Floating Nuclear Power Plants (FNPPs) pose novel questions under existing international maritime and nuclear law regimes, as the international community has yet to agree on fundamental issues, such as what constitutes an FNPP. Whether categorized as a facility, a vessel, or a combination of both, such classification has a significant impact on nuclear security, nuclear nonproliferation, and the law of the sea. Their appeal for deployment in remote areas and support activities, such as offshore oil extraction, raises serious questions about the application of international ocean laws and nuclear nonproliferation norms. Utilizing floating nuclear power plants in areas such as the Exclusive Economic Zone and beyond presents challenges to adhering to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and nuclear laws, including the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and its Amendments. What rights does the coastal state have, and what rights does the possible flag state of the FNPP possess if it is categorized as a vessel? Additionally, how would they respond in the event of a nuclear security incident? These questions underscore the connection between maritime and nuclear law and the uncertainty surrounding maritime accidents.

Chapter 2 reviews John Merryman’s ‘two ways of thinking’ about cultural property, rooted in an eighteenth-century dispute about the respective merits of particularism and cosmopolitanism, which continues to the present. A new section has been added on material looted from Benin.

Underwater archaeology serves to understand cultural heritage, artifacts, sites, and objects. It advances with technology, enhancing the ability to locate and study shipwrecks. Shipwrecks are a key element under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage. This paper examines how underwater archaeology technologies impact the rights of coastal and flag states to access shipwrecks in maritime zones and to collaborate in preserving underwater cultural heritage. It considers wreck locations, vessel types, and the flag state of archaeological ships. The analysis focuses on warships, which may enjoy sovereign immunity, in contrast to other kinds of shipwrecked vessels. Relevant UNCLOS articles, such as 33, 149, and 303, emphasize the protection of objects at sea and warn against infringing upon another state’s rights when retrieving archaeological finds from the seabed. The change is significant as technology increases access to inaccessible sites. The paper explores side-scan sonar, unmanned surface vehicles, and specific underwater imaging technologies. These technologies enable states to study and access shipwrecks across ocean zones. This chapter examines UNCLOS, the Underwater Cultural Heritage Convention, concerning rights to access wrecks within and beyond national jurisdiction amid growing ocean exploration.

Ships rely on Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), like the NAVSTAR Global Positioning Systems (GPS), for safe navigation and precise Position, Navigation, and Time (PNT). Based on satellite input, PNT enable shipboard receivers to determine location with precision. As a primary PNT source, GNSS must be accurate and protected from manipulation to ensure safe ship operations. While some GNSS interference is unintentional, threat from State and non-state actors persist. Over the past 20 years, cyberattacks on international shipping by rogue States like China, Iran, and Russia and state-sponsored hackers have increased, threatening maritime safety by disrupting navigation and communication equipment. The proliferation of GNSS interference poses a strategic threat, to global navigation safety, civilian finances, logistics, and communication. This chapter discusses GNSS threats and how States can mitigate jamming and spoofing. It examines efforts by the International Maritime Organization and shipping industry to address these threats and review United States measures to protect its maritime transportation system from cyberattacks. No single solution addresses all GNSS vulnerabilities but combining alternatives can augment GNSS and ensure resilience for critical maritime PNT operations. Regular risk assessments identify vulnerabilities and prioritize mitigation. A clear incident response plan supports cyberattacks, minimizing damage, and expedite recovery.

The adoption of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in the maritime sector marks a significant technological advancement with broad implications for operational efficiency, crewing, and regulatory frameworks. While these innovations are expected to enhance safety, reduce operating costs, and promote environmental sustainability, they are also likely to introduce challenges related to workforce displacement, cybersecurity, and evolving labor regulations at sea. This chapter examines the impact of AI on the maritime workforce, more specifically seafarers. It explores how AI may affect crew size, the emergence of new roles, and new skills in the future. It also offers an analysis of the significant impact of AI on working conditions and labor rights at sea under international maritime regulations, particularly the Maritime Labour Convention (MLC), 2006, and the Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers Convention (1978, STCW Convention), as amended. This chapter explores the intersection areas of AI and maritime law, focusing on the emerging regulatory frameworks, including the EU AI Act and the International Maritime Organization’s Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) Code. The findings point out that while AI presents opportunities for improving the working conditions of seafarers, its use must adhere to acceptable labor standards, legal clarity, and robust cybersecurity measures.

This chapter explores when shipmaster conduct triggers Flag State responsibility. While individual acts are not attributable to States, exceptions arise from special State-individual relationships. Influenced by the shipmaster’s traditional role as agent and navigator, the modern role includes a range of internationally codified duties. If stemming from Flag State obligations, the shipmaster fulfills them, supported by two ARSIWA exceptions to non-attributability: (1) when individuals act under State control; (2) when the State fails to prevent conduct. Flag State responsibility for shipmasters’ conduct evolves in rescue violations. It arises when States fail to ensure shipmasters assist persons in distress where reasonably possible without endangering lives onboard, or when rescued persons face treatment violating international refugee law, including human rights law. This chapter re-assesses Flag State responsibility by examining whether shipmasters’ conduct is attributable based on their humanity or presence onboard. It also evaluates when private conduct is attributable to the Flag State, based on (1) organ/agent status under ARSIWA and (2) the State’s due diligence in preventing unlawful acts. Attributability depends on vessel ownership, breached obligations, and the State’s role in prevention. The chapter expands ARSIWA attribution analysis to autonomous ship operations, where shipmasters are absent or replaced by decision-making artificial intelligence.

The sale, twice, of a Medici cabinet ordered for an English estate introduces the modern idea of heritage, initiated by Edmund Burke. It covers Protestant narratives and customary laws, and concludes with Alasdair MacIntyre’s thesis about narrative and identity.

Subsea cables date to the 19th century with telegraphic use and have served various roles, including military. However, they rose to prominence in communications with the Internet’s creation in 1980s. Today, global telecommunications, the Internet, and financial and security systems rely on subsea cables, which handle about 97% of international communications. A new development enhances subsea cable technology by adding oceanographic sensors to collect ocean, environment, and climate data. These are called ‘SMART (Sensor Monitoring and Reliable Telecommunications) cables. Adding monitoring to subsea cables is a cheap way to improve marine environmental understanding through data collection, transforming them into dual-purpose systems combining data gathering and telecommunications. This dual role raises legal questions—primarily whether SMART cables collecting marine data qualify as scientific research needing coastal State consent in certain maritime zones. The subsea cable industry is lukewarm on SMART cables, fearing coastal State laws may hinder operations which adds complication. Security concerns over subsea cables increases with geopolitical tensions and deliberate targeting, such as the October 2023 Baltic Connector incident. Adding new technology to an established one raises several issues. Though SMART cables offer strong scientific benefits for understanding the (marine) environment, caution is needed as legal hurdles arise.

Jurisdiction institutionalizes shipping regulation, rooted in State sovereignty. States act as flag, coastal, or port authorities. While UNCLOS prioritizes flag States’ jurisdiction, it also recognizes ports as enforcers of international maritime compliance and provides the legal foundation for State jurisdictions. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) creates treaties. The synergy between UNCLOS and IMO adapts the legal framework to emerging challenges. This paper examines the interplay between UNCLOS and IMO regulating MASS and its implications for port and coastal States’ responsibilities and navigational rights. This study assesses the navigational rights to MASS. While port States possess discretion in setting entry conditions, it discusses the legal basis of port State jurisdiction and key elements of autonomy. It explores the rights of semi- and fully autonomous ships to call at foreign ports and analyzes port States’ discretion in regulating MASS entry. Despite UNCLOS and IMO regulations hesitating to regulate ports directly, the advent of MASS operations necessitates port States’ role in ensuring compliance with international norms. This paper examines IMO’s mandate regarding the introduction of MASS. It questions whether IMO plays a proactive role in encouraging Member States, through developing Generally Accepted International Rules and Standards (GAIRS), to welcome such ships in ports.

James Kraska and Khanssa Lagdami, The trajectory of science and technology in developing the Law of the Sea and Oceans Governance

As states pursue net-zero emissions by mid-century, transforming energy systems and mobility is essential. This ‘Green Transition’ demands large-scale deployment of clean energy technologies and infrastructure, which requires expanding mining and mineral processing. Oceans, covering 71% of the Earth’s surface, are now seen as a new frontier for sourcing these minerals. These resources are considered strategic due to their role in clean technologies, sustainable products, and supply disruption. Consequently, the European Union, the US, India, Japan, and Australia have prioritized mineral supply security. As land-based deposits decline in quality and quantity, focus has shifted to the sea-raising environmental concerns, as the marine environment already faces over-exploitation, pollution, biodiversity loss, and climate change. Harnessing ocean resources requires sustainable, balanced approaches. Technological advances are essential, particularly due to the expiration of the two-year deadline for the mining code. Once this expires, the ISA must consider any seabed mining plans. Given the complexity of seabed mining, assessing whether seabed technologies meet sustainability goals is vital. This chapter examines the governance framework, including precautionary practices, and examines the role of states and contractors. It also maps the technological and environmental readiness and highlights adaptive management to reduce uncertainty and avoid costly mitigation.