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This article analyzes the competitive strategies of Odense Steel Shipyard between 1918 and 2012 and challenges existing scholarship on competition in global industries. Until the 1980s, the yard adopted typical strategies in shipbuilding, starting with cost leadership and subsequently adopting global segmentation and differentiation strategies. From the mid-1980s, however, it successfully followed a unique national responsiveness strategy, which scholars including Dong Sung Cho and Michael E. Porter had ruled out in shipbuilding. The article shows how shipyard owners shaped strategies and influenced competitiveness.
This paper examines how culture affects information asymmetry in financial markets. We extract firms traded in the United States but headquartered in regions sharing Chinese culture (“Chinese firms”), and we manually identify a group of U.S. analysts of Chinese ethnic origin (“Chinese analysts”). We find that Chinese analysts issue more accurate forecasts on Chinese firms than non-Chinese analysts. The effect is stronger among firms with less transparent information environments. Further evidence suggests that cultural proximity can go beyond language commonality and analysts’ pre-existing channels for information. Market reaction is stronger when Chinese analysts issue favorable forecast revisions or upgrades about Chinese firms.
With this issue of the Industrial and Organizational Psychology: Perspectives on Science and Practice (IOP) journal, the Practice Forum concludes its first full year of operation. The Practice Forum published its first manuscript in Volume 9, Issue 4, and since then, three additional papers have been published.
Events that disrupt customer–supplier relationships pose a source of risk for suppliers that depend on a customer for a large portion of their revenues. We identify the replacement of a customer’s chief executive officer (CEO) as a disruptive event that results in suppliers losing substantial sales. These losses are greater when an incumbent customer CEO is more likely to be entrenched and stem largely from the successor divesting assets. Finally, we document that losses in sales following a customer CEO turnover lead to declines in a supplier’s financial performance and that suppliers experience negative abnormal stock returns to announcements of customer CEO departures.
Does more competition lead to more information production and greater investment efficiency? This question is largely unexplored in the finance literature. This article provides both a model and a series of extensive empirical tests. The model features a 2-stage Bayesian game in differentiated products market competition. We find that competition causes firms to acquire less information and investments to become more inefficient relative to a first-best case with the same market structure. Empirically, the panel regression analysis provides strong support for the theory and shows that investment is more efficient in concentrated industries.
Although more than 100 billion dollars is spent each year on policing, we know very little about what works, and still less about whether the benefits of various policing policies and practices outweigh the costs. In particular, although there has been some important work done to assess the effects of various practices, and even to monetize some of the benefits of reducing crime, there has been virtually no attention paid to the other side of the benefit-cost equation: the social costs that particular policing practices potentially can impose. In February 2017, the Policing Project at NYU School of Law held a conference aimed at jumpstarting the use of benefit-cost analysis to assess policing practices, and to begin to tackle the many methodological challenges to doing so. Here, we provide an overview of the existing literature, identify the serious gaps that remain, and sketch out a research agenda for moving forward.
We compare the influence of entry mode choice on subsidiary performance in two developmentally-differentiated regions of a developing host country. Analysis of 113 subsidiaries located in two provinces of China indicates that wholly owned subsidiaries outperform joint ventures in the developed region, whereas joint ventures outperform wholly owned subsidiaries in the less developed region. However, the smaller performance gap between wholly owned subsidiaries and joint ventures in the developed region indicates that the magnitude of influence of entry mode choices on performance varies across subnational regions. Firms must therefore be more discriminating in formulating entry strategies to regionally heterogeneous countries.
Transnational standards related to the environmental and social sustainability of production processes are becoming commonplace governance tools in the global economy. This book demonstrates how sustainability standards serve two fundamentally different functions: coordination and regulation. Standards can coordinate like-minded businesses in an industry by demarcating common sustainability commitments to distinguish between sustainable and unsustainable sectors of the industry. Yet, standards can also regulate businesses, requiring them to change production and trade practices to align with the sustainability demands of third-parties, including trading partners, advocacy groups, consumers and other civil society constituencies. These two functions reflect the private and public lenses, respectively, through which legal scholars can assess standards as transnational sustainability laws. With key case studies in forestry standards, palm oil standards, and the ISEAL Alliance, this book demonstrates how socio-legal analyses of transnational rulemaking inform debates about global administrative law and the constitutionalization of the global economy.
Trade multilateralism in the twenty-first century faces a serious test as weakness in the global economy and fast-paced technological changes create a challenging environment for world trade. This book examines how an updated and robust, rules-based multilateral framework, anchored in the WTO, remains indispensable to maximizing the benefits of global economic integration and to reviving world trade. By examining recent accessions to the WTO, it reveals how the growing membership of the WTO has helped to support domestic reforms and to strengthen the rules-based framework of the WTO. It argues that the new realities of the twenty-first century require an upgrade to the architecture of the multilateral trading system. By erecting its 'upper floors' on the foundation of existing trade rules, the WTO can continue to adapt to a fast-changing environment and to maximize the benefits brought about by its ever-expanding membership.
Growing levels of education, the increasing availability of capital, the diversification and specialization of economic activities and the numerous soft and hard supports available to start new businesses have led to the creation of more and more micro and small businesses across Europe. But while the process of setting up a business is increasingly straightforward, keeping it going is much tougher. In normal times, business entry and business exit are natural processes, inherent to economic life. In fact, 50 percent of enterprises do not survive the first five years and, of all business closures, bankruptcies account in average for 15 percent (A Second Chance for Entrepreneurs, Expert Group Report 2011). Yet, the number of bankruptcies peaked during the recent financial crisis and even before that, the Lisbon Partnership had identified the key role of “overcoming the stigma of business failure” as a strategy for growth and jobs.
There are clear economic and social rationales to promoting a second chance for failed entrepreneurs and deriving positive experience from negative situations. First and foremost, businesses set up by restarters grow faster than first- timers in terms of turnover and jobs created (Stam, Audretsch, Meijaard 2006), and approximately one- fifth of all successful business people failed the first time around. The case studies of Ford, Hershey and Disney are instructive for young entrepreneurs in this matter.
Second, most of the time, business failure is not due to the incompetence of the entrepreneurs but due to external circumstances, such as a slump in demand, a financial crisis or the rise of a new competitor. However, this professional failure is often confused with personal failure, and low self- esteem causes individuals to withdraw and retreat to safer employment options.
Third, it is accepted that a society does not generate innovation and productivity by steadfastly avoiding mistakes but, rather, by learning from them. Yet our culture and incentive system does not reflect this. There is much evidence to show that Europeans as a whole are relatively risk- averse, especially compared to countries such as the United States. In Germany, for example, only 1– 2 percent of new companies annually are founded by second- chance entrepreneurs (see KfW- Gründungsmonitor 2013), and the World Bank recently critiqued Poland for its failure to understand the value of secondchance entrepreneurs as manifested in its particularly onerous liquidation procedures (Devictor 2013).
This chapter discusses economic failure in the process of small business growth, using the example of Polish companies operating in the shadow economy. The discussion covers internal and external barriers contributing to economic failure in the process of company growth. The presence of companies in the shadow economy influences their operation and consequently the process of their growth. On the one hand, it stimulates the efficiency of businesses and, on the other, it boosts the risk of failure due to possible overestimated investment profitability, the confidential nature of internal activity in a company and problems in contacts with the surroundings. Such a risk is increasing with the increase of the shadow economy's financing of the company's growth.
Introduction
Small businesses have specific market, finance, location, organization and technology features that define their operational and strategic behavior, which are different than in large companies. Due to those features a small business is not merely a downscaled large company (Storey 1994). Differences in companies of various scale can be seen when it comes to development as well. Contrary to large companies, the majority of small businesses are in the early stages of their operations and only some of them succeed and grow to become a larger, stable and expandable company. With the growth of the scale of business, a company faces new problems and challenges in terms of management, finance and technology, and they contribute to various barriers and risk factors. According to the literature, we observe concentration of attention interchangeably on internal and external barriers and factors causing economic failure in the process of company growth (Ropęga and Stawasz 2014; Blackburn et al. 2013; Wiklund et al. 2009; Garnsey et al. 2006). One of the less examined factors is the share of companies in the shadow economy and the impact of the latter on the growth of small businesses (Stawasz and Głodek 2009; Caca 2010).
Shadow economy activity complements the legal sphere of business limited to certain areas only. In 2010– 15, the scale of the shadow economy was about 19.7– 18.5 percent of businesses in EU member states, whereas in Poland it was 23– 24 percent (Schneider 2015). Retail, construction and property and business services have the largest influence on the scale of the shadow economy.