In this paper, we examine a major transparency initiative affecting tax abatements for state and local economic development in the United States that has been plagued by noncompliance. Unlike academic studies examining government compliance with transparency rules such as Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, we examine government and independent auditor responses to inquiries about information already posted, or not posted, in annual financial reports. Using a pre-registered experimental approach on cities, counties, and school districts in a single large-population state (Texas), we remind entities and their external auditors of their transparency obligations as well as our ability to check their compliance with this transparency rule and ask these entities follow-up questions about their required posts. Against expectations, we found that entities were not significantly more likely to comply with our request for information when we reminded them of their disclosure obligations and we found some evidence that nudges made entities less likely to comply. We argue these results provide novel insights into the limitations of transparency initiatives.

Algorithmic management is deeply changing the way work is performed and the interaction between managers and workers in organizations. It also heavily affects the conditions for meaningful work highlighted by existing literature. Therefore, organizations need an appropriate framework to enable meaningful work when adopting algorithmic management systems. This article presents a normative study of the conditions for work to be meaningful in this new scenario. To fulfil this purpose, it adopts a MacIntyrean approach, according to which work is meaningful when it embodies practice-like characteristics. The article identifies the main threats of algorithmic management and characterizes the normative conditions organizations should meet to enable meaningful work. In addition, the article explores the strategies of resistance that workers use to live up to the standards of meaningful work when organizations are not capable or willing to provide those conditions.

Contemporary human-centered organization and management practices endanger the planet’s health, affecting the life and death of multiple species—including humans. Drawing on insights from multispecies ethnography and feminist new materialism, this article contributes to the business ethics literature by developing a theoretical framework for multispecies organizing as a matter of care. Going beyond existing understandings of human-animal relations, we show how ethico-political dynamics shape multispecies relations in three ways: how we and other species relate to ecologies-in-place (affective relationalities); what we and other species do (vital doings); and, finally, what kinds of worlds we—through our ethical sensibilities—commit to bringing into being (ethical obligations). Using an illustrative example of a rewilding site in England, this article shows how multispecies organizing plays out in a specific ecology-in-place. Our argument has important implications for the conception and contemporary practices of the organizational ethics of life and death.

Heat-related mortality risks are a substantial component of the looming costs of climate change in the United States and globally. This article presents the results from a risk-risk survey to test whether U.S. respondents place a valuation premium on mortality risks from heat relative to cancer and transportation risks. The questionnaire exploits exogenous shocks to temperatures during a heat wave and randomized elements to further test whether preferences vary with heat exposure or the age of individuals exposed to heat risks. The results provide strong evidence that there is no valuation premium in the U.S. for heat-related risks. Subjects valued cancer risks twice as highly as heat and transportation risks, the latter of which are a common benchmark for general traumatic fatalities. While there is some evidence that subjects value heat risks more when exposed to a heat shock of approximately 3–4 °C, the size of the differential is too small to establish a statistically significant heat risk premium. Finally, subjects’ responses demonstrate no differential valuation of mortality risks to seniors versus the general population based on the preferences of the general population or the senior subsample.

This article is based on feedback I submitted in response to the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB’s) April 2023 request for comments on its draft revisions to Circular A-4, “Regulatory Analysis.” Much has changed since I submitted my comments in June 2023. OMB issued a final circular in November 2023 and subsequently rescinded it in February 2025. This article includes my comments as submitted, along with an introductory “prologue” and an “epilogue” that reflects on the decision to abandon the 2023 revisions and return to the 2003 Circular. My comment addressed key elements of regulatory analysis, suggested areas where OMB could provide more guidance, and identified several aspects of the 2023 Circular that appeared to be internally inconsistent or contradictory. It concluded that some of the 2023 revisions were worthwhile, while others would have obfuscated for policymakers important information on the welfare effects of regulatory actions.

Political theory increasingly intersects with business ethics. A notable example is the application of philosopher Jürgen Habermas by Scherer and Palazzo, along with their interpreters, to advocate for the “politicization of the corporation” and “Political Corporate Social Responsibility” (PCSR). Consequently, business ethics focused on corporations also becomes politicized. From a Habermasian perspective, this politicization offers legitimacy through deliberation and consensus. However, a less represented perspective in business ethics discourse—legal philosopher Carl Schmitt’s—highlights the darker sides of politicization, viewing it as an intensification of enmity. This shift undermines the unique ethical-reflective nature of business ethics.

This article presents my 2023 peer review panel comments on the 2023 Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-4 and offers recommendations for future revisions of this circular. The Prologue section introduces my official peer review comments and indicates how the structure of my comments was tailored to the guidelines established by the OMB. The main section consists of my 2023 peer review comments as they were submitted to OMB. I recommended changes in the draft Circular A-4 to increase the discount rate from the 1.7% rate that OMB proposed, to report domestic benefits whenever global benefits are reported, to adopt a behavioral transfer test for the use of behavioral economics findings, to update the procedures for estimating the value of a statistical life, and to abandon the proposed distributional weights. The most problematic component of the new Circular A-4 is the OMB distributional weights, which will shift the role of benefit–cost analyses away from the current role of providing an efficiency-oriented test. The Epilogue to my comments summarizes how the final version of Circular A-4 differs from the draft version and how future administrations might revise Circular A-4 after President Trump rescinded it.

Is trade lobbying effective and does its effectiveness vary across firms? Using requests for relief from China trade war tariffs, we demonstrate that lobbying for specific trade policies contributed to securing those exact policies, an elusive target in the long-running trade lobbying literature. We further argue that lobbying should be most impactful for big companies because policymakers prioritize jobs and growth when allocating a limited number of policy favors. In line with this, we find that lobbying for tariff reductions by large firms was hugely more effective than for small firms, though with one major exception: requests from firms that owned foreign subsidiaries in China were overwhelmingly rejected. Large firms are powerful, especially when their interests align with policymakers’ economic policy objectives.

Overt political retribution, typically considered outside the bounds of American democracy, has recently risen to the surface of American political discourse. How do voters respond to elected officials wielding their powers of office for retributive purposes? In the current partisan political climate, do voters’ views of retribution depend on whether the official is a member of their party? Politicians in both parties have demonstrated willingness to threaten or pursue retaliation against corporations for using their political voice to publicly express opposition. Due to the American public’s ambivalence about the role of business in politics and the rights of corporations to political speech, the scenario of corporate political speech provides a useful case in which to test for partisan acceptance of the use of political retaliation. In an original and replication experiment, we find strong bipartisan rebuke of an elected official’s employment of “abusive legalism” in response to corporate political criticism. Strikingly, the negative consequences are greatest for an in-party official. The drop in support suffered by the official is equivalent to the effect of partisanship, such that an in-party official using their powers of office to “keep business out of politics” is viewed as unfavorably as a non-responsive out-party official.

Benefit–cost analysis is a protocol for assessing alternative public policies, primarily in terms of efficiency. An important complementary element can be estimating distributional impacts to show net benefits for groups of interest. The fundamental advantage is enabling decision-makers to see and weigh the importance of changes in efficiency and changes in distribution. Rigorous estimates of any distributional effects should incorporate credible baselines, private behavior, and markets. Estimation for groups with limited evidence and data is hard. Primary estimates of net benefits should be based on conventional market values. Any estimates based on distributional weights should be supplementary estimates. Combining them into a single number, risks masking the impacts of efficiency and distribution. The values of regulatory effects to U.S. citizens and residents depend on where the risks of damage take place. Willingness to pay values by U.S. citizens and residents to adopt a global value of benefits to increase the probability of international agreements can be positive but will reflect uncertain negotiation and compliance. The primary analysis should focus on benefits and costs to U.S. citizens and residents within domestic borders. The recommended rate of 1.7% does not reflect the rates relevant for all members of society. Given the emphasis on distribution effects, rates should include those facing rates of 3% or more. Sensitivity analysis should include several rates. The onus should be on making the case for a specific behavioral bias and nudge that will successfully address the perceived problem. Recent meta-analyses of nudge interventions indicate difficulty in implementing effective nudges.