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We analyze how employee compensation contracts of target firms affect merger terms and outcomes. Using unique data from merger agreements, we document that in 80.0% of all merger and acquisition (M&A) deals, at least some of the target’s employee stock options (ESOs) are canceled by the acquirer and not replaced by new equity-based grants. Contract modifications reduce the value of ESOs by 38.4% in the average M&A deal. Further, the combined merger returns are larger when employees experience greater losses. Overall, our results indicate that the benefits of reducing the number of ESOs outweigh the potential negative effects on firm value.
Low probability risks create challenges for individual decisions and potential pressures for government regulation. This article reports original survey evidence regarding the public’s perception and valuation of water-related risks from plastic bottles with bisphenol A, residues in drinking water of the herbicide atrazine, and trace amounts of prescription drugs in water. People who believe that they face high water-related risks generally believe that the risks apply and, given that belief, are willing to pay more to limit the risk. However, the expressed willingness to pay for risk reductions is inordinately high even among those who are unsure of whether they are even exposed to the risk, and therefore may not be reliable as values for the actual benefits.
Conceptual metaphors, like Galambos and Amatori’s “entrepreneurial multiplier,” play a pivotal but largely unexamined role in historical interpretation. They do this by allowing historians to see one set of historical associations or relationships in terms of another, more familiar, one. I highlight this interpretive role by comparing Galambos and Amatori’s construct to Joseph Schumpeter’s “gale of creative destruction” and Arthur Cole’s “entrepreneurial stream” as metaphors that attempt to explain the relationship between entrepreneurship and historical change. I also point out the risks that taken-for-granted metaphors can have in narrowing room for interpretation, and argue that reflexivity and playfulness are essential to keeping conceptual metaphors alive as interpretive devices. I conclude by suggesting that metaphors are an intrinsic form of theorizing in historical interpretation, and illustrate my argument by briefly examining “industrial revolution” as a construct in business and economic history.
Galambos and Amatori applaud this discourse over entrepreneurship but contend that the multiplier is not a metaphor. They acknowledge Wadhwani’s insightful analyses and look forward to further fruitful discussions focused on innovation, capitalism’s major strength. They briefly argue for scalar evaluations rather than binary evaluations of innovation and the socio-economic problems they inevitably create.
A growing body of normative work explores whether and how deference to people’s choices might be reconciled with behavioral findings about human error. This work has strong implications for economic analysis of law, cost–benefit analysis, and regulatory policy. In light of behavioral findings, regulators should adopt a working presumption in favor of respect for people’s self-regarding choices, but only if those choices are adequately informed and sufficiently free from behavioral biases. The working presumption should itself be rebuttable on welfare grounds, with an understanding that the ends that people choose might make their lives go less well. For example, people might die prematurely or suffer from serious illness, and what they receive in return might not (on any plausible account of welfare) be nearly enough. The underlying reason might involve a lack of information or a behavioral bias, identifiable or not, in which case intervention can fit with the working presumption, but the real problem might involve philosophical questions about the proper understanding of welfare, and about what it means for people to have a good life.
Many academic authors, policy makers, NGOs, and corporations have focused on top-down human rights global norm-making, such as the United Nations Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights (UNGPs). What is often missing are contextual and substantive analyses that interrogate rights mobilization and linkages between voluntary transnational rules and domestic governance. Deploying a socio-legal approach and using a combination of longitudinal field and archival data, this article investigates how a local, indigenous community in Northern Chile mobilized their rights over a period of almost two decades. We found that rights mobilization was largely shaped by tensions between the different logics of legality and the business organization. In our case, the UNGP implementation process has been ineffective in giving rightsholders access to genuine remedy. On the contrary, it has led to weakened rights mobilization, dividing the local community. We conclude that greater attention to rights mobilization and domestic governance dynamics should be given in the business and human rights debate.
What is the benefit from obtaining more precise values of environmental or other public goods through surveys or other information gathering? In the value of information (VOI) problem studied here, a buyer who wishes to preserve a resource sets a price to offer a seller without knowing precisely its protection value, B, nor its value to the seller, V. The VOI from more precise information about B is important for environmental and natural resource valuation, but is typically not quantified nor compared to valuation costs. More precise environmental values reduce the frequency of two types of mistakes (protecting the resource when it should not be; and not protecting it when it should), and increases ex ante welfare. We apply our analysis to Amazon rainforest protection, focusing on the “value of perfect information,” VOPI, which, we show through simulations, typically exceeds realistic valuation costs, justifying significant valuation expenditures. VOPI also depends on the nature of buyer–seller interactions, and takes its highest value when the buyer has full concern for the seller’s outcome. Our paper proposes and prepares the base for a new, needed, field in applied welfare economics, the “benefit–cost analysis of public-good valuation studies.”
This chapter explores the centrality of risk information to the construction of managerial agency. It is argued that this theme has been neglected by policy makers and others in the debate about risk culture in financial services. This debate is characterised by an underlying individualism in the approach to culture in general, and risk culture specifically, focusing ultimately on values and incentives as the core features of behaviour, from traders to board members. In contrast, drawing on a range of studies in the organisational sociology of risk, it is argued that information infrastructures are profoundly cultural and shape organisational values and the quality of decision making. Three illustrative themes – networking, technology and governance - are discussed and generate three indicative and testable propositions about the importance of information for risk culture. These three discussions also point to the fundamental role of an “appetite for knowledge” which varies between organisations and across fields. This revealed appetite is indicative and generative of organisational culture. Efforts to reform the culture of the financial services industry should therefore begin with understanding how information infrastructures do or don’t shape what counts as “doing the right thing”, rather conducting endless attitudinal surveys of individuals.
The one bad apple spoiling the barrel has become a common metaphor to describe risk culture in organisations. This ‘inside-out’ perspective begins with the individual as the unit of analysis and follows with inferences to the broader environment. Since the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008, risk culture for many has become the explanation for shortcomings, poor decisions and moral failures in organisations. We present an institutional perspective of some of the forces that shape risk culture in organisations.
How does “Tone at the top” travel from the board room to the rest of the organisation? While the qualitative description of tone at the top provides a noble and virtuous vision for guiding or changing risk culture, the mechanisms for actualisation are less clear. There has been a revival and emphasis of tone at the top after the Global Financial Crisis as it became widely espoused as both an explanation and a solution for the crisis. Tone at the top continues to symbolise risk culture maintenance and improvement for firms and their regulators. However, the processes and structures that are relevant to transmitting and propagating culture and values espoused by the leadership of the firm have been less explored.
We study the impact of charisma and strength of connections on transmission and persistence of culture in a given social network structure. Specifically, we analyse the effort to change culture in a firm by looking at communication effectiveness of opinion leaders throughout the firm; while influential, they are secondary to the board but act as “repeater stations” in transmitting the tone set by the board. This is a refinement of the classical approach to culture (Schein, 1990) which tends to focus more on messages from senior leaders, consistent with tone from the top, but without accounting for the social network of the firm’s staff.
We present a risk culture model using an agent-based algorithm which considers how the structural patterning of risk culture varies with the influence levels of opinion leaders given the social network in the organisation. To complement the hypothesis, we highlight the indicative relationship between the charisma and strength of connections of opinion leaders versus the survivability of risk culture in an organisation.
Objective: Gain a broad understanding of tactics for interfacing with associated applications, as well as approaches to graphical user interface development through Userforms, designs for user experience enhancement, and add-in packaging.
In the wake of the 2007–2009 financial crisis and subsequent financial services scandals, there are numerous normative and regulatory demands on risk managers to assess the ethicality of corporate plans and actions. An ethical turn in risk management looms, focusing the attention of boards and executive teams on a plurality of values at risk, rather than on a single or composite—and primarily financial—Value at Risk. The question of what risks an organisation is running is increasingly seen as intertwined with the ethical question of whose risks an organisation is managing—or even taking into account—a discussion that needs to be addressed in the “risk appetising process.” Based on case studies conducted in two Canadian high-reliability organizations, I show empirical evidence that some risk managers have created tools and processes that tangibly link risk management and business ethics. Drawing on the literature of new accounting emergence and behavioural ethics, I argue that risk managers have now the mandate, and possibly, the tools and processes to visualize and bring business ethics concerns to decision makers. Finally, I highlight two areas of concern where an explicit consideration of Values at Risks tools and processes might be necessary for generating constructive debate and action: corporate failures due to conflicts of interest, and the incubation of man-made disasters. I conclude that an ethical turn in risk management will require the ability to bring the ethical dimension to the fore by making values at risk an inescapable and actionable part of decision-making and formal control processes.