What can we learn about organizational ethics from studying cemeteries as organizational/organized manifestations of our mutual, embodied vulnerability? How does, and how should, the ethico-political imperative of death and the deceased materialize in the cemeterial space? With reference to a comparative analysis of two island cemeteries, Venice’s San Michele and New York’s Hart Island, this paper makes three contributions to the emerging literature on organizational ethics of life and death. First, it makes an empirical contribution based on an organizational study of two “resting places” that highlights the importance of understanding organizational life and death with reference to ethics. Second, it makes a theoretical contribution to scholarship on the organization of death and on grieving as embedded in a politics and ethics of recognition. Third, the paper shows how our desire to be recognized as valid, viable subjects comes to be organized, and situated, in ways that perpetuate precarity and vulnerability, a point that is illustrated with reference to cemeteries as ethically significant organizational settings.

We study trading among strategic traders who may incorrectly assess the degree of market crowdedness. These mistakes distort equilibrium strategies and prices. When traders underestimate market crowdedness, they target larger inventories and trade more aggressively, but their actual profits are lower than expected because they underestimate the amount of information already impounded in prices. Crowded markets are prone to abrupt crashes. The magnitude of price dislocations and the speed of recovery during fire-sale events can help infer traders’ beliefs about market crowdedness.

We study a specific practice of predatory lending: Borrowers being rejected and approved in rapid succession by the same lender. We show that in such cases borrower and contract characteristics and ex post performance are consistent with predatory steering. Steered borrowers are associated with groups with lower financial sophistication. They are more likely to enter non-amortizing contracts with high profit margins that are quickly securitized. Steered borrowers default less in boom years when refinancing is easy. However, their performance deteriorates sharply once falling prices trap them in contracts with rising payments, reflecting the long-term costs of predatory lending.

Using individual records of about 950,000 financial advisors, we find that the probability and intensity of financial advisor misconduct significantly increase after local newspaper closures. The impact is more pronounced in counties with a higher proportion of seniors, minorities, and individuals with lower education levels. Male advisors are more likely to commit misconduct following newspaper closures than female advisors. The sensitivity of advisors’ job turnover to misconduct decreases after closures, suggesting a lower cost of committing misconduct. Our evidence indicates that local newspapers play a distinct role in mitigating financial advisor misconduct, as media exposure raises the costs of misbehavior.

A well-documented pattern of bank lending during crises is allocating credit to insolvent firms at the expense of productive firms, leading to inefficient resource allocation at the macro level. I investigate the role of bank CEOs in influencing such distortions during crises, using the strictly enforced age-based retirement policy of Indian government-controlled banks. I find that banks experiencing a CEO turnover in a crisis are less likely to bail out insolvent borrowers, as the new CEO has a lower incentive to do so. Consequently, the efficiency of credit allocation improves, and the zombification of the economy decreases.

We document a strong, negative relation between the curvature of stock price paths (i.e., price-path convexity) and future short-horizon returns at both the aggregate and firm levels. This relation obtains regardless of the cumulative return during the convexity estimation period. At the aggregate level, convexity is a better predictor of future returns than many commonly used predictors. At the firm level, this effect is not explained by known return predictors, microstructure frictions, or illiquidity. Using survey-based expectations of short-horizon returns, we show that the negative relation between convexity and future returns is driven in part by overextrapolation of past returns.