Across the twentieth century, CEOs became more powerful, and their decisions had a sizeable effect on their company’s performance and the British economy. Some CEOs harnessed technological and organisational innovations which allowed companies to grow and become more efficient, resulting in improvements in national productivity. In contrast, the insularity and lack of dynamism of some CEOs played a significant role in Britain’s economic stagnation. History shows that who gets to the top matters. Based on this, the chapter goes on to argue that those involved in selecting and preparing CEOs need to develop pathways to the top that identify individuals with interpersonal characteristics, values, and vision focused on the long-term stewardship of companies. They need to improve diversity to ensure that a range of cognitive abilities and insights get to the top. Across the century, various corporate governance mechanisms have been used to address the principal–agent problem at the heart of the corporation. The chapter closes by arguing that corporate governance needs to be strengthened through legislation to align CEOs to the long-term interests of company stakeholders.

By the 1970s, Britain’s economic malaise had become chronic. This chapter shows how a group of business outsiders sought to cure the malaise by unleashing market forces. These buccaneers, including Jim Slater, Jimmy Goldsmith, James Hanson, and Gordon White perfected the art of the hostile takeover to shake up poor-quality incumbent management. They believed they were liberating assets and improving the performance of management by focusing their attention on shareholder value. This resulted in high-profile and acrimonious takeover battles. Their critics named them corporate raiders, and incumbents such as Denys Henderson of ICI fought back through accusations of asset stripping and sweating. Although few tangible elements of the buccaneers’ empires survived their fall in the 1990s, they had a profound impact on business strategy, the role of the CEO, and the British economy. They empowered CEOs, their demands for improved corporate leadership were followed, and a growing number of CEOs were sacked for poor performance. Their business model influenced the growing financialisation of companies and Margaret Thatcher’s economic reforms.

This chapter examines the changing nature of the glasshouse agrifood value chain and the dominant role played by powerful lead-firm supermarkets. It highlights the tight margins that growers operate under and the consequences for their sustainability and food security before turning to the types of upgrading strategies that growers have deployed in the value chain over time.

Family and founder CEOs had their heyday in the interwar period. They faced a highly volatile economic and geopolitical environment. The chapter shows how they responded to these challenges. CEOs such as Alfred Mond led his family company to become the chemicals giant ICI, and William Lever founded and grew consumer goods company Lever Bros. Skin in the game and roots in social groups outside the mainstream of British society gave many of the families and founders a set of values and a deep commitment to grow their companies. Through investment and innovation, they achieved scale and scope. Their success took some to the heart of government, where they reshaped competition policy. The chapter then goes on to show that families and founders were particularly challenged by succession issues. John Ellerman, the most successful entrepreneur of the era, found his son had little interest in his business empire. The succession trap led to the collapse of many family companies. Others survived by handing power to professional managers such as D’Arcy Cooper, who transformed Lever Bros. Families and founders declined in importance, but through their stewardship corporate giants were built.

In the 1990s, privatisations, globalisation, and the ICT revolution opened up the British economy. This chapter examines how CEOs took advantage of these opportunities. Privatisation of national industries meant CEOs such as George Jefferson of BT now led some of Britain’s largest companies. Jefferson and his successors ensured their pay increased significantly. The average pay of CEOs rose rapidly, becoming a fixture of media debates, making the likes of Cedric Brown of British Gas a cause célébre. British CEOs finally underwent a managerial revolution in terms of education levels and training, but did increased pay correspond with improved corporate performance? In banking, pay rose for the likes of Fred Goodwin of RBS, and James Crosby and Andy Hornby of HBOS. But these CEOs all played leading roles in the collapse of their banks in 2008. The chapter shows how the Cadbury Report sought to rein in CEO excesses, but with limited effect. Governance problems were exacerbated as CEOs got younger and their tenures shorter, further incentivising short-term thinking. Women finally entered the role of CEO with Marjorie Scardino of Pearson and Cynthia Carroll at Anglo American.

This introductory chapter sets out the enduring food security crisis that the UK has faced over the post-War period and positions it in relation to how the UK is situated with respect to global value chains of food supply, labour provisioning and the adoption of new technology. It introduces the core concept of the ‘total ecology’ as a way of understanding attempts to enhance food security through glasshouse agrifood production, but highlights the fragilities of this system of food production.

“Where are you really from?” This chapter takes a closer look at corporate nationality, the key element in geopolitical risk. Notwithstanding the challenges in defining a global company’s nationality, a firm’s country of origin will shape how it is treated in global markets. The chapter examines how corporate nationality shapes the manner in which companies compete, the resources they have access to, and whether it will be a source of advantage or disadvantage in global operations. For managers, an important question is whether they can shape others’ perceptions of their company’s nationality. Different approaches including masking, localization, transfer of control rights, and partnerships with foreign firms are discussed.

As companies increasingly acknowledge the need to actively manage the impact of rising geopolitical tensions, they are on the hunt for geopolitical advice from trained and professional staff. Companies first scan the global landscape to assess where frictions may arise, leveraging the expertise of former government officials and professional analysts. They then need to determine which aspects are relevant for their businesses – a personalization of their scan results – followed by planning, which is an evaluation of how shifts in the geopolitical environment will affect their business. Finally, if the analysis suggests geopolitical headwinds, companies must understand how to pivot. These four steps – scanning, personalizing, planning, and pivoting – call for a combination of internal and external expertise. Geopolitical advisors, boards of directors, top management teams, government affairs teams, line managers, and cross-functional teams all have a role to play in the architectural changes that would be needed.

This chapter sets out the debates that have grown up around CEOs, highlighting three major reasons why they warrant serious study: their importance to the companies they lead, their wider economic and political power, and what their careers tell us about social mobility. To address these debates the book explores three questions: Who were the CEOs and how did they get into the role? What did they do? Did they matter for their companies and Britain’s economy and society? To answer these questions, a unique database of the CEOs of the top 100 most valuable UK public companies between 1900 and 2009 has been assembled. This consists of 475 companies and 1,397 CEOs. For each CEO a career biography is created. To analyse the data, we draw on Upper Echelons Theory and Agency Theory, alongside historical scholarship to understand the environments in which they operated. The chapter then sets out the five analytical threads that are developed throughout the book. The chapter closes by discussing how the nomenclature around top corporate officers evolved from ‘chairman’ to ‘managing director’ to ‘chief executive officer’.

This chapter examines the most recent sets of technological interventions in the glasshouse agrifood value chain centred on the adoption of digital technologies and digital automation in the labour process. It explores the limits to their development and the ‘boundedness’ of technological innovations today.

After World War II, Britain’s CEOs faced major economic challenges. International competition increased, and Harold Wilson called for a managerial revolution to exploit the white heat of new technology. This chapter examines whether this revolution occurred. Engineers, including Leonard Lord and George Harriman of the British Motor Corporation, and accountants, like John Davis of Rank and Leslie Lazell of Beechams, made up an increasing proportion of top CEOs. These trends increased social diversity with over 70 per cent of CEOs rising through merit rather than social position or family. Yet, British CEOs had significantly less formal education and specialist management training than their competitors. In 1950, 36 per cent of British CEOs had an undergraduate degree. The equivalent figures were 75, 75, and 95 per cent in the United States, Germany, and France. Although training in accountancy and engineering brought a focus on optimisation and efficiency, it lacked more holistic approaches to management, resulting in bureaucratic organisations and siloed thinking. The managerial revolution failed, innovation and productivity suffered, and economic malaise set in.