Victim precipitation is embedded deeply within industrial and organizational (I-O) psychology. Cortina, Rabelo, and Holland (2018) are right to challenge the assumptions that have perpetuated victim blaming in our discipline (consciously and unconsciously); however, a significant source of victim precipitation discourse within our field was strikingly absent in their discussion: construct measurement. The nature of how we measure most of our workplace aggression and mistreatment constructs (e.g., incivility, abusive supervision, bullying) have potential to negate the experiences of targeted employees as well as the unique impact of various perpetrator behaviors. Furthermore, how we interpret these measures can result in researchers and practitioners privileging the experiences of some individuals and dismissing the experiences of others. How can we hope to achieve a progressive approach to mistreatment in our disciplines if our measures do not keep pace?

Cortina, Rabelo, and Holland (2018) have cogently suggested that workplace mistreatment should be viewed through a “lens” that squarely implicates the perpetrator (i.e., the perpetrator predation framework) rather than through a lens that at least partially absolves the perpetrator while blaming the victim for inviting, or not actively resisting, the mistreatment (i.e., the victim precipitation framework). We agree that the perpetrator predation framework provides a better basis for policy, practice, and law. Furthermore, however, the perpetrator predation framework provides a better basis for science. Whereas Cortina et al. allude briefly to the scientific benefits of a perpetrator-focused framework, the current commentary fleshes out these benefits and outlines an agenda for future perpetrator-focused research on workplace mistreatment.

We unequivocally agree with the root of Cortina, Rabelo, and Holland's (2018) argument about the danger in focusing mostly on the victim in situations of workplace aggression. Workplace aggression is indeed initiated by the perpetrator (or perpetrators if there are two equally responsible parties in enacting the aggression). Where we believe Cortina et al.’s arguments are lacking is the hard-drawn line that the perpetrator should be the only subject of study. No, the victim should not hold any blame nor insinuations of blame. However, we hold the premise that both sides (i.e., perpetrator and victim) must be considered, and thus both are inherently subjects of interest in order to thoroughly capture the essence of these scenarios. Therefore, our position is that a focus on the victim is not only important, but it is actually an essential component when contemplating workplace aggression. Furthering research in this area will only be successful if we have candid conversations around the inappropriate nature of a solely victim-focused approach to workplace aggression and discuss the explicit differences (or nuanced ones) that may exist across varying perspectives on workplace aggression in order to more fully understand it. Therefore Cortina et al. have rightly initiated an important conversation within industrial and organizational (I-O) psychology.

Cortina, Rabelo, and Holland's (2018) perspective on studying victimization in organizations is a welcome contribution to workplace aggression research. We share their believe that considering a perpetrator predation paradigm may advance and proliferate research on issues related to gender harassment, bullying, mobbing, and other explicitly overt forms of victimization where the intent to harm is supposedly clear. However, we propose that, if blindly adopted, neither the dominant victim precipitation paradigm nor the suggested perpetrator predation paradigm will improve research on incivility or other more covert and indirect forms of victimization. In fact, we suggest in our commentary that both models may be counterproductive for understanding and remedying incivility in organizations.

Science is a complex task. It involves the creation and dissemination of knowledge. The creation of knowledge requires identifying and abstracting patterns (i.e., identifying phenomena and theorizing about the processes that bring it about), as well as systematically observing to better see and quantify the patterns (e.g., effect size estimating) or assess the validity of the abstractions used to explain the patterns (i.e., theory testing). To help (a) hone in on what observations would be useful and (b) communicate what the patterns mean, we are encouraged to develop and report hypotheses. That is, strategically, hypotheses facilitate the planning of data collection by helping the researcher understand what patterns need to be observed to assess the merit of an explanation. Meanwhile, tactically, hypotheses help focus the audience on the crucial patterns needed to answer a question or test a theory. When the strategic hypotheses are not supported, it raises a question regarding what to do tactically. Depending on the result (i.e., different direction; null), one might construct a hypothesis to facilitate dissemination without reporting this post hoc construction or remove mention of a hypothesis altogether. This practice is called HARKing (i.e., hypothesizing after results are known). HARKing has been so disparaged as to be considered a “detrimental research practice” (Grand et al., 2018, p. 6). As such, the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology's (SIOP) Robust and Reliability Science task force appears to be recommending that HARKing not be taught by educators, encouraged by reviewers or editors, or practiced by authors. I do not agree with those recommendations, and I elaborate on my position below.

We acknowledge and agree with Cortina, Rabelo, and Holland (2018) that the tendency to focus on victims as precipitators of their own negative workplace experiences (e.g. abusive supervision) presents a problematic theoretical paradigm. Using organizational justice as an illustration, we note that even in fields with an orientation toward victims, similar trends with regard to victim precipitation have still emerged. However, we also argue that although the perpetrator predation approach may help to avoid this tendency and encourage a better understanding of the responsibility for and origins of certain organizational experiences, it may fall short when examining complex phenomena that involve more than the dyad of perpetrator and victim. We suggest that industrial and organizational (I-O) psychology scholars might be better served by abandoning the language of victim and perpetrator altogether. Though we invoke these two terms when discussing organizational justice, we ultimately come to argue that researchers should utilize different language that better captures the experience and role of employees in these phenomena.

We applaud the efforts of Cortina, Rabelo, and Holland (2018) in their development of perpetrator predation as a sensitizing concept (see also Cortina, 2017) for future work in workplace aggression and mistreatment (hereafter workplace mistreatment). The importance of being mindful of the manner in which we frame our arguments is both highly relevant and well-articulated by the authors. We further believe that the transfer of focus from that of blaming victims to placing the onus for workplace mistreatment on the actor him/herself is an important idea as our field continues to develop into the 21st century.

Grand et al. (2018) address an important and timely concern with scientific research with implications well beyond industrial and organizational (I-O) psychological science. As they describe a comprehensive ecosystem responsible for robust science, they have alluded to the notorious scientist–practitioner gap in our field. In this commentary I propose how that gap relates to the various stakeholders in Grand et al.’s ecosystem, and suggest professional associations take on an elevated role in the communication of science.

Cortina, Robello, and Holland (2018) advance a case for the danger of using the victim precipitation model in industrial-organizational (I-O) psychology—a model that is interpreted as suggesting that characteristics and behaviors of victims may influence criminals to select them as targets, in effect blaming victims for crimes committed against them. This “victim blaming” found its way into criminology, criminal justice, sociology, and other disciplines, resulting in revictimization and in the exoneration of violent criminals, among other undesirable outcomes. We agree with Cortina and colleagues that these outcomes, then and now, are unacceptable: Victims cannot and should not be blamed for their aggressors’ actions, and aggressors should unequivocally be held accountable for their crimes. This extends to workplace mistreatment. Using the operationalizations of generalized workplace harassment, workplace incivility, sexual harassment, and abusive supervision as guides (Rospenda & Richman, 2004, as cited by Cortina et al., 2018; Magley, Williams, & Langhout, 2001; Tepper, 2000; Walsh & Magley, 2014), we define workplace mistreatment as any interpersonal interaction in the workplace that creates an oppressively intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment that extends beyond acceptable evaluative and professional actions given situational demands (e.g., poor performance reviews, layoffs during downsizing/mergers/acquisitions, discipline, etc.). Although an unpopular point of view, we maintain that whether or not victims influence the contexts that facilitate victimization in the workplace is an empirical question. This research continues to be scientifically valuable, relevant, and practical, and it is necessary to more fully understand workplace mistreatment (Barling, 1996; Cortina, Magley, Williams, & Langhout, 2001). Two principal reasons drive this position: (a) the lack of scientific, data-driven evidence to support the exclusion of the victim precipitation model and (b) the potential harmful premise of its replacement, the perpetrator predation model. Elucidating our thoughts on these reasons will occupy our commentary.

The focal article (Grand et al., 2018) provides an exemplary roadmap for improving the practice of robust science in industrial-organizational (I-O) psychology, which includes recommendations for authors such as practicing robust science, even in the absence of reward. However, authors are faced with practical constraints; to succeed in our field, we must publish, at least occasionally, in prestigious journals to secure scholarships, awards, employment, grants, and tenure. We can practice robust science (commonly referred to as “open science” or “reproducible research”) without reward—but only to some extent, if there is no support from our gatekeepers. After all, it is difficult to influence the field without a job and research funding.

As I write this essay in mid-September 2017, the news is reporting yet another tragic police shooting that led to the death of a US resident. This time, it was a deaf, nonverbal, Hispanic man in Oklahoma City, Magdiel Sanchez, who happened to be carrying a pipe that he used to fend off stray dogs when he went for walks at night (NewsOK, 2017). To the members of Mr. Sanchez's family and community, his name is the most important part of the previous sentence, but the most terrifying part for the rest of us is the first two words: this time.

The goal of focal articles in Industrial and Organizational Psychology: Perspectives on Science and Practice is to present new ideas or different takes on existing ideas and stimulate a conversation in the form of comment articles that extend the arguments in the focal article or that present new ideas stimulated by those articles. The two focal articles in this issue stimulated a wide range of reactions and a good deal of constructive input.

Cortina, Rabelo, and Holland (2018) make a compelling case for shifting away from a victim precipitation perspective in industrial and organizational (I-O) psychology. In addition to noting that victim precipitation potentially violates ethical principles, the authors suggest that such paradigms shape attributions of blame and implications for practice within organizations. This commentary builds upon the ideas discussed in the focal article by encouraging I-O psychologists to collect data on the extent to which victim precipitation appears in the field and experimentally examine how and why the paradigms we use to explain workplace mistreatment might affect attitudes and behavior.

The focal article (Grand et al., 2018) addresses one of the most important issues across virtually all areas of science (Goldstein, 2010): the trustworthiness and credibility of a scientific discipline. Once these attributes are lost, it is difficult to regain them within a reasonable time frame, if ever. In contrast to previous articles on this topic (e.g., Kepes & McDaniel, 2013), the authors of the focal article provide a detailed review of the stakeholders surrounding industrial and organizational (I-O) psychology, including their potential effect on the robustness and trustworthiness of our scientific discipline. In essence, the focal article describes I-O psychology's ecosystem responsible for fostering robust and credible science. The authors should be commended for their comprehensive undertaking, and we have no substantive disagreements. However, implicitly, as with most articles on this vital topic, the focal article tends to take a bottom-up approach to decision making and change. The bottom-up approach is an emergent process where the individuals involved in the day-to-day activities are primarily responsible for the decision-making process and resulting change (Kindler, 1979). Thus, changes resulting from this process are incremental and typically involve making minor adjustments to existing processes (Bartunek & Moch, 1987).

As a practitioner with 25 years of experience applying industrial and organizational (I-O) psychology concepts to address business challenges, I want to expand upon the point that “robust science is relevant” (Grand et al., 2018, p. 10)—specifically, that making two changes in the field's research direction could greatly increase the impact, value, and credibility of I-O psychology in the broader world of work.

Cortina, Rabelo, and Holland (2018) accurately cite the general public's overuse of victim precipitation ideologies, or the notion that victims engage in actions that directly bring about their unfortunate circumstances. These ideologies also have permeated industrial and organizational (I-O) psychology and the study of people in the workplace (e.g., women's choice in clothing leads to sexual harassment, certain target characteristics and actions incite workplace bullying). We agree with Cortina et al. that this ideology unintentionally benefits the perpetrator by placing blame and responsibility for nonoptimal workplace situations directly on the target. The field of I-O psychology needs to move away from this model of victim blaming as a remediation for workplace disparities.

Los Angeles County's civil service rule specifies a 70% cutoff score regardless of the situation (type of job, type of assessment, or outcome of interest). This civil service rule would be difficult to defend if it were challenged in court, and the rule places the county at increased risk in the event of employment litigation, particularly with public safety jobs (police, fire, sheriff, etc.). Additionally, it is unlikely that this cutoff would optimally balance the county's interests in fair employment practices and expected job performance (SIOP, 2003). Given the propensity for public safety candidates and employees to file lawsuits related to hiring and promotions, and given the fact that public safety agencies in this county have been subjected to a number of employment-related lawsuits in the past, the current rule is problematic. Prior to this rule's development, as well as after its implementation in 1988, there has been substantial litigation related to cutoff scores, and courts have identified what they consider to be more and less appropriate methods for setting cutoff scores.

As researchers who have advanced victim precipitation arguments in our own work on victimization and job performance (Jensen, Patel, & Raver, 2014), we agree fully with this statement made by Cortina, Rabelo, and Holland (2018): “A victim's traits or behaviors might help us understand why the instigator chose that particular person for abuse, but we must always emphasize that it was the instigator, not the victim, who did the choosing and abusing” (p. 93). An overemphasis on victim characteristics does deflect attention away from wrongdoers, and theory that encourages us to consider perpetrator motivation and the social environment is needed.

We measure market reactions to announcements concerning liquidity regulation, a key innovation in the Basel framework. Our initial results show that liquidity regulation attracts negative abnormal returns. However, the price responses are less pronounced when coinciding announcements concerning capital regulation are backed out, suggesting that markets do not consider liquidity regulation to be binding. Bank- and country-specific characteristics also matter. Liquid balance sheets and high charter values increase abnormal returns whereas smaller long-term funding mismatches reduce abnormal returns. Banks located in countries with large government debt and tight interbank conditions or with prior domestic liquidity regulation display lower abnormal returns.