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EU laws remain structurally misaligned with how algorithmic systems generate harms. This paper identifies an “EU collective redress gap” for harms to algorithmic “groups of persons.” It uses doctrinal comparison of the GDPR, the Representative Actions Directive (RAD) and the Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act), complemented by case studies of TPC v Oracle/Salesforce and the CJEU’s Meta Platforms Ireland (C-319/20) judgment, to showcase this gap. The analysis demonstrates that GDPR remedies are ultimately bound to identifiable data subjects and (optionally) their mandates, RAD ties redress to consumers, and the AI Act, while repeatedly referring to “persons or groups of persons” in its risk-based prohibitions and obligations, outsources collective enforcement to RAD and offers only individualised complaints. On that basis, the paper conceptualises three group categories, organised, inferred and legislatively “vulnerable” groups, and identifies inferred, risk-exposed groups constructed from anonymised data as the main harm-bearers currently left without meaningful access to compensation. To close this gap, this paper proposes a guide for “group-friendly” collective redress consisting in privileging opt-out models, lowering representativeness thresholds (including digital expressions of support), importing WAMCA-style categorisation of claimants, introducing an explicit AI-specific representation right for “persons or groups of persons,” and extending collective standing to non-consumer groups.
This article argues that platform capitalism generates a distinct legal problem that existing regulatory frameworks, designed to address disinformation and censorship, structurally fail to recognise: attention fragmentation. The commodification of attention produces a form of distraction that undermines the preconditions legal accountability itself depends on. Platform capitalism’s business model rewards engagement, and the dominant architectures reward a fragmented modality of engagement in particular, producing subjects who have internalised the logic of self-optimisation that Han identifies as psychopolitics. Through a theoretical genealogy from Debord’s externally imposed spectacle to Han’s psychopolitical internalisation, this article explains why distraction resists conventional legal intervention. Turning to environmental governance as a particularly stark illustration, the article reveals four structural vulnerabilities that make environmental regulation systematically susceptible to attention collapse: temporal mismatch, monitoring dependency, breakdown of accountability chains and asymmetric harm distribution. The article identifies possible policy interventions but emphasises their structural limits; legal reform cannot guarantee attention when the economic system profits from its commodification and fragmentation. The effectiveness of law in the age of platform capitalism depends on confronting the alignment between extractive capital’s interest in deregulation and platform capital’s dependence on engagement-driven fragmentation.
Antitrust and competition laws are government regulations that seek to encourage competition by limiting the market power of firms. Some degree of monopolistic or market power has long been a feature of our economies and is most recognisable today through the activities of companies such as Google, Amazon, Meta, Microsoft and Apple. The concept of market power remains a central idea in fields such as industrial organization, the economics of regulation, competition law and competition policy, yet there is still much debate about how to define it and how to measure it. Antitrust and Competition Policy suggests a new approach for identifying market power and building on it sets out, for the first time, a sound, comprehensive economic foundation for competition law and policy. This framework sheds new light on a range of antitrust violations including the discernment of anti-competitive mergers, abusive practices and restrictive agreements.
This book examines the rise of the direct-to-consumer genetic testing industry (DTC) and its use of 'wrap' contracts. It uses the example of DTC to show the challenges that disruptive technologies pose for societies and for regulation. It also uses the wrap contracts of DTC companies to explore broader issues with online contracting.
The DTC industry is centred around the online sale of genetic tests. The industry has emerged and has been able to develop because of rapid advances made in two technological areas: genetic and genomic science; and computing. The rate of technological advances in genetics and genomics is continuing on an almost unprecedented scale. This chapter provides a brief introduction to the scientific advances that have enabled the DTC industry to develop and an overview of the types of service currently available.
2.2 The Nature of Genetic Information and Genetic Exceptionalism
(a) What is Genetic Information?
Genetic information can be defined as ‘the information carried in a sequence of nucleotides in a molecule of DNA or RNA’. For present purposes, genomic sequence data can be understood as the data generated by sequencing technology. It has recently been suggested by Raymond McAuley that the cost of sequencing a genome will be less than the cost of flushing a toilet by 2020. ‘As of January 2014, sequencing a human genome cost just under $1,000 – less than the cost of a chest X-ray’ and ‘genome scanning is dropping in cost faster than computers can keep up. Moore's Law observes that computing power doubles every two years, but the cost of sequencing a genome drops by 5 or 10 times per year.’
DTC services normally only sequence a portion of an individual's genome, rather than the entire genome sequence. However, this may change, as more companies begin to offer whole genome sequencing.
The original work upon which this book is based began almost a decade ago and as with many other new technologies, the personal genomics industry is still developing at a rapid pace. This is also a period of change for the law and so this book captures the industry and the state of the law at a particular moment. I intend to be able to update this volume in the future, but as this manuscript was submitted in late 2018 and will be published in mid-2019, some things may change in the interim and I will only be able account for these changes in the future. I ask readers to bear this in mind and to please note that this book is intended to provide an introduction to a complex area and provide some suggestions for reform, which it is hoped will contribute to stimulating a wider discussion of regulation of personal genomics and of technology more generally and the ways in which we all interact with contracts and privacy policies online.
The Table of Abbreviations for DTC Contracts provides links to the Wayback Machine wherever possible. Efforts have also been made to provide archived links throughout.
While immigration status is often arbitrarily ascribed, the moral meanings of undocumented status are central in the growing polarization and punitiveness of immigration politics in the United States. How do political actors construct the moral meanings of undocumented status and reason their preferred redresses? Existing substantialist approach’s search for a coherent list of moral traits is unable to locate the basis of such construction. Through interviews with a multiracial group of 65 Democratic and Republican activists, this paper identifies the relational meaning-making process underlying the construction of migrant morality, which I label as “Folk Durkheimian.” I find that, like Durkheim, activists believe that law exists to uphold social solidarities and therefore legal categories mark people as belonging or threatening to the social body. I further find that activists construct belonging and threat along two axes: similarity and division of labor. As both Democratic and Republican activists construct migrants as simultaneously belonging and threatening on different axes, both prefer the ambivalent redress of pathways to citizenship for a limited subset of migrants. This Folk Durkheimian understanding advances a relational and integrated framework for understanding morality, group politics, and punitive attitudes.
This chapter sets out the findings of a review of the wrap contracts used by DTC companies that provide testing for health purposes.1 This takes the form of a descriptive comparative document analysis of these contracts. It provides an outline of the typical terms likely to be included in a DTC contract and a discussion of terms which are likely to be deemed unfair and unenforceable under UK law. In this chapter it will be argued that several terms commonly included in DTC contracts are likely to be deemed to be unfair terms under UK law and consequently unenforceable. Given the frequency of use of these terms it is suggested that the best means of enhancing protection for consumers in this context in the short-term is for the Competition & Markets Authority (CMA) to begin to take pre-emptive action and work with the industry to discontinue the use of such terms. Specifically, the following terms are likely to be deemed to be unfair or fail to meet transparency requirements:
1. clauses allowing for unilateral variation of the contract
2. clauses disclaiming liability for fitness for purpose or for personal injury caused by the company's negligence 3. clauses limiting scope of purpose
4. clauses purporting to bind the consumer to resolve any disputes in another jurisdiction
5. consent clauses
This chapter will also provide a brief overview of contract and consumer protection law, as it relates to DTC contracts. In so doing it will make reference to the applicable UK legislation, namely the Consumer Rights Act 2015 (CRA) and the work of the CMA. As it will always be difficult for an individual consumer to pursue litigation against a large company, if certain terms currently included in these contracts seem likely to be deemed as unfair, it is desirable that the CMA works with the industry to prevent the use of such terms.
The nature of the DTC industry as providers of genetic tests means that privacy and data protection law have relevance to industry governance. As with many other digital service providers, security is also a significant issue here. At present, the European Union is undergoing a time of transition with the implementation of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).1 Although the UK is also undergoing a broader period of transition with Brexit, the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA18) transposes the GDPR into the UK's national law. As DTC companies collect genetic data, as well as other types of personal data, which they often use in ongoing research, companies should be complying with the GDPR and applicable data protection law in EU Member States and also other countries that have similar law.
This chapter provides a broad overview of privacy, data protection and security issues raised by DTC services. The aim here is to provide an introduction to a complex area and provide some suggestions for how industry practices and governance could be improved. In the context of privacy policies and notices, it is important to recognise that these documents are often linked with wrap contracts on DTC websites. This is often done through incorporation of terms by reference and for an individual to understand their legal rights in this context, they should really be reading all of these documents. This is problematic, as a number of studies have demonstrated in relation to privacy policies and contracts more generally that consumers are not reading these.