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As China's role in the global economy has grown, it has become increasinglyinvolved in developing economies through aid and overseas developmentassistance. China promotes a range of projects under the umbrella of“development cooperation” and has, on occasion, proclaimed an alternativedevelopment model to that of its Western counterparts. Such statements drawattention to how development operates as both a rhetoric and a practice forchannelling foreign investment abroad. This chapter examines how narrativesof a “Chinese model” has shaped the rationalization and practices ofChinese rubber companies in Laos through the Opium Replacement Program(ORP). The ORP is a Chinese state project active since 2004, which aims toeradicate opium cultivation by providing alternative agricultural livelihoods.This project catalyzed an influx of Chinese capital into northern Laos that hasdrastically transformed local agricultural systems, livelihoods and land uses.The ORP is an important case for analysing the challenges and contradictionsthat arise when Chinese concepts and China's unique historical experience ofdevelopment are transplanted into other contexts.
Introduction
In the late 1990s, the global price for natural rubber soared and Xishuangbanna — a major rubber producing area in remote southwest China — grew rich. Across the border in northern Laos, farmers and state officials looked on in envy at this miracle cash crop. Some began experimenting with it. When the Chinese government established the Opium Replacement Program (ORP) in 2004, it was welcomed in Laos as further support for the growing rubber sector. As a result, Lao rubber cultivation expanded significantly. The ORP was established to incentivize large-scale agribusiness projects to provide alternative livelihoods schemes as substitutes for opium cultivation in Laos and Myanmar. Chinese companies rushed to take advantage of the ORP and its financial supports. Though a range of cash crops were allowed, the vast majority of ORP funding went to establishing rubber plantations. Amid the initial rush, Chinese investors, Lao farmers and Lao state officials recounted stories of rubber's success in Xishuangbanna as justification. Rubber was a silver bullet that contributed to development, poverty alleviation, and modernization. But in 2011, as global rubber prices plummeted, dreams of new motorbikes, paved roads, corporate profits and hefty government revenues were suddenly dashed.
The drop in rubber prices also dashed claims that China's development success was wholly replicable in other contexts.
Over the last three decades, one of the most significant changes in the context of development in the Global South is the transformation of China from a capital deficient developing country to a rising capital exporter in the world economy. For a long time, the main form of China's capital export is its massive purchase of US Treasury bonds. But since the Hu Jintao era (2002–12), the Chinese state has diverted ever larger part of its foreign reserves to outgoing direct investment in infrastructures, mines, and other assets in the developing world. China's official financial institutions also started offering concession loans to other developing countries.
Africa has been the most prominent recipient of Chinese investment, partly because of the PRC's longstanding presence in the continent since the height of Cold War and partly because of Africa's abundance in fossil fuel and mineral resources that China needs desperately for its roaring developmental machine. “China in Africa” has been an established field in development studies. Numerous papers and books debated whether China's increasing presence in Africa would elevate the region's growth prospect or whether it represents little more than a new form of extractive colonialism.
China's ambitions in becoming a major capital exporter to the developing world is surely not restricted to Africa. Chinese investments in Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia has been increasing rapidly. Among all these regions, Southeast Asia, which is right at the doorstep of China, is the most interesting one, and it is poised to becoming the most important arena for China's overseas projection of political-economic influences.
China's presence in Southeast Asia dates back to premodern times, when many states in the region paid tribute to the dynastic state ofimperial China and conducted trade with China via Chinese diasporic traders in the region. Time and again, some states in the region attempted to challenge Chinese dominance and sever its tributary ties to China. But at least in the perception of many officials and intellectuals in China, these challenges did not alter the reality that China had been hegemonic over Southeast Asia all along until Western imperialism shattered this Sinocentric other in the mid-nineteenth century. China's link to the region receded in the mid-twentieth century because of Cold War division, only to be restored after China's reintegration into the capitalist world in the 1980s.
By
Philip Andrews-Speed, Senior Principal Fellow at the Energy Studies Institute of the National University of Singapore.,
Mingda Qiu, Research Associate with the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington DC.,
Christopher Len, Senior Research Fellow at the Energy Studies Institute, National University of Singapore.
Chinese energy and mineral companies have been investing overseas formore than twenty years, and the quantity and size of their projects havebeen growing steadily. Although Southeast Asia is not a preferred regionfor these investments, they remain significant on account of their relativevalue to the host country and because of the geostrategic importance ofthe region for China. Most of the companies making the investmentsor undertaking the projects are wholly or partly owned by the Chinesegovernment at either central or local levels. As a result, the motivations fortheir investment activities reflect a mix of corporate and state objectives.Corporate objectives include securing energy or resource supply chains,increasing or diversifying their asset base, and enhancing their profits ormarket share. Government motivations range from direct support tocompanies for purposes of industrial strategy and resource security toindirect support through development assistance, diplomacy and regionalstrategic positioning.
This chapter presents an overview of the scores of investments and majorinfrastructure projects undertaken by Chinese companies in Southeast Asiain oil and gas, coal, hydroelectricity and metalliferous mining, showing howthe mix of motivations for these activities varies between industries and, toa lesser extent, between host countries. While the economic benefits of theseinvestments to host countries are in most cases evident, there are some risks.The lack of transparency and low operating standards that characterize someprojects can weaken the social license to operate, creating risks for both theChinese companies and the host governments
Introduction
China's economic engagement in Southeast Asia has grown markedly in recent years, and this includes the energy and mining industries. In addition to importing energy and mineral commodities from the region, Chinese enterprises have been investing in primary resources and constructing energy infrastructure. While the objectives of these companies are often primarily commercial, they are also multi-faceted and involve the ambitions of both the enterprises and the Chinese government. In addition, this mix of objectives varies between the different resource industries. The aims of this chapter are to identify the specific motivations of Chinese enterprises and government in their engagements with Southeast Asia's energy and mineral resources, and examine some of the implications from their mix of corporate and state drivers.
Foreign aid and economic investment have been effective tools used byChina to leverage influence in many developing countries, includingCambodia. China is now the largest aid donor and investor to Cambodia.Despite positive aspects of China's presence, which include an increaseof FDI inflow, infrastructure development, and economic growth, China'ssubstantial investment in natural resource sectors also comes withsignificant costs. As one of the largest holder of economic land concessions,mining licenses and hydro dam construction projects, Chinese companies,often partnering with local companies and elites, have been involved withillegal land grabbing, deforestation, and human rights abuses. These issueshave prompted countless outcries and protests from local peasants, civilsocieties and international community. In addition, opposition parties inCambodia have leveraged these issues to accuse the ruling Cambodia People'sParty (CPP) of promoting a pro-China policy. This chapter explores thecomplex issues that have emerged around Chinese investment in Cambodiannatural resources. First, the chapter analyses structural factors in the Sino–Cambodian relations that have generated a favourable investment climatefor Chinese resource companies. Second, it investigates various recurringproblems emerging around resource sector projects of Chinese companies inCambodia. Lastly, the chapter evaluates the benefits and costs brought alongby Chinese investment in natural resource extraction in Cambodia with aview to preventing the fallouts of such investment in the future.
Introduction
If China has been “going global” since the early 2000s, it has gone regional for far longer. China's Cold War-era influence in Southeast Asia prior to the 1980s is well documented, after which both foreign and domestic difficulties led to a period of relative withdrawal. Since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, however, China's foreign policy toward its southern neighbours has increasingly re-embraced its outwardly engaged version of “peaceful coexistence”, as first articulated in the 1950s. Seeking both regional political stability and, perhaps more pointedly, access to natural resources for its own ongoing economic development, China's leaders are widely understood to see Southeast Asia as a strategic sphere of influence. In such a context, they have looked to development cooperation as a core mode of regional engagement for much of the last two decades.
As a key locale of this strategy, Cambodia receives close attention from Beijing, given its pivotal position in the region. Since 1996, the relationship between Phnom Penh and Beijing has deepened.
Private sector action provides one of the most promising opportunities to reduce the risks of climate change, buying time while governments move slowly or even oppose climate mitigation. Starting with the insight that much of the resistance to climate mitigation is grounded in concern about the role of government, this books draws on law, policy, social science, and climate science to demonstrate how private initiatives are already bypassing government inaction in the US and around the globe. It makes a persuasive case that private governance can reduce global carbon emissions by a billion tons per year over the next decade. Combining an examination of the growth of private climate initiatives over the last decade, a theory of why private actors are motivated to reduce emissions, and a review of viable next steps, this book speaks to scholars, business and advocacy group managers, philanthropists, policymakers, and anyone interested in climate change.
Leung and Morris (2015) propose conditions under which values, norms, and schemata drive cultural differences in behavior. They build on past theories about dimensions of situational strength to propose that personal values drive behavior more in weak situations and perceived norms drive behavior more in strong situations. Drawing on this analysis as well as two recent models of cultural tightness-looseness, country-level effects are predicted on the assumption that tighter cultures more frequently create strong situations and looser cultures more frequently create weak situations. Using secondary data, I examine values as well as perceived descriptive norms and injunctive norms relevant to collectivism in relation to two key dependent measures: helping strangers and emotion regulation. The relation of embeddedness values to helping strangers is moderated negatively by tightness (in that high embeddedness reduces helping less in the context of tightness), and its relation to emotion regulation is moderated positively (in that embeddedness increases emotion regulation more in the context of tightness). Furthermore, descriptive norms show main effects for both dependent variables that are predominantly unmoderated by tightness. Finally, the link of injunctive norms with emotion regulation is moderated positively by tightness (in that injunctiveness heightens emotion regulation more in the context of tightness). Results support the relevance of nation-level tightness to reliance on values and norms, but the strength of effects depends on how it is operationalized.
In this work we develop and validate a model measuring norms that distinguish three types of culture: dignity, face, and honor (Leung & Cohen, 2011). Our motivation is to produce empirical evidence for this new cultural framework and use the framework to explain cultural differences in interdependent social interactions such as negotiation. In two studies, we establish the content validity, construct validity, predictive validity, and measurement invariance of this measurement model. In Study 1, we present the model's three-factor structure and situate the constructs of dignity, face, and honor in a nomological network of cultural constructs. In Study 2, which uses a sample of participants from 26 cultures, we show that the measurement model discriminates among people from the three cultural regions corresponding to the dignity, face, and honor framework. In particular, we report differences between face and honor cultures, which are not distinguished in other cultural frameworks (e.g., Hofstede, 1980). We also show that the measurement model accounts for cultural differences in norms for use of negotiation strategy.
While regulators, firms, and the courts must all be able to interpret regulations to best address economic and social issues, regulatory interpretation may vary greatly across parties. After introducing a framework to explain the impact of the complexity of written regulations and the complexity of the regulatory environment on regulatory interpretation, this paper utilizes regulatory examples to explore the challenges associated with regulatory interpretation. Several recent initiatives designed to improve regulatory efficacy are examined to assess potential methods available to reduce challenges associated with regulatory interpretation. When considered with the public policy implementation literature and research on networks in public policy, several implications emerge from the consideration of regulatory interpretation and recent regulatory initiatives. Regulators should pursue strategies to minimize the number of possible interpretations in the design of regulation and seek improved regulatory mechanisms to alleviate regulatory interpretation challenges. Furthermore, theoretical models should acknowledge regulatory interpretation to better assist in the design and implementation of regulation.
This capstone issue of volume 13 of Management and Organization Review is a poignant moment for me, and at the same time inspiring, as we remember, celebrate, and honor our colleague, friend, and intellectual giant Kwok Leung. He was my friend, mentor, and teacher, who introduced me to the literature and controversies crisscrossing the landscape of cross-cultural research as I learned the ropes of leading the Journal of International Business Studies. He was eloquent and persistent in persuading me to accept the challenge of following Anne Tsui as Editor-in-Chief of Management and Organization Review, which at age eighty opened up for me exciting new intellectual horizons for which I am profoundly grateful. Kwok has been a prolific scholar with over two hundred peer-reviewed publications that collectively have received over 20,000 citations. I know that we will always miss Kwok, but his legacy will continue to shine and remind us of him.
Although a substantial literature on the management of technological innovation exists, several scholars argue that much of this research has been rooted in Western contexts, where key assumptions are very different from those in emerging economies. Building on this viewpoint, we investigate the current state of knowledge on technological innovation in two of the largest and fastest growing emerging economies: China and India. We undertook a bibliometric analysis of author keywords and combined different quantitative approaches – frequency analysis, cluster analysis, and co-word analysis – to review 162 articles on technological innovation published about China and India for the period 1991–2015. From the analyses, the trends in technological innovation research in the two countries and the dominant themes of discussion were identified. These themes were further classified into eight sub-themes. Our key findings indicate a near absence of research on the management of technological innovation based on India, limited volume of research on indigenous aspects of innovation, and a lack of theory-building based on these countries’ contexts. Several suggestions for future research are offered based on the gaps identified.
This article aims to enhance understanding of employee anonymous online dissent (EAOD), a controversial phenomenon in contemporary digital environments. We conceptualise and scrutinise EAOD as a communicative and interactional process among four key actors: dissenting employees, online outlet administrators, audiences, and targeted organisations. This multi-actor, dialectical process encompasses actor-related tensions that may generate unethical consequences if single voices are not brought out and confronted. Appropriating a Habermasian ethical and discursive lens, we examine and disentangle three particular challenges emerging from the EAOD process: lack of accountability and potential opportunism; equal participation and resolution of actor-related tensions; and organisational participation and internalisation of dissent. We show that EAOD can initiate plural dialogue that helps co-construct and balance different voices within an informal and noninstitutionalised context for interaction and public deliberation. We conclude our inquiry by offering reflections on practical implications and a research agenda for further investigation.
This special issue is devoted to celebrating and extending the scholarship of Kwok Leung, who passed away on May 25, 2015. Management and Organization Review is grateful to Michael W. Morris, Zhen Xiong (George) Chen, Lorna Doucet, and Yaping Gong for their thoughtful, instrumental effort in the publication of this special issue.
We appreciate this invitation to comment on the paper on Western perceptions of Chinese culture, to provide an insider perspective. Because of its unique perspective on Chinese historical teachings, the study reminds us about the challenges in learning and applying indigenous knowledge. For example, it compares the lens of war and business in many dimensions, such as a focus on an enemy (war) or on customers (business), a matter of life and death (war) or not (business), one competitor (war) or a number of competitors (business), deception (war) or secrecy (business), or a one-time relationship (war) or a long-term relationship (business). The paper offers us a striking warning about the risk of overdrawing historical analogies in management research.
Conservation of resources theory is employed to examine the effect of workplace support on thriving at work and the mediation of thriving at work on the workplace support and life satisfaction relationship using data on white-collar workers in China. We find that workplace support is positively related to thriving at work and thriving at work is positively related to life satisfaction. We also find that thriving at work fully mediates the relationship between life satisfaction and supervisor support, while the relationship between life satisfaction and coworker support is partially mediated by thriving at work. Consistent with the COR caravan and spillover hypothesis, we conclude that thriving at work is a mechanism that transmits the positive effects of workplace support on life satisfaction. The research findings suggest that an increase in workplace support can benefit both individuals and organizations by improving individuals’ thriving at work and life satisfaction.