At International Harvester, a 1902 merger, the defining feature was discord. A J. P. Morgan financier by the name of George W. Perkins and a formal agreement initiated changes to mitigate stress and struggle. Existing research dates improvement to 1906. This paper extends the analysis and documents that, among changes, entrepreneur William Deering and his children parted with some holdings, helping to diminish tensions. Meanwhile, the McCormicks agreed to a stock dividend.  This action helped mellow strife and augment their power. How did discord affect efficiency? The conventional answer centers on management along with expansion abroad, but that analysis is enhanced through study of seven brands and their local factories, pricing, and an antitrust consent decree. When a voting trust ran out its clock in 1912, conflict at International Harvester was receding. The firm’s record suggests various governance formats could yield efficiency and profitability.

It is necessary for personnel selection systems to be effective, fair, and legally appropriate. Sometimes these goals are complementary, whereas other times they conflict (leading to the so-called “validity-diversity dilemma”). In this practice forum, we trace the history and legality of proposed approaches for simultaneously maximizing job performance and diversity through personnel selection, leading to a review of a more recent method, the Pareto-optimization approach. We first describe the method at various levels of complexity and provide guidance (with examples) for implementing the technique in practice. Then, we review the potential points at which the method might be challenged legally and present defenses against those challenges. Finally, we conclude with practical tips for implementing Pareto-optimization within personnel selection.

Many people argue that we should practice conscientious consumption. Faced with goods from gravely flawed production processes, such as wood from clear-cut rainforests or electronics containing conflict minerals, they argue that we should enact personal policies to routinely shun tainted goods and select pure(r) goods. However, consumers typically should be relatively uncertain about which flaws in global supply chains are grave and the connection of purchases to those grave flaws. The threat of significant uncertainty makes conscientious consumption appear to be no better, or even worse, than an overlooked option. This overlooked option is consumption with relinquishment: disregarding each product’s possible connections with upstream grave flaws and using the time, money, and energy saved in this way to address grave flaws directly.

More than ten years after the financial crisis, the challenges of European banking and of the eurozone highlight that the existence of a European common market in banking is at best partial. Examining how British and French commercial banks and banking associations responded to the plans for a European common market in banking between 1977 and 1992, this article contributes to explaining this partial character, and highlights that this project was primarily political. This challenges the widely held view that large companies tended to push for more integration. This article shows that until the mid-1980s, the banking sector was not necessarily calling for European financial integration in the form of a common market in banking for at least three reasons: they doubted the usefulness of such a move, they feared an increase in regulation, and they focused more on domestic or global matters than on European ones.

The history of insurance has been characterized in most countries by the coexistence of a wide range of organizational forms. The reasons for this plethora of vehicles remain unclear, as does the impact of this diversity on the development of insurance around the world. Drawing on the latest research, this paper examines, first, the different functions of the state in relation to insurance in a wide range of national markets from the early modern period to the present century; second, the path-dependent effects that determined the historical distribution of public and private forms of insurance; and third, the relation between public and private insurance and its impact on market development.

In the 1950s, outdoor retailer Eddie Bauer donated down jackets to American mountaineers embarking on climbing expeditions in the Himalayas. In the 1990s, chemical manufacturer W. L. Gore & Associates donated both goods and $2 million to an expedition in Antarctica. The funds dedicated to sponsorship by the end of the twentieth century reflect a shift in how companies saw expeditions as useful to their marketing goals. This article uses two archives previously unexplored by historians that offer an unprecedented chance to compare sponsorship relationships in a single industry across decades. Commercial sponsorship of American expeditions and athletes has undergone three dramatic changes since 1950, and these shifts help explain how sponsorship as a form of marketing became so popular. Sponsorship contracts shifted from vague to specific as a result of decades of unsatisfying results for corporate sponsors. Sponsored athletes became business partners and began taking an active role in promoting the companies that provided them cash or donations in-kind. Finally, companies developed strategies for leveraging their sponsorship deals. The changing landscape of the business of expeditions ultimately reveals how the most long-lasting legacies of these extreme adventures happened far from the trail and much closer to company boardrooms, sponsorship managers’ offices and retail stores where consumers learned to engage with the narratives companies and athletes had crafted together.

We trace a corporate governance channel of bank shock transmission into the real economy. Using 1,245 U.S. bank enforcement actions (EAs) issued between 1990 and 2017, we show that when a nonfinancial firm (NFF) and bank share a common director, NFF stock prices fall around bank EAs. Severe EAs elicit more negative returns. During enforcement, valued directors substitute NFF board meeting attendance with bank board meeting attendance. Impaired credit relationships, director reputational damage, and endogenous director selection cannot fully explain our results. These findings imply that shared directors could transmit larger bank shocks into the real economy.