’naakonige). This law is embodied through Anishinaabe treaties with our evolutionary progenitors, our clan relatives. These treaties with the more-than-human world were incorporated into treaties with other First Nations. From an Anishinaabe perspective, these obligations were, in turn, eventually imported into treaties with the Crown. Anishinaabe treaties with the more-than-human world continue to inform how Anishinaabe people practice constitutional law through consultation protocols, legislation, and participation in court proceedings.

Medical personnel operate on the front lines of armed conflict, addressing its profound physical and psychological impact by providing care to the wounded and sick. At the same time, they themselves experience psychological harm, whether directly from acts of violence or indirectly from the demands of their work during armed conflict. In recognition of their vital role, international humanitarian law (IHL) grants them special protection, requiring that they be respected and protected in all circumstances. This article advances, de lege ferenda, that the obligation to respect and protect medical personnel should be interpreted to encompass protection against both direct and incidental psychological harm. Such an interpretation is warranted on several grounds: first, it reflects the growing recognition in IHL of the “person” in a broader sense; second, it follows from the broad formulation of the obligation to respect and protect; and finally, it aligns with IHL’s object and purpose of alleviating suffering in armed conflict.

This reflective practitioner essay asks what it means to teach law ‘as a conversation’ and who is heard as speaking law within that conversation. Drawing on teaching notes from an elite Indian law school writing classroom, the article analyses a staged counter-factual dialogue among four legal thinkers (Nicholas J. McBride, Patricia J. Williams, Kiruba Munusamy and Angela D. Gilmore). ‘Counter-factual pedagogy’ names a method that stages an ‘as-if’ encounter that is structurally unlikely within conventional legal education in order to make institutional defaults newly visible, including neutrality as epistemic rigour, professionalism as merit and doctrinal learning as separable from social power. The article reads the exercise through five literature-informed lenses (voice, neutrality, performance, justice, discomfort). No student quotations, paraphrases or artefacts are reproduced.

Data privacy and protection are inextricably intertwined, whereas the former often slides into a national security concern. Amid geopolitical tensions, the U.S. aims to preserve TikTok’s independence and prevent its use in cognitive warfare. The landmark case presents potentially groundbreaking trade-offs for the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States and the balance between data privacy and national security. The TikTok ban can be seen as a Catch-22 situation, presenting a Hobson’s choice for both the U.S. and China in the ongoing data war. The U.S. faces national security concerns regarding Chinese influence over the app’s data and its potential use for surveillance and propaganda. Conversely, banning TikTok risks setting a precedent for censorship and digital platform manipulation, undermining the U.S.’s long-standing commitment to free speech and open markets. The dilemma lies in whether to prioritize national security over the principles of free expression and open trade or to accept the risks posed by adversary-owned platforms operating in the U.S. This decision underscores rising tensions as the two powers grapple with data governance, digital sovereignty and geopolitical rivalry – an outcome that will shape global data governance and the technological landscape for years to come. A paradox emerges as China’s ideological aims and the U.S.’s technical concerns converge on a cutting-edge global challenge, that is, cognitive warfare in shaping global discourse and public opinion. This study examines how these conflicting forces shape TikTok’s quest to become a global platform, delving into the root causes of these tensions and exploring strategies to address the associated challenges.