In the period from the 1990s emerging market financial crises until the North Atlantic financial crisis of 2008, the development of domestic bond markets in developing economies was a prominent agenda item in international financial reform circles. The crises of the 1990s drew attention to the vulnerabilities generated by frequently occurring double mismatches of currency denominations and maturities in the borrowing of emerging economies. This led to a series of reform efforts targeted at both increasing liquidity and the range of borrowers in domestic bond markets. In the aggregate, these efforts were successful: For emerging market economies as a whole, domestic debt now exceeds international debt. Moreover, domestic corporate bond markets have emerged in many countries, often for the first time. However, the nature of market development has been far from uniform, and often has not been in line with government aims. In this paper, we examine the interplay of government and business actors in market development. Drawing on 155 interviews with policy and market actors as well as secondary data, we show that the main explanation of variation in market development lies in the pre-existing structure of financial markets, conceptualized as a heterogeneous set of interest/influence constellations.

What factors explain U.S. participation in multilateral forums that govern finance? Current literature misses the key features of the Federal Reserve, Treasury, and Congress that result in their distinct manners of support for various multilateral arrangements. I revisit the archival record and apply a new understanding to American participation in the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) as the financial regime has evolved since the collapse of fixed parity in the IMF after 1971. I thus explain the puzzle of American ambivalence through an exploration of the fragmented U.S. regulatory system, which inhibits the United States from acting as a unitary, lead actor of multilateral negotiations. Hence, American coordination must take place both domestically and internationally for an agreement to emerge.

There is a standard trade-off in compensation contracts between the provision of incentives and insurance. We hypothesize that this trade-off influences the precision with which firm performance is measured. We find that firm outcomes are measured less precisely when chance plays a large role in these outcomes. Further, this precision is determined through the choice of shares outstanding. This has several novel implications. Nominal stock prices can remain constant over time, and firms with unpredictable cash flows should have more shares and lower stock price levels, all else equal. We find evidence consistent with these implications.

The European Union’s regulation for chemical safety (REACH) addresses the registration, evaluation, assessment, and consequent authorization (or restriction) of chemicals which are potentially harmful for both public health and the environment. The current study aims at ascertaining the costs and benefits of the REACH framework for the Austrian economy under major uncertainties, and draws on a wide range of databases on public and workplace health, chemical accidents in households, and the potential environmental impacts of harmful chemicals.

The uncertainties in the REACH system assessments of the effects of chemicals on health lie not only in the insufficiency of scientific evidence but also in the economic evaluation of effects on health, especially in regard to the value of statistical life (VSL), and the economic value of diseases attributed to chemicals.

This benefit-cost analysis (BCA) of the REACH system in Austria therefore takes into account these manifold uncertainties by designing a conservative baseline scenario and by varying all determinants in comprehensive sensitivity analyses. Projected over a period of about 30 years, this paper provides evidence that the REACH system most probably leads to net benefits for the Austrian economy (benefit-cost ratio of about 10.6) even though many benefits are still highly uncertain or unknown.