Chapter 5 A THEORY OF NATURAL TALENTS singles out two theoretical questions surrounding talents. The first is whether their existence is a myth. The second is whether talents are necessary for acquiring skills. I argue that accepting the existence of talents helps account for some robust psychological generalizations. On the other hand, there are good reasons to think that in a variety of domains, talents are by no means required for skill acquisition. I develop a novel theory of talents—capacitism—which falls out from the theory of intelligence developed in Chapter 4 and provides the philosophical foundation for debunking the myth of the raw talent. The final section concludes the general argument that skill is a natural kind.

Models of mind as computational processes in the brain have some attractive features, but are ultimately unviable. One fundamental reason is that they cannot account for representation in and for the organism itself, but only at best for some outside programmer or user – they cannot account for representational normativity. A model of the emergence of such normativity is outlined and shown to yield a model of functional brain processes as oscillatory processes that modulate other such processes. This is in fact what is found in studies of brain processes, and these phenomena are at best anomalous for any kind of computational model.

A neglected aspect of individual vulnerability is the limits it may pose for epistemological capacity, in particular, how specific circumstances of individual vulnerability may challenge the role individual introspection can play in leading autonomous lives. The chapter proposes and investigates the claim that individual vulnerability can jeopardise the role introspection is usually assumed to play in deciding what course we hope to give our lives. In some cases of vulnerability, individuals may not be able to endorse and take responsibility for choices they make because they don’t trust their introspective knowledge. In this way, vulnerable individuals lose the authoritative grip on their introspective self-knowledge. Yet self-knowledge is a vital condition of individual autonomy: without self-knowledge, individuals lack the internal requirements of personal autonomy. The final part of the chapter discusses of how this aspect of vulnerability plays out for considerations of relational equality.

Chapter 3 INTELLIGENCE SOCIALISM opposes two radically different views about the relation between skills and intelligence—elitism and socialism. Elitism—pervasive in popular culture as well as in psychometrics—is the view that only a particular class of skill—‘theoretical’, or ‘intellectual’ skills, versus ‘practical’ or ‘embodied’ skills—manifests intelligence. I single out the best case for the stronger socialist claim that no principled difference in intelligence can be found between theoretical, or intellectual, skills, and practical, or embodied skills.

In this chapter, I demonstrate that Hegel removes three Kantian obstacles that stand in the way of an elaboration of autonomy as a form of life. Hegel rearticulates the form of autonomy in such a way that we can recognize living beings as a basic case of autonomy. Secondly, Hegel shows that internal purposiveness is not a derivative concept, making positive knowledge of natural purposiveness intelligible. Thirdly, Hegel provides a positive account of the lived reality of freedom. Taken together, these shifts open up the possibility of understanding practical autonomy not just as analogous to living self-organization but as an actual form of living self-organization. The second half of the chapter shows how this account is underwritten by Hegel’s new understanding of the distinction between the realm of nature and of freedom. By reference to Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature, the chapter shows how he modifies Kant’s distinction in crucial ways. Firstly, he gives a new substantive account of the realm of nature, revealing how it includes a form of natural freedom. Secondly, Hegel clarifies that the realms of freedom and nature are not externally juxtaposed and argues that the differentiation of these two realms is internal to spirit. Thirdly, Hegel considers the ways in which spirit reproduces the forms of a realm of nature within itself in the shape of a second nature.

This chapter introduces the fundamental idea of The Life of Freedom in Kant and Hegel: the notion that we can only make sense of autonomy by returning to the concept of life. This return is needed to understand fully the genesis, the form, and the reality of human freedom. Such an account can be developed by means of a systematic reconstruction of Kant’s and Hegel’s philosophies of freedom. As we can learn from Kant’s account, the notion of autonomy is threatened by the paradox of self-legislation and an opposition of freedom and nature that makes the reality of freedom unintelligible. As Kant already indicates and Hegel goes on to develop, we can overcome these problems by reconceiving of autonomy as a form of life. The chapter outlines the reading of Kant and Hegel supporting this view, situates the resulting systematic position in current debates on the sources of normativity and the nature of human freedom, and defines its relation to other approaches norm and nature (ethical naturalism, forms of life, and biopolitics).

Chapter 11 AN EPISTEMIC THEORY OF STRATEGIC CONTROL argues that a knowledge-based theory of strategic control for expert skilled action can explain skilled action’s flexibility as well as the fact that skilled action is procedurally controlled. My discussion provides novel reasons to doubt the doctrine of essentially intentional actions. I outline a theory of automatic control.

Chapter 6 INTELLECTUALISMS distinguishes between forms of intellectualisms and lays out the main goal of the second part of the book: to defend a form of intellectualism about skills, skilled action, and intelligence that, while explaining the distinctive features of intelligence and skills in terms of knowledge, it shies away from fully identifying either intelligence or skills with knowledge states. It is a form of intellectualism that is compatible with socialism and that pertains to the kind of intelligent beings that we are; it concerns agentive intelligence but it also extends, in a qualified way, to subagentive intelligence, thereby widening the scope of traditional intellectualism. In all of these ways, it is intellectualism with a human face.

Chapter 2 SKILLS in ACTION argues that skills are keys to understanding crucial notions in action theory, such as intentional action. The idea that intentional actions are constitutively the employment of skills is an attractive thought, and yet, the view has fallen in disrepute. This chapter resuscitates it: I argue that no other capacity—from instincts to habits or talents, to innate general-purpose faculties—can figure as centrally in action theory.

Chapter 10 PRACTICAL CONCEPTS AND PRODUCTIVE REASONING reviews arguments for positing practical concepts and discusses a novel empirical argument for the psychological reality of practical concepts that relies on evidence for a distinctively productive kind of reasoning.

Although Thomas Hobbes is often portrayed as an egoistic and atomistic thinker, his political philosophy has a great deal to say about vulnerability and relational equality. This chapter draws out four insights from his political philosophy to apply to contemporary political philosophy. First, he outlines a compelling psychological theory that connects our ontological and social vulnerability. Second, he argues the best strategy for minimising our ontological and social vulnerability is to establish a society of equals, thus asserting a vital connection between vulnerability and relational equality. Third, he identifies some key powers that states must possess to establish and maintain equal relations among people and assuage our vulnerabilities. Fourth, he offers a unique justification for relational equality arguing that it is valuable not so much because it represents an authentic expression of our basic human equality as because it is instrumentally necessary to tamp down our anxieties and promote peace.