This part looks at the conceptual and methodological issues to evaluate parental power. Findings from psychology strongly support the view that parents can use their power so as to promote their children's agency. The part examines the legitimacy of parental power. Even when parents successfully promote their children's social, cognitive, and emotional development, they can be faced with moral dilemmas and conflicts which call into question the legitimacy of their power.

This chapter explores an aspect of parents' power over children and provides instances where parents' power is exercised so as to promote children's agency. It discusses the findings from the psychology literature on child development, where a positive association is hypothesised between children's positive freedom and children's ever-increasing independence from parental control. To use the concepts of political philosophy, in the psychology literature, a positive association is hypothesised between children's negative freedom and positive freedom. The chapter looks at Joseph Raz's discussion of positive freedom, which refers to both 'the inner capacities required for the conduct of an autonomous life' and 'an adequate range of options' to choose from. Like Raz, Isaiah Berlin acknowledges that moral considerations can pull in different directions leading to moral conflicts. He indicates how practical reasoning can be critical and can take account of the background conditions supportive of autonomy.

This chapter examines the efforts made by parents to share a way of life with their children as well as those efforts made in the name of the wider society to shape the values of its future citizens. It also examines civic education within a broader political environment of liberal democratic values and institutions. The chapter focuses on the legal, policy, and service issues relevant to civic education. Numerous studies have been carried out concerning civic education, both the civic component of children's formal education as well as specific civic education programmes. However, when children engage with civic education programmes, parents can be faced with moral conflicts concerning the requirement to protect children's liberty. The chapter explains the ways in which philosophers address the moral conflicts. It also addresses some of the ethical questions that arise when considering civic education.

This chapter explores the irreducible plurality of appropriate moral considerations and of morally relevant features when evaluating the legitimacy of parental power. The concept of coercion is necessary for evaluating parental power. The chapter discusses numerous theoretical positions such as republicanism, anarchism, various forms of liberalism, and social contract theory. It shows the inadequacy of efforts made to equate power with one of its forms and, in that way, to reduce moral complexity concerning the legitimacy of power. The legitimacy of power leads to arguments about liberty, coercion, control, authority, and paternalism. The chapter focuses on liberal arguments about the legitimate use of control. Liberals in particular are sensitive to the possibility that those exercising control may violate fundamental liberal commitments, such as liberal neutrality, without using coercion and without interfering with liberty. The chapter distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate parent-child power relations.

The debate on paternalism is important as it is illustrative of a wider controversy about the nature and role of political philosophy, in particular with respect to moral conflicts and how they are to be resolved. This chapter provides a brief outline of the prevailing, liberal view on paternalism and explains the various forms of paternalistic power. The prevailing, liberal view on paternalism does rely upon arguments from consent. A widely held assumption among liberals is that paternalism is a justified treatment of those who lack the qualities of an agent. An area of profound disagreement between liberals and pluralists concerns whether or not paternalism involves moral conflict. The chapter argues that paternalists must believe that the people over whom paternalistic power is exercised do generally believe that they generally know what is for their own good.

This conclusion presents some closing thoughts on the concepts discussed in this book. The book considers the conditions that should be attached to the 'right to parent', and, in particular to, the arguments for parental licences, the monitoring of parents, and the provision of parenting support programmes. It also considers one area where parents exercise power over their children, namely informed consent decisions for children's research participation and medical treatment. The book argues that paternalism as a concept was not sufficient to account for the power exercised by parents. Paternalism is insufficient to account for the legitimacy of parents' power, as there are non-paternalistic forms of parental power. The book argues with the assumption that political philosophers can answer complex moral questions without giving very much consideration to the complexities of the questions raised. Such arguments about political philosophy do or should have generality of theoretical claims.

This chapter provides an analysis of paternalism by exploring the way that the concept of paternalism has been utilised in the 'caretaker thesis' and the 'liberation thesis'. To understand the caretaker thesis, it is helpful to start with the general liberal argument concerning legitimate power. The chapter examines Onora O'Neill's Kantian defence of the caretaker thesis according to which the fundamental moral principle is the requirement to respect autonomy. O'Neill denies that there is a moral conflict when parents interfere with their children's liberty in acting paternalistically. According to the caretaker thesis, parental power makes up for the deficits in children's agency, and for that reason, children should be subjected to standard institutional paternalism. The chapter argues that children with the capacity for liberty of action are owed a right to liberty even when they are incompetent and/or cannot execute decisions.

This chapter argues that moral dilemmas are real or genuine conflicts between independent moral considerations. It addresses moral dilemmas concerning the legitimacy of parents' power through what John Rawls's public or political reasoning, that is, reasonableness as well as Thomas Nagel's account of public justification in a context of actual disagreement. In support of Nagel's position, the chapter looks at Bernard Williams's account of what genuine dilemmas are and how they arise. The view of moral dilemmas defended entails that the role of theory has its limits, and in particular, theory will not identify a general rule for the resolution of moral conflicts. The chapter outlines an approach to practical reason and practical judgement. It explains how practical judgement can complement theoretical reasoning when faced with moral dilemmas.

This part examines some of the moral questions that arise when evaluating parental power. It evaluates parental power within the boundaries provided by a number of case studies. They are the right to parent and whether parents should be licensed, monitored, and trained; children's capacity and competence to provide informed consent; and sharing lives with children and shaping children's values through civic education. Each case study explores both empirical evidence as well as the relevant legal, policy, and service context.

This chapter evaluates a reductive approach to the conceptualisation of power and a reductive approach to the resolution of moral conflicts when evaluating parental power. Psychology and Foucauldian sociology are indicative of two distinct approaches to the conceptualisation of parental power. The psychology literature supports a pluralist, non-reductive approach to the conceptualisation of parental power in political philosophy. The chapter looks at the psychology literature on children's agency, where the empirical evidence suggests positive associations between children's negative freedom and children's positive freedom. It concerns the differences between science and ethics, and argues that there is an irreducible plurality of power concepts, including 'power to', 'power with', and the various forms of 'power over'. Within the 'power over' category, the chapter distinguishes coercion, interference with liberty, control, authority, and paternalism.

In addressing the issue of informed consent, this chapter examines the legitimacy of the exercise of parents' power over their children. It begins with the legal status of minors and, in particular, the legal rights of minors to make informed consent decisions. The chapter investigates some important legal, policy, and service issues concerning informed consent. The discussion of legal, policy, and service issues, empirical findings about children's competence, professional judgements of competence, and the impact of parenting on children's competence, indicate where conceptual clarification is greatly needed. The chapter also examines empirical evidence relating to children's informed consent. It explores a number of central conceptual issues and addresses a number of ethical questions concerning children's informed consent. The chapter focuses on children's competence in joint decision making. It also focuses on the concepts of competence and voluntariness.

This chapter shows that the moral dilemmas, for which the liberal account of practical reason is required, arise not only in the political domain but also in relations between parents and children. It examines the role played by consent in the legitimation of power generally and parents' power in particular. Liberals, in their evaluation of the legitimacy of power relations in family, examine whether and to what extent they are based on the consent of the subjugated party. The chapter evaluates the legal validity of parental power by exploring the legal rights granted by the State to parents and children, as well as their legal duties. These legal rights and duties can be discerned from an examination of constitutions and legislation, as well as obligations arising from international, binding covenants and treaties. The chapter considers what type of reasoning is appropriate to justify the coercive imposition of society's basic institutions.

This part provides different definitions of paternalism that political philosophers employ. Based on an extended analysis of the caretaker thesis and the liberation thesis, the part argues that parental power often is not paternalistic. Parents exercise their power in ways that are not paternalistic. The concept of paternalism focuses on both the nature of power and also the role of the philosopher in considering its legitimacy.

This chapter evaluates the legitimacy of parental licences and the monitoring and training of parents. It discusses the evidence for the effectiveness of parental training programmes as a means to protect children's interests. It explores conceptual questions, relevant empirical evidence, and legal, policy, and service issues concerning parental licences and the monitoring and training of parents. The chapter also explores various proposals for the State's role in respect of adults becoming parents and retaining the right to parent, including the licensing and monitoring of parents. Through the passing of legislation, the implementation of policies, and the provision of services, the State exercises a profound influence on parenting. The chapter examines opportunities both to acknowledge the presence of moral conflict and to try to resolve such conflicts through practical reasoning and practical judgement.