There is growing awareness of the role that multinational corporations (MNCs) play in contributing to modern slavery down their supply chains (8.7 Alliance, 2023). According to Global Estimates of Modern Slavery, published by the International Labour Organization (ILO), in 2021 there were 27.6 million people trapped in situations of forced labour around the world, with 17.3 million individuals being exploited in the private sector (ILO, 2022). Sectoral analysis of this finding suggests that a third of exploited workers are employed in export-related sectors and are, presumably, part of global value chains (GVCs) (ILO, 2022). The increasing realization, in the last decade or so, that MNCs’ profits are linked to modern slavery has driven workers, their representatives, global and local activists, consumer organizations, and unions, as well as legislators and policymakers at various levels (local, national, regional, and international), to seek innovative and effective ways to hold MNCs accountable and assign them responsibility (LeBaron, 2020; ITUC, 2020; Trautrims et al., 2021).

This trend suggests a shift in policy responses to modern slavery. Since the adoption of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Trafficking Protocol in 2000,1 there has been a predominant view that human trafficking and modern slavery primarily result from the operation of organized crime (H. Shamir, 2012). The expansion of the anti-trafficking and modern slavery policy response towards addressing the role of mainstream business entities, and particularly MNCs, raises multiple complex questions for scholars, policymakers, and activists. These relate to the exact role of MNCs in modern slavery and the practices they adopt, and MNC and supplier compliance (Han et al., 2022); the causes and drivers of modern slavery; the reality of work on the factory floor (and wherever work takes place); and effective policy solutions to change corporate patterns of purchasing, supply chain management, and engagement with suppliers, as well as with workers and their communities.

This chapter provides insights from economic theory and empirical methods to determine if production of medical services in a firm is efficient. The concepts of a production function can indicate whether production is technically efficient and estimate the marginal contribution to revenue of each input (labor of different types, capital, etc.). With data on the prices or wages of these inputs, the manager can determine the profit-maximizing rate of use. A cost function can indicate whether there are economies of scale in quantity (somehow defined) and economies or diseconomies in scope. Examples from classic health economics literature are used to show that there was underuse of physician aides and other substitutes in office-based physician practices, that there are constant returns in scale in the production of hospital admissions, and that there are increased returns in emergency rooms. Caution in interpretation of variation in cost per unit output (of the type provided for Medicare in the Dartmouth Atlas) is offered.

This chapter provides economic explanations of the level of total national health expenditures in the US and of population health outcomes. It helps managers explain the role of wage differences with other countries and the impact of income inequality and racism on spending and outcomes. Wages of healthcare workers are much higher in the US than abroad. The healthcare GDP share has stabilized after growing for many years, but beneficial yet costly new technology still matters for cost and health growth. Metrics of relative health spending are distorted by exchange rate mismeasurement. Evidence on the fraction of total spending that is wasteful is very uncertain because no managerial or policy actions as yet have been proven to reduce waste in ways that do more good than harm. Changes in insurance and pricing policy have the highest promise for improvement.

This chapter deals with child labour in value chains, whether global value chains (GVCs) or domestic value chains (DVCs). This chapter goes beyond the usual question of the regulation of child labour in value chains to consider the conditions necessary for the elimination of child labour. This chapter is the product of many years of research on this topic by the two authors, sometimes jointly and at times along with other researchers. The empirical base of the analysis in this chapter comprises the various studies carried out by the authors, jointly or separately, of child labour in the garment GVCs in Delhi (Bhaskaran et al., 2010); in the global and DVCs of handicrafts in Jaipur, matches in Sivakasi, stone quarries in Rajasthan, brick kilns in Malda, West Bengal, knitwear and fireworks in Tirupur, Tamil Nadu (Nathan and George, 2012); cotton production in Punjab and Haryana (IHD and Save the Children, 2014); and of gems, lac bangles, and embroidered garments in Jaipur (The Freedom Fund, 2018). One of the authors (Varsha Joshi) led the Child Helpline, which is the key agency in the identification and rescue of child labour in Jaipur, so we were able to use the insights gathered in the course of her work in rescuing child labourers. While the data leading to the chapter's analysis are mainly from Indian cases, the analysis itself is applicable to other, developing countries in the Global South where child labour still exists in serious dimensions. The chapter's policy prescription of combining higher adult earnings at the base of the labour force pyramid with compulsory and quality education is relevant to all developing countries of the Global South.

After this introduction, the next section deals with types of child labour and the implications for different types of interventions. This is followed by a summary of the different types of interventions of both public and private regulation that have been undertaken to eliminate child labour in value chains, both global and domestic. The elimination of child labour involves a change in the business strategy of both the lead firm or principal employer and the supplier.

Primary care physicians are supposed to play a central role in care coordination. This chapter finds no strong evidence that they have been able to improve care, a possible reason for relative low incomes for this specialty and small numbers. Evidence does show a need for care coordination, but health system managerial strategies to make gains by use of financial incentives (pay for performance) or organizational changes (patient-centered medical homes) have so far not been demonstrated. Prospects for the use of other sources of coordination (advanced practice providers and hospitalists) are discussed and opportunities outlined. Bundled payment or capitation might help support coordinated services, and competition among health systems to offer different models may eventually lead to success.

This chapter discusses health insurance, including its sources (public and private) in the US and the unique quirks introduced by employer-sponsored insurance. Employer purchasing of health insurance on behalf of employees likely induces a decrease in monetary wages, so employees are paying for much of this out of their own pockets. This is due to the federal tax exclusion of fringe benefits, such that it is cheaper for employers to compensate their employees in health insurance than in monetary salary. The chapter also discusses selection, risk pooling, and coverage options in large group health insurance, as individuals will likely choose jobs with health packages that maximize their own utility, which can lead to adverse selection of which managers should be aware. The chapter concludes by addressing Medicaid and Medicare as the other two arms of insurance in the US, with a final word of caution that our private-centric system may be unstable to future political pressures.