Mobilizing Foucault’s genealogy, this article investigates how an “ethics event”—the involvement by some sell-side financial analysts in the United States and United Kingdom across the past two decades in corporate governance—emerged. It is found that the complex relations formed between specific historical precedents, normative discourses, and fields of power rendered certain issues in financial markets morally problematic and constructed analysts’ corporate governance work as a potential solution. Contributing to research in finance ethics, this article develops a novel perspective to conceptualize the rise of ethically relevant practices in financial markets, focusing on how ethical problems and their solutions are outcomes of discursive construction and power relations. This article also revises our understanding of the boundary between technical norms and moral norms in financial markets. When ethical crises occur, it is argued, transforming technical practices and revising the technical norms adopted by financial professionals has the potential to tackle ethical concerns.

Considerations about the legitimacy of futures trading have been ubiquitous in the highly integrated world economy since the late nineteenth century. This article compares two national debates in Germany and British India from the 1880s to the 1930s. Despite significant differences in the cultural and economic contexts of the two countries and in the emergence of futures trading, there are interesting similarities. In both countries, individual futures exchanges were organized and controlled by small privileged groups of traders. These minorities were glued together by social ties, de facto controlling (or profiting from) access to futures markets and facing criticism because of their privileged position. While contemporaries and historians often focus on futures trading as trading without intent to deliver, the historical analysis in this article shows that an equally important issue was the conflict over distribution and power between more and less privileged interest groups and their respective market access.

This paper explores the relationships among positive and negative work reflection during leisure time, psychological capital, and radical and incremental creativity. We collected data from 500 dyads of employees and their direct supervisors, and employed the structural equation model to test our research hypotheses. The results reveal that positive work reflection during leisure time is positively related to radical and incremental creativity, while negative work reflection during leisure time is negatively related to the two types of creativity. Our findings also suggest that psychological capital mediates the effects of positive and negative work reflection during leisure time on radical and incremental creativity.

We provide evidence on market structure and the cost of raising capital by examining changes in market structure in U.S. equity markets. Only the Order Handling Rules (OHR) of the Nasdaq, the one reform that reduced institutional trading costs, lowered the cost of raising capital. Using a difference-in-differences framework relative to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) that exploits the OHR’s staggered implementation, we find that the OHR reduced the underpricing of seasoned equity offerings by 1–2 percentage points compared with a pre-OHR average of 3.6%. The effect is the largest in stocks with the largest reduction in institutional trading costs after the OHR.

Institutional demand for a stock before its earnings announcement is negatively related to subsequent returns. The relation is not attributable to the price pressure of institutional demand and is stronger for stocks with higher information asymmetry and/or greater valuation difficulty. These findings support the notion that overconfident institutions misprice stocks. Following announcements, institutions’ behavior exhibits the outcome-dependent feature of self-attribution bias. Whether they become more overconfident and delay their mispricing correction depends on whether earnings news confirms their preannouncement trades. This behavioral bias also offers a new explanation for the well-known post-earnings-announcement drift.

Concentration in many industries has increased markedly in recent decades in the United States, although in Europe it has been stable or has even decreased. Where concentration has increased, the question arises as to how to measure the extent of competition (or the degree to which it is contestable) in a market in which there are relatively few competing firms, over the long term. This article explores competition in clearing banking in the UK from 1946 to 1971. This period is of interest in the context of industry concentration because clearing banking was relatively concentrated and, it has long been argued, uncompetitive. The article evaluates competition from four perspectives. First, it considers the competitiveness of London clearing banking from a quantitative perspective. Next, it evaluates competition through the lens of competition policy, particularly the extent to which monopoly, mergers, and restrictive trade practices existed in clearing banking. Third, the conclusions of the National Board for Prices and Incomes’ report into bank charges in 1967 are considered. Finally, it explores the extent to which the clearing banks were open to and embraced change, and were innovative, assuming that these qualities are more likely to be present when there is competition among banks. It questions key aspects of the dominant interpretation of clearing banking as uncompetitive and slow to innovate.

Hail insurance in Britain emerged as a product by and for farming communities, expanding as wheat production rose in the mid-nineteenth century before declining in the latter decades of the century amidst wide-scale conversion from arable to livestock farming. Drawing on detailed research conducted in the remaining archives of the three major hail insurers in this period, we demonstrate the challenges of establishing a new insurance product for farmers. We argue that to make hail insurance effective, the insurance company’s central office collated and circulated information, rules, and paperwork to enable it to govern farmers, agents, and valuers at a distance. Such networks were fragile and required continual maintenance, whether to enhance reputation, manage farmers’ requests for new products, enforce rules, or tinker with rates in response to perceived risks and competitive pressures. Conceptualizing this emerging insurance business as a fragile network is a useful device demonstrating that paperwork, the governing of actors, and personal rivalries are as important as broader economic changes in explaining the development of a novel insurance product in this period.

This research aims to reveal how and under what conditions service-oriented high-performance human resource practices (HR) influence employee service performance (ESP). Data were gathered from full-time hotel employees and line managers. In total, 1,525 questionnaire forms were acquired. While respondent employees had filled in the questionnaire form containing independent, mediator, and moderator variables, line managers filled in the questionnaire form containing the dependent variable. The research results demonstrate that HR attributions, trust in the organization, and affective commitment serially mediate the relationship between service-oriented high-performance HR practices and ESP. In addition, the results point out the moderating roles of person–supervisor fit and person–vocation fit. As a result, the current research contributes to the literature by way of revealing how and under what conditions the service-oriented high-performance HR practices affect ESP.

We employ the concept of stupidity to address why more has not been done to address climate change and sustainable development. While the ‘new’ science of stupid has long existed in organizational studies, academicians have been too polite to call it that and organizational researchers historically labeled it the ‘threat-rigidity effect.’ With Alvesson and Spicer’s ‘stupidity-based theory of organizations’ management researchers overcame this reluctance. In this work we explore what we will call the ‘stress-stupidity system.’ Building on the threat-rigidity effect, we outline the elements of the stress-stupidity system and look at how we may be able to ‘fix stupid’ to address issues of sustainability.

The relentless spread of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19)1 has been exponential, with an alarming number of deaths2 putting health systems under severe strain. The World Health Organization (WHO) has declared COVID-19 a pandemic3 and health experts cannot predict when a vaccine may be available, or when the spread will slow.

This article discusses three questions. First, what drives business to ignore human rights, or even worse, consciously undermine the achievement of human rights? Second, given the state of affairs of business and human rights, why is there not a quick regulatory fix to the problems that we see? Third, in light of the failure of business and of regulation so far, what can be done? The article posits that reform of company law is key to ensuring business respect for human rights, as an intrinsic element of the transition to sustainability. The article outlines how company law can facilitate sustainable business. It concludes with some reflections on the drivers for change that make it possible to envisage that the necessary reform of company law will be enacted.

The fields of business and human rights (BHR) and business for peace (B4P) have overlaps in how they view business in society and in their multidisciplinary nature. This paper seeks to build on the work of BHR scholars in connecting with the B4P scholarly community, to bridge the divide by explaining the elements of the B4P literature that might be of interest for BHR scholars, and to describe a joint research agenda for scholars in both fields. The paper begins with a literature review of the major assertions and findings of B4P on the role that business can and should play in enhancing peace. Similarities and differences in approach and theories between BHR and B4P are then noted. A common research agenda is proposed that BHR and B4P scholars may use as a starting point for broader collaboration.

Despite their claimed advantages, toehold strategies have rarely been adopted in recent corporate takeovers and do not seem to increase acquirer returns. Are toeholds ineffective and becoming obsolete? We show that this is not the case. We find that toeholds are preferred for executing difficult takeovers. After controlling for such endogeneity in toehold-based acquisitions, toeholds do increase returns to acquirers. Moreover, the performance of toehold strategies improves over time due to more selective and more effective acquisition of toeholds. We find that this time trend is in part explained by learning from past toehold acquisitions.

We study fragmentation of equity trading using a model of imperfect competition among exchanges. In the model, increased competition drives down trading fees. However, additional arbitrage opportunities arise in fragmented markets, intensifying adverse selection. Due to these opposing forces, the effects of fragmentation are context dependent. To empirically investigate the ambiguity in a single context, we estimate key parameters of the model with order-level data for an Australian security. According to the estimates, the benefits of increased competition are outweighed by the costs of multi-venue arbitrage. Compared with the prevailing duopoly, we predict the counterfactual monopoly spread to be 23% lower.

We document the central role of collateral in the pricing of tri-party repos. Markets are competitive for repos with safe collateral but are severely segmented for repos with risky collateral, such as equities and low-grade corporate bonds. Fund families are the sole contributors to the segmentation, and collateral concentration is the main determinant in the substantial variation in repo pricing, both across and within segments. The segmented structure points to Fidelity as a systemically important player and the markets potential fragility. Facing market segmentation, dealers optimize financing costs by allocating their collateral across fund families.