To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Two measures of investment worth: the discounted-rate-of-return and the payback method will be compared here. Many examples can be found in the literature illustrating the serious limitations of the payback method.
According to these examples, an investment proposal may be judged economically undesirable when in actual fact it is highly profitable. This happens when the annual cash flow is not equal, and the investment project promises a relatively large cash flow after the cut-off period.
Corporations tender for their own shares for a variety of reasons. Some stock tenders are made for strategic purposes—to prevent a take-over, to raise the market price of the stock, or simply because the stock represents ‘a good investment.’ For discussion of tendering in these situations, see the articles of Ellis [2] and Guthart [1]. In addition, there may be tactical reasons for a stock tender; one such reason is to reduce bookkeeping and shareholder servicing costs. In this instance, the argument runs roughly as follows: “The annual cost of servicing a holding is independent of the number of shares; consequently, the cost per share of servicing small holdings is relatively great. Let us reduce these high per-share costs by buying up small holdings.” Typical procedure is to then mail out an offer to buy holdings of less than a certain size directly, thus permitting the shareholder to dispose of his holding without paying the usual brokerage and odd-lot fees. Frequently no premium is offered except for the avoidance of brokerage fees. If one were to consider the premium offered as a controllable variable, it would be surprising to discover that its optimal value were exactly zero. One also recognizes that the maximum shareholding tendered for may be another decision variable available for optimization. See the appendix for data on tenders of this sort made in recent years. The variety of policies seems to indicate an almost complete absence of systematic application of the ideas presented here.
Professor Solow's article, “Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function,” now virtually classic, has made a great impact on economists generally and in the last few years the subject has received unprecedented attention in economic literature. The reason for this extraordinary emphasis on “Technical Change” has been the conclusion—in Solow's above-mentioned article—based on statistical evidence, that gross output per man-hour in the United States nonfarm economy doubled over the period 1909–1949, “with 87.5 percent of the increase attributable to technical change and the remaining 12.5 percent to increased use of capital.”
In “Valuation Under Uncertainty,” which recently appeared in this Journal (September 1967), Houng-Yhi Chen argues [1, pp. 313–314] that “Robichek and Myers' criticism [2, 3] of the use of the risk-adjusted discount rate is unfounded,” and suggests that our “conclusions must be based in part on a misunderstanding of the risk-adjusted discount rate method.” These charges are without foundation, as we will show here.
Although the importance of evaluating the risk of potential investments has long been recognized, only recently have formulations been developed to include risk as an explicit variable in the decision-making process. The considerable progress being made in this area, both in theory and in application, is attested to by the number and variety of contributions to the literature.
This paper investigates how the addition of debt to the capital structure of a corporation affects the risk of the stockholders. In the first instance, we will hold the size of the firm constant and substitute debt for common stock. In the second situation, we will allow firm size to change, and will accomplish the increase in size by issuing debt. For both situations, we will first observe the effect of debt on the earnings per dollar of common stock investment. The analysis could also be made using the number of shares of common stock. Since the number of shares of common stock may be changed quite arbitrarily (as, for example, by stock dividends), we want to make the measure invariant to the number of shares outstanding. We will do this by using value of common stock and value of debt. We are then computing the variance of return on common stock investment when we compute variance of earnings per dollar of common stock investment. After considering how debt affects earnings per dollar of stockholders' investment, we will investigate the effect of debt on the total earnings of the stockholders, and on the probability of a deficit.
Investment management is a decision-making process which ranges from an individual managing his own small portfolio of securities to institutional investors who manage portfolios valued in millions of dollars. The importance of investment management is readily observed in the increased activity of the securities markets, the close scrutiny given by regulatory agencies to various institutional investors and professional investment managers, the growing market value of pension funds, trust funds, and investment companies, and finally, the increasing number of related research studies which are reported in the financial literature.
As the American South recovered from the Civil War, railroads and the businessmen who managed them were important ingredients in the process of economic change. But who were the railroad leaders of the first generation of the “New South” and what were their personal and corporate goals? What were the effects of their actions on the course of southern restoration? Sharply at odds with the usual “carpetbagger” demonology, Professor Klein suggests an alternative explanation and analysis.