There are large individual differences in prosocial vs. antisocial behavior as studied via economic games. Prominent among the personality traits that have been considered as potential correlates are ‘dark’ traits (especially Machiavellianism, Narcissism, Psychopathy, and Sadism). However, although such traits should account for choices in games, the corresponding associations are weak and inconsistent, leading to a state of knowledge that lacks specificity and parsimony. We argue and demonstrate across 10 studies and 8 economic games (total N = 10,474) that a clearer picture emerges once (a) including games that (also) afford the expression of forgiveness (vs. retaliation) and/or (dis)trust and (b) considering the shared vs. unique aspects of dark traits. Specifically, we find that (i) the common core of all dark traits—the dark factor of personality, D—consistently predicts antisocial behavior in all games, (ii) dark traits also (though less strongly) predict antisocial behavior, and (iii) dark traits do so almost entirely due to D. We discuss the theoretical and methodological implications of these findings for the study of individual differences in pro- vs. antisocial behavior in economic games.

To the known causes of overconfidence in decisions and judgments, we reveal another source that derives from a bias during the act of decision making. While this bias, the predecisional distortion of information, is well studied, its impact on overconfidence is not. We demonstrate how the distortion of information creates overconfidence in those professionals often regarded as singularly overconfident, entrepreneurs. When these professionals use a sequence of relevant information to make an accept-reject decision about a business opportunity, a cycle of confidence-distortion-confidence builds unjustified confidence in the chosen action – and does so whether that action is to accept or reject the venture. Overconfidence is a well-recognized cause of flawed decision making. Our work demonstrates the paradoxical converse of this claim, that flawed decision making can be a cause of overconfidence.

Murayama and Jach critically evaluate the idea that motivation is a dynamic that determines behavior and propose alternatively that it might be an emergent property that people construe through perceived regularities in experience and action. The critique has value but fails to appreciate the progress that has been made in moving beyond the idea of which the authors are critical.

The target article argued that motivation constructs are treated as black boxes and called for work that specifies the mental computational processes underlying motivated behavior. In response to critical commentaries, we clarify our philosophical standpoint, elaborate on the meaning of mental computational processes and why past work was not sufficient, and discuss the opportunities to expand the scope of the framework.

This article presents a comprehensive neuroethical framework that seeks to deepen our understanding of human consciousness and free will, particularly in the context of psychiatric and neurological disorders. By integrating insights from neuroscience with philosophical reflections on freedom and personal identity, the paper examines how various states of consciousness from interoception to self-awareness influence an individual’s autonomy and decision-making capabilities. The discussion utilizes a multidimensional, bottom-up approach to explore how neurobiological processes underlie different levels of conscious experience and their corresponding types of freedom, such as “intero-freedom” related to internal bodily states and “self-freedom” associated with higher self-awareness. This stratification reveals the profound impact of neurological conditions on patients’ freedom of choice and the ethical implications therein. The insights gained from this analysis aim to inform more tailored and effective treatments for psychiatric patients, emphasizing the restoration of autonomy and respect for their inherent dignity. This work underscores the essential unity of the human person through the lens of neuroethics, advocating for healthcare policies that recognize and enhance the personal freedom of those with mental health challenges.

This article, titled “A Unified Understanding of the Human Mind - A Neuroethical Perspective,” examines the evolution of the concept of the human mind in Western thought and its integration with neuroscience, psychology, psychiatry, and relational dimensions. The author explores how the understanding of the mind has changed over time, influenced by shifts in philosophical paradigms, scientific advancements, and societal perspectives. The article traces the historical development of the mind’s concept, starting from ancient Greece, through influential thinkers like Plato and René Descartes, and progressing to contemporary perspectives. It highlights various philosophical and scientific approaches, including structuralism, functionalism, empiricism, and associationism, which have shaped our understanding of the mind. The article also delves into contemporary integration, where advancements in neuroimaging and the rise of holistic approaches offer a more nuanced understanding of the human mind. The author emphasizes the importance of the relational dimension and the interconnectedness of mental processes, the brain, and the external environment. This integrated perspective can benefit psychiatric treatment and psychological assessments by fostering a holistic approach to mental health. In conclusion, the article advocates for a multidimensional perspective that bridges subjective and objective aspects of human experience, offering promise for theoretical knowledge and practical applications in psychology, psychiatry, and neuroscience.

We compared Ed Diener’s Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS), which was designed as a purely cognitive measure of global life satisfaction, with the Affective Neuroscience Personality Scales 3.1, which provides self-report measures of Panksepp’s six primary emotions (excluding LUST), in two English-speaking samples: a main sample and a hold-out validation sample. Our data showed robust negative correlations between higher satisfaction with life and lower FEAR, lower SADNESS/Separation Distress, and positive associations (albeit less strong) between higher satisfaction with life and higher PLAY and SEEKING in both samples. The relationships between the SWLS and at least four of Panksepp’s primary emotions suggest Diener’s SWLS is not purely cognitive and includes a strong affective component. In addition, detailed analysis of the negative correlation between the SWLS and the ANPS 3.1 SADNESS scale provides insight into the importance of the low arousal end of the SADNESS/Separation Distress brain system and supports the idea of a continuum of psychological states from high SADNESS including loneliness and depression to low SADNESS psychological states characterized by social comfort, self-confidence, and social strength.

Schizotypal traits include abnormalities in cognition, behavior, and interpersonal relationships that are similar, yet less severe than psychotic symptomology. It is estimated that approximately 5% of the general population displays psychotic symptoms and experiences that can be considered schizotypal in nature, but there is little research examining the neurological correlates of these traits. The mismatch negativity (MMN) event-related potential is an objective measure of auditory change detection derived from electroencephalography. The current study contributes to the limited body of evidence examining the neurobiological underpinnings of schizotypy in a non-clinical sample using the MMN. Participants were recruited from the general population and divided into high and low-schizotypy groups for comparison. Individuals with high schizotypal traits displayed reduced MMN amplitudes in response to frequency and location deviants, and longer MMN latencies in response to location deviants. Specific sub-traits of schizotypy were uniquely related to frequency and location amplitudes, suggesting the previously reported inconsistencies in the literature may be due to diverse samples and differing deviant tone types. Finally, impulsivity and sensation-seeking likely contributed to the slower processing seen in location deviance detection. Ultimately, the current results provide evidence that the neurobiological abnormalities seen in clinical populations of schizotypal personality disorder and psychosis also extend to non-clinical populations.