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We introduce incubators as an organizational form intended to facilitate entrepreneurship. The theorizing and research on incubators have been primarily anchored in market failure perspective and carry over the assumptions about a free market economy, mostly implicitly into the empirical work. This ignores the influence of the institutional context and obscures processes that may come into play in emerging economies like India. Using Scott's model (2008) of institutional context, we argue how the institutional context provides a complementary perspective that may reveal a richer picture of incubator operation in emerging economies. We illustrate this in the case of academic incubators in India.
Close ties between government authorities and private firms are often the object of suspicion, but a systematic understanding of when they arise is still missing. This article uses machine learning tools to analyze a large dataset of public contracts from across Europe, in order to identify the conditions under which close connections, defined both in terms of repeated interaction, as well as geographical dispersion, appear. Previous theoretical results suggest that close ties should emerge as an enforcement mechanism in settings characterized by weak outside enforcement, such as those involving corruption. Results from random forest models show support for this hypothesis, along with identifying other structural determinants of the outcome. The most striking finding is that even after accounting for numerous potential confounders, major differences in terms of average diversity levels between countries persist, and these differences map onto an indicator of governance quality and corruption, but not at all on income per capita. These findings point to the centrality of the structure of interactions between private and public actors for understanding governance outcomes.
This chapter examines the Shareholder Primacy Norm (SPN) as a widely acknowledged impediment to corporate social responsibility (CSR), including how this relates to Stakeholder Theory. We start by explaining the SPN and then review its status under US and UK law and show that it is not a legal requirement, at least under the guise of shareholder value maximization. This is in contrast to the common assertion that managers are legally constrained from addressing CSR issues if doing so would be inconsistent with the economic interests of shareholders. Nonetheless, while the SPN might be muted as a legal norm, we show that it is certainly evident as a powerful social norm among managers and in business schools— reflective, in part, of the sole voting rights of shareholders on corporate boards and of the dominance of Shareholder Theory. We argue that this view of CSR is misguided, not least when associated with claims of a purported legally enforceable requirement to maximize shareholder value. We propose two ways by which the influence of the SPN among managers might be attenuated: extending voting rights to non-shareholder stakeholders or extending fiduciary duties of executives to non-shareholder stakeholders.
This research investigates how employees' perceptions of role ambiguity might inhibit their propensity to engage in organizational citizenship behaviour (OCB), with a particular focus on the potential buffering roles of two personal resources in this process: political skill and organizational identification. Survey data collected from a manufacturing organization indicate that role ambiguity diminishes OCB, but this effect is attenuated when employees are equipped with political skill and have a strong sense of belonging to their organization. The buffering role of organizational identification also is particularly strong when employees have adequate political skills, suggesting the reinforcing, buffering roles of these two personal resources. Organizations that want to foster voluntary work behaviours, even if they cannot provide clear role descriptions for their employees, should nurture adequate personal resources within their employee ranks.