Lyndwood’s Provinciale (c. 1433) contains the ecclesiastical legislation, and a gloss on it, of the Province of Canterbury. The York Provinciale (c. 1518), issued by Wolsey, Archbishop of York, contains the legislation of that province, but with no gloss. The Canterbury Provinciale is well known, and dominates in the works of ecclesiastical lawyers and in the church courts after the Reformation. The York Provinciale is little known, and much neglected after the Reformation by the ecclesiastical lawyers, and today by historians of canon law. The two Provinciales have never been compared. What follows remedies this neglect and compares these two legal entities, in terms of ten matters, namely, their: authors; sources; purposes; internal structure; authority (the Canterbury Provinciale was never ratified legislatively, the York one was, arguably as a legatine constitution and so superior in status to Canterbury’s); geographical applicability (including York’s adoption of Canterbury’s provincial law in 1462 subject to its consistency with York law); position in historic debates; editions; use by the post-Reformation ecclesiastical lawyers; and use by modern scholars. It is time, therefore, for Canterbury’s laws to share the limelight with the York Provinciale.

Federal prosecutors regularly transition to private practice, where they often defend the same types of cases and clients they once prosecuted. This may be particularly true for Assistant U.S. Attorneys (AUSAs) in white-collar cases. Here, using data linking career trajectories to case outcomes, we examine whether AUSAs who depart for private practice treat corporate defendants differently than those who remain in government. We find “revolving” prosecutors exhibit greater leniency toward corporate defendants than their counterparts; this is clearest in cases involving big law firms. The findings speak to the revolving door’s impact on corporate accountability and career-duty tensions for prosecutors.

Courts that wish to avoid the effect of a binding precedent sometimes do so by reinterpreting the precedent so that its application depends on underlying facts of the case that were not invoked by the precedent court in the formulation of their reasons for decision. This article considers the implications of this practice, which I call “restrictive reinterpretation,” for the popular reason model of precedential constraint. The practice of restrictively reinterpreting precedent exposes the reason model to criticism on two opposing fronts. On one hand, it threatens the distinction between distinguishing and rule-modification that underlies the reason model. On the other hand, it provides a basis for challenging the view that courts’ formulations of their reasons for judgment have constraining effect. The article presents these challenges within an extended formal framework, before offering a qualified defense of the reason model.

This article offers a critical literature review on the debate on constitutional identity, combining a synthesis of existing literature with a critical reframing of the concept’s theoretical and methodological foundations. While constitutional identity has become increasingly prominent in legal and political debates – particularly within the European Union – its meanings and functions remain contested. The article develops a typology of approaches to constitutional identity, distinguishing two main strands. First, it examines constitutional identity as a legal doctrinal notion. In this sense, identity can function either as a static concept – anchored in an unchanging normative core that limits political or legal interference – or as a dynamic concept, shaped through interactions between domestic constitutional orders and external legal ideas and practices. Second, the article turns to the descriptive use of constitutional identity, understood as a way to explain how a political community understands itself through its constitution. This part surveys key philosophical debates, including how constitutional identity negotiates sameness and difference, how it evolves over time, how it relates to competing conceptions of the constitutional subject, and how it is constructed through narrative, symbolism, and social practice. The article concludes by arguing that if constitutional identity is not a fixed essence but a dialogical and constructed assemblage of identities, then its study must go beyond the legal domain. It calls for a deepening of the interdisciplinary research agenda that includes insights from philosophy, sociology, discourse theory, and literary studies.

Under the notion of the twin transition, the green and digital transitions were conceptualised as a synergetic pair that should pave the way for a globally competitive green and digital Europe. But are European digital and environmental laws truly twins within the EU’s regulatory strategy, suggesting parallel approaches? In this article, we take a formal approach, focusing on regulatory instruments that are employed in both areas and their defining characteristics. While the twin transition in some respects blurs the boundaries between environmental and digital law, including through the integration of environmental considerations into digital regulations, we adopt an analytical distinction between the two domains. Through a series of steps, we identify key differences that set both regulatory approaches apart and help us understand the different trajectories the transitions have taken. Contrary to the often-invoked claim that form is substance, the analysis reveals that the choice of regulatory instruments does not inherently determine substantive policy choices, thereby underscoring the necessity of their comparative examination. Ultimately, the article argues that fostering dialogue between the two policy fields may yield valuable insights into how regulatory tools can be adapted and deployed across domains.

Sociolegal research has long found that most people “lump” their problems rather than pursue legal remedies. This study examines how social media transforms legal consciousness and mobilization. Drawing on in-depth interviews with 100 families who experienced the same birth injury, and 37 legal and medical professionals, we analyze how online communities shape perceptions of medical injury, blame attribution, and legal action. We find that parents often experience profound guilt, believing they are responsible for their child’s injury. However, participation in online support groups reframes their understanding of the injury, shifting their guilt toward medical providers and fostering legal claims. Our findings show that social media serves as a new “structuring structure,” shaping legal consciousness across geographic and social class boundaries. Social media serves as a powerful force in shaping parents’ perceptions of their child’s injuries as legally actionable, challenging existing assumptions about why people do or do not pursue legal action. By examining how online communities facilitate the transformation from guilt to blame and encourage legal mobilization, this study contributes to broader sociolegal debates about the role of digital technologies in shaping contemporary legal consciousness.

This Article analyzes the relevance of dissenting opinions issued on the judgments of constitutional courts, particularly the Spanish Constitutional Court, for dialogue between courts—especially the ECtHR—in the field of rights. The interpretative capacity of individual opinions is an important question in the case of the Spanish order, given that Article 10.2 of the Spanish Constitution requires that the rights guaranteed in the Constitution be interpreted in accordance with the treaties on rights signed by Spain. In this sense, the ECHR plays an essential role as the main instrument of interpretative reference in the domestic sphere. Therefore, we have sought to study the capacity of individual opinions to promote new developments in the field of rights based on the bridge generated with the doctrine of the ECtHR and to what extent this can have repercussions on the positions initially defended by the dissenting minority of the Spanish Constitutional Court becoming the majority position defended by the Court. This study is channeled through the freedom of expression in Fragoso Dacosta case because of its relevance in the multilevel context, analyzing the ruling 190/2020 of the Spanish Constitutional Court, December 15, and the ruling of the ECtHR in Fragoso Dacosta v. Spain, June 8, 2023.

Prefigurative law reform develops and experiments with ideas about radical legal change. But these ideas are vulnerable to being challenged, including for having failed and for being unreal. This article responds to such charges, drawing on utopian studies for a different account of failure and the not real. Its focus is a speculative legal proposal to “decertify” sex and gender so that they would no longer be assigned, obligatory aspects of legal personhood. The article explores the utopian dimensions of decertification alongside accusations that it is fictive, undesirable, and nonviable. Reading these charges through utopianism reduces their sting since failure and the not real become inevitable, even positive, qualities. At the same time, dichotomies of real/fictive, existent/non-existent, and achievable/unachievable do injustice to prefigurative legal proposals. This article therefore proposes an alternative frame that embraces failure and the not real while reaching beyond their limits: staying “in play.” This combines simulation, disorientation, and falling short with the ambition, hopefulness, and pleasures of utopian praxis. Sutured to a utopian impulse, in play emphasizes the importance of persistence for prefigurative proposals while recognizing that their form may fluctuate and change over time.

Light pollution – the use of artificial lighting at night (ALAN) – is a growing environmental problem. This article focuses on how the European Union (EU) governs light pollution. A few key points are made. At first glance, the regulatory situation appears to be straightforward: there is no explicit EU governance in this area, as no regulation has been adopted with specific targets to mitigate light pollution. Yet, many EU instruments indirectly affect the growth of light pollution without mentioning the term by name. This article discusses specific examples from the EU Habitats Directive and the Energy Labelling Regulation, amongst others. On the basis of these examples, the article argues that this web of instruments, when considered together, can be conceptualized as ‘shadow’ governance. It concludes that unless light is shed on regulatory spillovers, the current EU regulatory framework will continue to worsen, rather than address, light pollution.

Cryptoassets, while viewed by many as a significant innovation in the banking and investment industry, present exigent risks to investors, markets and possibly the financial system itself. Can these risks be managed appropriately using securities regulation? This article argues that securities regulation is appropriate to regulate a popular kind of cryptoasset, utility tokens, given the similarities between utility token risks and those found in traditional securities markets. This analysis begins to point to a consistent global regulatory response to cryptoasset regulation and has implications for future cryptoassets and financial innovation more generally.

This article examines the new provisions on contract interpretation and characterisation in Book 5 of the Belgian Civil Code, which entered into force on 1 January 2023. The reform preserves Belgium’s traditional subjective approach to interpretation, prioritising the parties’ common intention over literal textual meaning, contrasting with the objective or mixed approaches adopted by French law and international instruments. Regarding characterisation, Belgium introduces innovative provisions explicitly addressing contract classification and mixed contracts, filling gaps left by other legal systems. These aspects of the Belgian reform are put intto perspective with comparative observations drawn mostly from French, German, and Dutch law.

The steadily growing reliance on international dispute settlement as environmental protection means is not uncontroversial, raising three sets of issues regarding: (i) the nature of adjudicative fora (ontological issues); (ii) wider assumptions and frameworks (methodological issues); and (iii) processes for creating and implementing environmental obligations (processual issues). Accordingly, this review essay is threefold. Despite a trend towards greater reliance on international dispute settlement fora, Part I discusses whether their presumably inherent ‘anthropocentric’ orientation hinders their suitability and assesses the feasibility of solutions advocated in judicial discourses. Having observed inconsistencies between the law-ascertainment methods deployed by adjudicative fora and the general regimes on law-ascertainment, Part II contends, international law-based environmental protection risks becoming overly “judge-centric”, despite international law-making’s state-centric nature. Part III concludes considering various reversals of perspective, potentially countering the shortcomings of overly “judge-centric” environmental protection, in addition to factors such as enforceability, plausibly justifying greater reliance on arbitral fora.

This article explores the potential effect of converting a constitutional narrative into a tax narrative that might help to address a constitutional controversy. The article examines, as a case study, the deep and long-standing issue of inequality in mandatory conscription. All efforts made over the decades to resolve the conflict or reduce its scope have failed. The article sets up a novel framework by conceptualising mandatory service as a ‘tax in-kind’, proposing a mandatory army tax credit (MATC) as a significant tool to alleviate the inequality. The proposed regime bridges the tension between Israel’s ‘people’s army’ ethos and the growing inequality. The proposed tax regime leverages the framing effect to preserve the ‘people’s army’ ethos while addressing inequities. Our insights apply to any country with mandatory military service facing issues of inequality: should conscription controversies be addressed solely through constitutional narrative, or through tax narrative as well? In addition, the approach of the article challenges traditional tax perspectives and public policy by incorporating non-monetary obligations into the tax discourse.

This memorial essay introduces the Journal of Law, Medicine, and Ethics special issue on supported decision-making in research by honoring David T. Wasserman (1953–2025), a major organizer of the NIH workshop from which the issue emerged and a coauthor of two papers in the volume. It situates supported decision-making in research as an emerging approach that aims to make participation by people with cognitive disabilities possible without displacing their agency through default reliance on legally authorized representatives. The essay highlights Wasserman’s distinctive contribution to this developing area. He sought a position that is respectful while remaining clear eyed about exploitation risks and about well-intentioned practices that can undermine a participant’s interests, especially in hard cases where meaningful authorization is fragile. Drawing on the two coauthored papers in the issue and on colleagues’ recollections, the essay emphasizes Wasserman’s commitment to conceptual clarity, workable institutional design, and mentorship through collaboration. It closes by reflecting on his intellectual virtues, humor, and lasting influence on disability bioethics and research ethics.

There is little consensus on how to regulate information giving in reproductive donation – using donated gametes (eggs, sperm) to have children. Should gamete donors be anonymous or should donor-conceived individuals have access to their donor’s identity, and at what age? What information should be available about donor siblings and other donor relations? And, crucially, how should this information giving be appropriately managed and regulated? Before we can answer these questions, we need to first understand what reproductive donation is. This paper sets out options for how reproductive donation can be conceptualized and develops a typology of different approaches, by categorizing reproductive donation into two main models: the biomedical and the psychosocial. These models provide a conceptual framework, a useful heuristic, for both understanding reproductive donation and critiquing regulation and oversight. The purpose of this paper is not to take a stand on which model is optimal; this is a matter for further debate. Rather, it provides clarification of what is at stake, and this can form the basis for coherent and justifiable approaches to the oversight and regulation of reproductive donation, instead of the patchwork of provisions that currently exist in many jurisdictions.

This article examines the transformative impact of large language models (LLMs) on online content moderation, revealing a critical gap between platforms’ rule-based policies and their AI-driven enforcement mechanisms. Using Facebook’s hate speech moderation policies and practices as a case study, we identify a paradox: while content policies are increasingly rule-oriented, AI-driven enforcement seems to operate in a standard-like manner. This disconnect creates transparency, consistency and accountability challenges relating to the delineation of online freedom of expression that are not addressed in the literature, and require attention and mitigation. In this specific context, we introduce the concept of ‘rules by the millions’ to describe how AI systems actually operate through generating vast networks of micro-rules that evade traditional regulatory oversight. This phenomenon disrupts the conventional rules-versus-standards framework used in legal theory, raising urgent questions about the adequacy of current AI governance mechanisms. Indeed, the rapid adoption of LLMs in content moderation has outpaced the human capacity to monitor them, creating a pressing need for adaptive frameworks capable of managing the evolving capacities of AI.

What do we mean by backlash against rights? How does backlash vary? What explains its variation? Although backlash is recognized as a crucial problem in the legal mobilization literature, it is treated as a residual category. This paper proposes a conceptual apparatus and research agenda for its identification and analysis. We propose a definition of backlash that distinguishes it from ordinary legal mobilization, and identify key dimensions along which backlash varies – actors, realms, tactics, goals, and outcomes. We propose typologies to explore how backlash differs across these dimensions. For each dimension, we offer criteria to distinguish between the different forms of backlash, use examples to illustrate their particularities, and propose hypotheses regarding the factors that may explain variation. The main innovation of our approach is the concept of veiled backlash, which occurs in the backdoor of state agencies when regressive networks have dominant influence thereon. We claim that veiled backlash often employs pseudolegal tactics, which are difficult to detect and challenge, thus increasing the likelihood of backlash’s success. We further argue that veiled backlash tends to be cumulative; it has the ambitious goal of curtailing pro-rights policies or state agencies, yet it can go unnoticed because it relies on tactics that appear like ordinary legal mobilization.