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Shaun Gallagher in his chapter argues that those who study psychopathology can adopt a level-free vocabulary without having to give up the explanatory virtues of levels of analysis thinking. In doing so, they can potentially make new contributions to our knowledge of psychopathology.
Psychopathology is the scientific exploration of abnormal mental states and behavior. The phenomena under consideration are first-person (i.e., lived) experiences and third-person clinical descriptions, which can be studied and explained in two different ways. On the one hand, descriptive psychopathology aims to capture these phenomena without any preconceived notions of cause or mechanism (Häfner, 2015). On the other hand, theoretical psychopathology explores the etiology of abnormal mental states, applying methods ranging from the social sciences to neurobiology and genetics (Schultze-Lutter et al., 2018). Here I will focus on the descriptive and theoretical psychopathology of panic disorder given that Russo and van Eck use it as the paradigmatic psychiatric illness in their chapter, “Charting the Explanatory Potential of Network Models in Psychopathology.”
Psychiatry has a core goal of understanding the mechanisms that produce, underlie, and maintain psychiatric disorders. But what is a mechanism? And how should the answer to that question be justified? In this chapter Craver defends a practice-first direction of fit, which involves building a notion of “mechanism” for psychiatry by charitably reconstructing what the term appears to mean from the functions it serves for psychiatrists and researchers. Taking this approach, many philosophical objections to mechanism (i.e., that it is at odds with a process metaphysics and that it is committed to reductionist obsession with detail) turn out to be predicated on misunderstandings. Some directions for a future mechanistic philosophy of psychiatry are sketched out.
Can we use neuroimaging to study the causes of psychiatric disorders? If so, how does neuroimaging compare to other methods in psychiatric research that allow for strong causal inferences? Neuroimaging study designs have evolved from cross-sectional, providing only correlational evidence, to longitudinal and interventional, which have strengthened the inferences we can draw from brain images. In this chapter, Heckers shows that researchers are using neuroimaging tools to pursue three very different goals. The techniques are similar, but they aim for different – at times conflicting – inferences. The three types of psychiatric neuroimaging studies pursue distinct aspects of causality, with different levels of explanation and applications for clinical practice. Much of current psychiatric neuroimaging does not study the causes of psychiatric disorders. However, the inclusion of neuroimaging methods in intervention trials has the promise to reveal causal relationships in psychiatric disorders.
Descriptive psychiatry has served our field well for more than half a century. The need to rely on phenomenology cannot be blamed for the structural errors built into the DSM system, such as choosing categories over dimensions, pseudo-precision to serve interrater reliability, and the arbitrary division of psychopathology into nearly three hundred distinct categories. Like all of medicine, psychiatric treatments exhibit unacceptable levels of variability in patient outcomes, consistent with cryptic mechanistic heterogeneity underlying indistinguishable clinical presentations. The result is an aspiration for precision medicine using biomarkers to select the right treatment for the right patient at the right time. Unlike most of medicine, however, psychiatric disorders lack clear natural anchors, like amyloid and tau in Alzheimer’s disease, that nominate mechanisms, biomarkers, and treatment targets. Hyman argues that it is now scientifically possible, albeit still very difficult, to begin identifying mechanisms and biomarkers, and that a concerted effort is warranted.
Chapter 7 examines interventions that can be implemented to address mental illness stigma. These include individual actions that the person who is stigmatized can engage in to help them cope with or resist stigma and actions that other people are obligated to perform in order to decrease stigma they may endorse or perpetuate unwittingly. These also include structural changes that social institutions and systems must undergo to make social structures less stigmatizing and more supportive of people with mental illness, and social and cultural interventions that increase the belongingness and acceptance of people with mental illness into the community as well as transform social norms to be more supportive of people with mental illness. In addition to using philosophical argumentation, this chapter draws on empirical literature in social psychology that examines what works to reduce and resist stigma.
To Galen, Plato was the great authority in philosophy but also had important things to say on health, disease, and the human body. The Timaeus was of enormous significance to Galen's thought on the body's structure and functioning as well as being a key source of inspiration for his teleological world view, in which the idea of cosmic design by a personified creative Nature, the Craftsman, plays a fundamental role. This volume provides critical English translations of key readings of the Timaeus by Galen that were previously accessible only in fragmentary Greek and Arabic and Arabo-Latin versions. The introductions highlight Galen's creative interpretations of the dialogue, especially compared to other imperial explanations, and show how his works informed medieval Islamicate writers' understanding of it. The book should provoke fresh attention to texts that have been unjustly marginalized in the history of Platonism in both the west and Middle East.
Chapter 3 analyzes some of the ways that stereotypes harm people’s sense of self and identity. One way is through expressive harm, which is the harm that results from the unwitting and inevitable perpetuation of stereotypes. Stereotypes have a pervasive cultural power that enables them to control people’s thoughts, feelings, behavior, and social interactions even when people actively disavow the stereotype. Other ways that stereotypes harm people’s sense of self and identity are through the internalization of oppressive social scripts, which ascribe motivations and expectations for behavior, and through stereotype threat, in which people inadvertently and paradoxically act in ways that correspond to stereotypes even as they are trying hard to avoid fitting stereotypes. When people with mental illness internalize oppressive social scripts and experience stereotype threat, they incorporate negative stereotypes into aspects of their experience and identity, which damages their identity and sense of self and also diminishes their autonomy.
Chapter 5 assesses harms that people with mental illness experience that are related to how their self is constituted. These include harms of de-individuation and mis-identification, but also, as this chapter focuses on, harms of social exclusion and dehumanization that result from status loss and moral distancing. Dehumanization occurs through both being reduced to a stereotyped trait and being viewed as lesser compared to others. Having a sense of belonging and being accepted as an equal member of a moral/epistemic/social community are important parts of being viewed as and viewing oneself as a full human being; these are also critical for developing and exercising autonomous agency as well as for well-being and flourishing. People with mental illness are often excluded from these communities as a result of public stigma, diminishing their autonomy and well-being. This chapter shows how dehumanization, social exclusion, and belonging uncertainty threaten belongingness and autonomy.
Chapter 1 examines what mental illness stigma is and analyzes the components of mental illness stigma to show how people with mental illness experience stigma in their daily lives. These components include labeling, stereotyping, prejudice, moral distancing, social exclusion, status loss, dehumanization, microaggressions, discrimination, and epistemic injustice. In each case, I use empirical evidence from the social psychology literature on stigma to show ways in which people with mental illness experience these forms of stigma. Next, I look at factors that affect the kind, degree, and scope of stigma associated with mental illness, including beliefs, political values, cultural values, socioeconomic status, education, and gender. Finally, I examine how many people experience compounding stigmas that come from multiple sources.
Chapter 6 examines what makes discrimination and microaggressions (as a form of discrimination) wrongful. Discrimination involves differential treatment where some people are treated in different, unequal, and worse ways compared to others, and where that differential treatment is based on possessing a socially undesirable trait that marks a person as bad and inferior. Discrimination is wrongful because it harms people in a variety of ways, impacting their circumstances, resources and opportunities, options, agency, autonomy, and well-being. It causes material disadvantage and distributive injustice that denies people access to resources and opportunities and prevents them from having the basic goods necessary to participation in society. It also demeans people and leads to unfair subordination, loss of deliberative freedom, and decreased autonomy. This chapter reviews the philosophical literature on discrimination to provide a pluralistic account of the many harms discrimination and microaggressions cause to people with mental illness, which altogether make discrimination wrongful.
Chapter 2 assesses what stereotypes are and explains what makes them both wrongful and harmful. The chapter begins by defining stereotypes, explaining their relationship to prejudice and implicit bias, and showing how they are maintained due to cognitive biases. I examine factors that go into making the judgments involved with stereotyping. Then I analyze what makes stereotypes wrongful, including their rigidity, their falsity, and the way they overgeneralize about a person’s experience so as to erase its nuance and complexity. I look at descriptive and normative components of stereotypes and show that negative stereotypes always make a normative judgment about the badness and inferiority of a person who fits the stereotype.
Chapter 4 shows how internalized stigma often results in adaptive preferences that harm a person. When people incorporate aspects of negative stereotypes into their identity, they sometimes develop adaptive preferences by internalizing harmful social norms and beliefs embedded within these stereotypes. I show how people with mental illness often develop goals and desires that are shaped by these beliefs and social norms, which limits what they believe they are capable of, thus reducing their options for action and truncating their agency and autonomy. While adapting desires to one’s circumstances can be positive, as in positive adaptation, it is negative when it is harmful to a person. The adaptive preferences that result from this can be seen as rationality deficits that are oppressive and nonautonomous and that damage well-being and flourishing.