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We examine the net benefits of social distancing to slow the spread of COVID-19 in USA. Social distancing saves lives but imposes large costs on society due to reduced economic activity. We use epidemiological and economic forecasting to perform a rapid benefit–cost analysis of controlling the COVID-19 outbreak. Assuming that social distancing measures can substantially reduce contacts among individuals, we find net benefits of about $5.2 trillion in our benchmark case. We examine the magnitude of the critical parameters that might imply negative net benefits, including the value of statistical life and the discount rate. A key unknown factor is the speed of economic recovery with and without social distancing measures in place. A series of robustness checks also highlight the key role of the value of mortality risk reductions and discounting in the analysis and point to a need for effective economic stimulus when the outbreak has passed.
Researchers disagree about the impact of board independence on firm value. The disagreement generally stems from the endogenous nature of board appointments. I add new evidence to this discussion by using a sample of closed-end funds to document the value-enhancing effects of independent boards. Using cross-sectional, difference-in-differences, and instrumental variables techniques, I address these endogeneity concerns and find consistent evidence that board independence is associated with higher firm value.
Why do organizations fail? What hinders otherwise responsible leaders from recognizing looming disasters? What prevents well-intentioned people from responding properly to an emerging crisis? Using systems psychodynamics to analyze an array of international crises, Amy L. Fraher explores ethical challenges at Silicon Valley tech companies, the Wall Street implosions that led to the 2008 financial industry crash, and a wide range of social crises, policy failures, and natural disasters, offering a crisis management philosophy applicable in diverse settings. Rather than viewing crises as anomalies that cannot be anticipated, Fraher persuasively argues that crises can, and should, be embraced as naturally occurring by-products of any organization's change management processes. If leaders do not proactively manage organizational change, they will inevitably manage crisis instead. This accessible textbook will appeal to business students and researchers studying leadership, change and crisis, as well as progressive-minded business leaders keen to improve their own organizations.
Salinas Grandes is a vast salt flat in the high-altitude Puna region of Salta and Jujuy, two north-western provinces of Argentina. It is situated in one of the world’s driest regions, with an extremely fragile ecosystem. Salinas Grandes is so iconic and beautiful that Argentinians voted it amongst the country’s top seven natural wonders in May 2019.1 In addition to its beauty, this stunning desert of salt also holds one of the largest reserves of lithium in the world. Lithium is a light and versatile metal used to produce, among other things, the lithium-ion batteries that power electric vehicles (EV). As global efforts to phase out fossil fuels from our transport systems and adopt clean energy alternatives increase, lithium is becoming increasingly critical. It is no wonder, therefore, that industry has coined it the ‘white gold’.2 Salinas Grandes is only one of many salt lakes in North West Argentina which, together with Bolivia and Chile, form what is known as the ‘lithium triangle’. It is estimated that these three countries alone account for more than half of the world’s lithium.3 Global demand for lithium to produce EV is expected to grow rapidly over the coming decade. To meet this demand, the lithium industry will require significant investment to ramp up additional supply.4 As a result, all eyes have turned to the ‘lithium triangle’ and investment in the region has soared in recent years.5 For the three developing countries, this represents a unique opportunity to attract much-needed foreign investment and boost economic growth.6
This article delves into the deep seabed mining regime under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) with a view to inform the negotiating process of the proposed business and human rights (BHR) treaty. It highlights points of convergence and divergence between the two regulatory regimes and explores how the BHR treaty negotiations could draw from the deep seabed mining regime with regard to the responsibility and liability of states and corporations. In particular, it suggests that a BHR treaty could incorporate some of the arrangements of UNCLOS to address state obligations and direct corporate human rights obligations, both of a general and specific nature, including the obligation to carry out human rights due diligence. The article also proposes a mechanism of responsibility and liability of states and corporations under the future BHR treaty going beyond UNCLOS and embracing residual liability for home and/or host states.
Economic and armed non-state actors increasingly operate through their transnational activities. International public law excludes them from any international regulation or accountability process. International humanitarian law (IHL, the law of war) as a branch of international public law is an exception to this because it also regulates the behavior of non-state actors. Recent developments pertaining to the potential liability of business entities for involvement in international crimes, particularly when related to the activities of ANSGs challenge the traditional doctrine of international law and demonstrate the need for its norms to adapt to an evolving reality.
Chapter 6 compares the outcome additionality of thirty-two indicators in a quantitative meta-analysis, and tests hypotheses derived from an inductive theoretical analysis of micro-institutional dynamics. It examines the comparative impact of regulatory clarity and stringency; effective training and capacity building; the existence of significant, individualized price premiums; the presence of investment and opportunity costs; restrictive auditor oversight policies; and the coexistence of public regulation on the likelihood that a requirement will show outcome additionality in matched farmers. The results show that regulatory clarity and stringency, along with the provision of substantive price premiums, have the most significant positive correlation with outcome additionality (i.e., likely behavior changes); while the coexistence of public regulations and the existence of high opportunity costs has a significant negative impact. These results are striking, as the majority of standards are currently moving away from a stringent regulatory approach. However, this approach is unlikely to allow for the creation of price premiums that could compensate farmers for high-cost practices.
Chapter 7 turns to the interaction between private and public regulation, with three main conclusions. One, standards perform poorly when they aim to reinforce public regulation, with little difference between certified and noncertified groups’ compliance with national-level rules. Two, national-level institutions may constitute important barriers to the effectiveness of private regulation when they pursue goals orthogonal to those of certification schemes – which is frequently the case in the coffee sector. Three, even when national institutions align on the goals for a sustainable coffee sector, the greater insulation they provide from the mainstream market – with its price volatility and bargaining power disparities – the more difficult it is for private sustainability standards to work as intended. Here we thus find a trade-off between public and private regulation that has hitherto been underappreciated.
Chapter 5 draws on the survey data to show how private standards are implemented in the field. It introduces three avenues through which standards may address different definitions of sustainability: to drive sustainable intensification, to shift time horizons backward, or to act as payments for social and ecosystem services. It then evaluates standards’ success by evaluating a range of production practices in each category. It shows that particularly industry-friendly standards encourage farmers to intensify their production, with moderate success, but that simultaneous decreases in input use are rarer. Improvements in practices that encourage farmers to make short-term investments for longer-term gains in terms of health or farm resilience can be observed, but often depend on outside financial support. Finally, the chapter finds very few improvements in practices that constitute long-term opportunity costs, for two reasons: one, over time many standards have lowered the stringency of their requirements for high-opportunity-cost practices such as the maintenance of permanent shade cover. Two, even when rules are binding (e.g., minimum wage laws), they are not always followed.
Chapter 4 examines the success of standards in changing prevailing market mechanisms in the conventional commodity chain, and providing reliable market incentives for behavior change. It first takes note that only two out of the seven standards under analysis have the clear aim of fundamentally changing pricing structures. Yet, during a period of mainstreaming and competition between sustainability initiatives, these standards have been overtaken by more industry–friendly alternatives that offer negotiation–based price premiums. Standards’ failure to limit participant entry through strict rule–setting and the existence of information asymmetry regarding buyers’ future purchasing patterns has led to a large oversupply of certified coffee, driving down such premiums. They are also likely to be absorbed by other supply chain actors. The chapter further shows the difficulty of isolating the market–based effects of market–driven regulatory governance from the multitude of simultaneous signals related to quality, origin, or timing. Price incentives trickling down to producers have thus substantially weakened, putting into question their motivation to comply with costly behavioral rules.
Extant literature focuses on within-dyad opportunism (i.e., transgression of the norms of a specific business relationship) while neglecting pro-relational opportunism (i.e., transgression of societal norms to benefit the relationship), resulting in limited understanding of their different effects. We argue that opportunism is a significant threat to the identity of business partners and boundary spanners which results in different relational dynamics at different levels, that is, Type-I (i.e., interorganizational identification squeezing out interpersonal identification) and Type-II identification asymmetry (i.e., interpersonal identification dominating interorganizational identification). Identification asymmetry further mediates the effects of opportunism on exchange performance. Based on a matched manufacturer–supplier sample, we find strong support to the hypotheses. Moreover, distributive fairness aggravates the effect of pro-relational opportunism on identification asymmetry, while interactive fairness mitigates it. Our research provides more nuanced between-level findings on identification in interorganizational settings, and cautions against firms’ tendency toward Machiavellian reasoning when they face the temptation of complicit behavior for organizational gains.
Chapter 2 constitutes the core theoretical chapter of the book. It serves two functions. First, it introduces the micro–institutional rational choice approach that is applied throughout the work. It explains why producers targeted by market-driven regulatory governance can be considered boundedly rational actors, what this characterization entails, and how institutional arrangements can help such actors to overcome collective action problems. It then shows how Kiser and Ostrom’s Three Worlds of Action can be leveraged to link institutional design choices to their outcomes. In a second step, Chapter 2 examines market-driven regulatory governance using this approach. It uncovers the institutional design dilemma that standards face as they scale up, and specifies a number of hypotheses on how these choices (e.g., between binding and flexible standard–setting; strict or flexible oversight mechanisms; and a focus on price premiums or on capacity building) will affect the implementation of standards by drawing on institutional rational choice theory as well as insights from the socio-legal literature.