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Many Wall Street financial analysts believe that a positive relationship exists between the level of short interest in equities and subsequent movements in the prices of these equities. This view is apparently grounded in the belief that short traders will push prices up in the future as they attempt to cover their short positions.
Analysts and investment advisors have long searched for investment tools that would either furnish predictive probabilities for future security price movements, or would aid in minimizing losses. One such tool, often recommended by market practitioners, is the Moving Average. This article describes a series of experiments that were performed upon actual market data, using Moving Averages of different lengths and weights, and presents results of the experiments. Conclusions derived from these experiments are suggested.
In recent years, there has been considerable interest in the random walk theory of stock price behavior. This theory, as applied to the stock market, implies that past stock-price movements cannot be used to predict future market prices in such a way as to “profit” from the predictions. By not “profiting,” we mean that a trader using the past history of stock prices cannot apply mechanical decision rules that result in a consistently better performance than a simple buy and hold strategy. If stock price movements were to become systematic so that a “profit” were possible, proponents of the random walk theory argue that a sufficient number of market participants would quickly recognize the recurring pattern and exploit it. In exploiting it, they would drive out the opportunity for “profit,” causing the price series to approximate a random walk.
Perhaps one of the most time-honored of technical market indicators is the Advance-Decline Line. Its predictive powers as a leading indicator of the general market have been written about, and historical data on this index are published in Barron's. However, the validity of this series as a leading indicator has not been subjected to rigorous statistical analysis.
Were congressional demands for the remonetization of silver in the 1870's triggered and supported by large-scale mining interests seeking a guaranteed market for their product? Contemporaries and historians have generally answered “yes.” Professor Weinstein revises this traditional interpretation by analyzing the actual interrelationships between American silver producers and government coinage policies.
In the history of personnel management and salesmanship in the United States, the concepts and techniques developed by Professor Walter Dill Scott of Northwestern University have been pervasive. As an introduction to Scott's ideas and to his activities, Professor Lynch summarizes his contributions in the application of psychology to business problems.