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This Element is an opinionated introduction to Heidegger's phenomenology in Being and Time and surrounding works, framed in terms of Heidegger's debts to and divergence from Husserl's phenomenology. Section 1 situates Heidegger's and Husserl's phenomenology with respect to the 'identity-crisis of philosophy,' in particular the debate over whether philosophy is a science or a mere cataloguing of worldviews. Section 2 critically evaluates Heidegger's claims that various forms of conscious intentionality central to Husserl's phenomenology are 'derivative' or 'founded.' Section 3 turns to method, exploring whether Heidegger adopts Husserl's reductions, platonism, and method of essential seeing and imaginative variation. Section 4 explores Heidegger's hermeneutical turn in phenomenology and explains the uses to which he puts religious sources, mythology, and ordinary language.
This book is about conscience and moral clarity. It asks how some people keep their judgment steadfast even when many around them are swept away by conspiracy theories, moral panics, and murderous ideologies-or, on a smaller scale, by immersion in a corrupt and corrupting workplace culture. It asks about the surprising fragility of common sense, including moral common sense, and it asks where morality fits into a meaningful human life. Beyond this, the book asks about legal accountability for crimes committed when moral judgment fails on a vast and deadly scale. Hannah Arendt addressed all these questions in a profound and original way. Drawing on her published works, letters, diaries, and notes, David Luban offers clear accounts of Arendt's contributions to moral philosophy and international law, showing how her ideas about judgment and accountability remain crucially important to the moral and legal life of our century.
Wilfrid Sellars (1912–1989) was a ground-breaking figure in twentieth-century philosophy. He co-founded the first American journal devoted to analytic philosophy, and he made major contributions to several areas of philosophy, but his work has been under-explored. This wide-ranging volume of new essays conveys the importance of Sellars's contributions to philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, ethical theory, and the history of philosophy. The essays explore such topics as Sellars's relation to Kant and Hegel, comparisons of Sellars with Continental philosophers such as Heidegger and Deleuze, new work on Sellars's philosophy of mind in relation to animal cognition and to AI, his contributions to ethical theory, and his place in the history of philosophy, including neo-Kantianism and American pragmatism.
Is there a human nature? Can knowledge of it help us live better lives? This book synthesises ancient and modern philosophical ideas and draws on scientific research to answer yes to both these questions. It develops an innovative normative theory on the basis of commonsensical, naturalistic, premisses; and it defends an Aristotelian normative theory -- whereby we should understand human goods as realisations or perfections of human nature -- against both traditional and emerging challenges to perfectionist ethics, including evolutionary biology and transhumanism. The result is a ground-breaking theory of 'natural perfectionism', which both returns perfectionistic ethics to its Aristotelian roots and shows how this is compatible with evolutionary biology and cognitive science. At a time when the very idea of human nature is viewed as something that can be readily transcended, this work recalls us to a realistic, sober and better-founded vision of it.
Many think that reality is structured such that some beings are more fundamental than others and characterize this structure in terms of “grounding.” Grounding is typically regarded as explanatory and as exhibiting certain order-theoretic properties: asymmetry, irreflexivity, and transitivity. Aristotle's notion of ontological priority, which inspired discussions of grounding, also has these features. This Element clarifies Aristotle's discussions of ontological priority, explores how it relates to other kinds of priority, and identifies important connections to metaphysical grounding. Aristotle provides numerous examples that appear to impugn ontological priority's order-theoretic coherence. This is Aristotle's “Priority Problem.” But Aristotle has an independently motivated solution that eliminates the threat from each of the apparently problematic examples and explains why such examples are ubiquitous. The Element argues that a ground-theoretic analog of Aristotle's solution to the Priority Problem addresses recent challenges to grounding. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
This Element discusses the roles played by the idea of God in René Descartes' epistemology, physics, and metaphysics, and problems arising from those roles. Section 1 gives an overview of Descartes' life, works, and reception, focusing on the extent to which he is a religious or a secular thinker. Section 2 focuses on the problem of the Cartesian circle generated by his claim that all human knowledge depends on knowledge of God. Section 3 explains the role of God in Descartes' physics and addresses problems concerning how God's causal activity relates to that of creatures, including how divine providence fits with human freedom and how voluntary bodily actions are consistent with the laws of nature. Section 4 explores Descartes' claim that God freely created the eternal truths, noting its implications for his theory of modality.
For more than half a century, dualities have been at the heart of modern physics. From quantum mechanics to statistical mechanics, condensed matter physics, quantum field theory and quantum gravity, dualities have proven useful in solving problems that are otherwise quite intractable. Being surprising and unexpected, dualities have been taken to raise philosophical questions about the nature and formulation of scientific theories, scientific realism, emergence, symmetries, explanation, understanding, and theory construction. This Element discusses what dualities are, gives a selection of examples, explores the themes and roles that make dualities interesting, and highlights their most salient types. It aims to be an entry point into discussions of dualities in both physics and philosophy. The philosophical discussion emphasises three main topics: whether duals are theoretically equivalent, the view of scientific theories that is suggested by dualities (namely, a geometric view of theories) and the compatibility between duality and emergence.
Sincerity is essential to communication: without a norm of sincerity, we could hardly trust what other people tell us. But what does it take to be sincere, exactly? And why is sincerity so important? Sincerity and Insincerity offers a comprehensive review of existing philosophical work on the nature of sincerity and its epistemic value. It puts forward a novel, fine-grained account of what sincerity and insincerity are, and dives into the grey area between the two, identifying various ways in which speakers can be partially sincere. Integrating ideas from different philosophical subfields and traditions, it offers an updated perspective on what makes sincerity epistemically valuable, giving serious consideration to the idea that sincerity is the norm of assertion. Overall, this Element provides a novel, informed perspective on what sincerity is, how it works, and why it matters.
What is moral character, and how does it unfold over time? This book offers a fresh Kantian alternative to the dominant Aristotelian paradigm, which defines character as a stable set of virtues and vices. Drawing on Kant's moral philosophy, A Kantian Theory of Moral Character reframes character as a first-person commitment to moral principles - not a fixed trait, but a freely chosen, evolving practical orientation that shapes and is shaped by an agent's life as a whole. Central to this view is Kant's notion of Gesinnung: a person's fundamental moral disposition, constituted through free choice and the continuous reaffirmation of moral commitment. Bridging contemporary debates in ethics with historical insights from Kant, this study offers a compelling account of how freedom, moral commitment, temporality, and moral identity intertwine. It will interest scholars and students of philosophy, ethics, and moral psychology seeking a deeper understanding of character and moral agency.
Autonomy is one of the central aspirations of our time, yet there is a growing worry that autonomy, as we have understood and practised it, has not liberated us but subjected us to new forms of domination. In his ground-breaking reinterpretation of Kant and Hegel, Thomas Khurana reveals the source of these problems in the very concept of autonomy and develops a new understanding of human self-determination. While the dominant conception of autonomy gives rise to the paradox of self-legislation and remains caught up in a dualistic opposition of freedom and nature, we can overcome these problems by understanding freedom as a form of life. Elaborating both Kant's and Hegel's compelling concepts of life, Khurana shows that we are not autonomous despite or against our living nature, but by inhabiting it in the right way. To understand freedom, we need a critical theory of our second nature.
Like many other world religious and spiritual traditions, the Sikh tradition is philosophically rich. However, its contributions have been wholly unrepresented in Western analytic philosophy. The goal of this Element is to present a central aspect of Sikh philosophy, its ethics, by using the tools and methods of analytic philosophy to reconstruct it in a form that is understandable to Western audiences, while still accurately capturing its unique and autochthonous features. On the interpretation of Sikh ethics this Element presents, the Sikh ethical theory understands ethics in terms of truthful living – in particular, living in a way that is true to the fundamental Oneness of all existence. Features of the Sikh ethical theory discussed include its account of vice and virtue, its account of right conduct, and the philosophical relationship between ethical theory and practice. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Everyone recognizes that it is, in general, wrong to intentionally kill a human being. But are there exceptions to that rule? In Killing and Christian Ethics, Christopher Tollefsen argues that there are no exceptions: the rule is absolute. The absolute view on killing that he defends has important implications for bioethical issues at the beginning and end of life, such as abortion and euthanasia. It has equally important implications for the morality of capital punishment and the morality of killing in war. Tollefsen argues that a lethal act is morally permissible only when it is an unintended side effect of one's action. In this way, some lethal acts of force, such as personal self-defense, or defense of a polity in a defensive war, may be justified -- but only if they involve no intension of causing death. Even God, Tollefsen argues, neither intends death, nor commands the intentional taking of life.
How should we conceive of the vulnerability which we all experience, and what import does it have for how we think of equality as a political ideal? How should the state express equal respect for its citizens in light of our common vulnerability, and the heightened vulnerability experienced by some citizens? What does it mean for us to treat each other as equals in light of the inevitable dependencies and vulnerabilities which colour our relationship with each other? This volume offers the first systematic exploration of the relationship between two increasingly central concepts in political and moral philosophy and theory, namely vulnerability and relational equality, with essays presenting a range of current philosophical perspectives on the pressing practical question of how to conceive of equality within society in light of vulnerability. It will be valuable for readers interested in political philosophy and theory, ethics, public policy and philosophy of law.
Humanity in the twenty-first century faces serious global challenges and crises, including pandemics, nuclear proliferation, violent extremism, refugee migration, and climate change. None of these calamities can be averted without robust international cooperation. Yet, national leaders often assume that because their states are sovereign under international law, they are free to opt in or out of international cooperation as they see fit. This book challenges conventional wisdom by showing that international law requires states to cooperate with one another to address matters of international concern-even in the absence of treaty-based obligations. Within the past several decades, requirements to cooperate have become firmly embedded in the international legal regimes governing oceans, transboundary rivers, disputed territories, pollution, international security, and human rights, among other topics. Whenever states address matters of common concern, international law requires that they work together as good neighbors for their mutual benefit. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Alvin Plantinga is a noted American analytic philosopher who has written in the areas of philosophy of religion, metaphysics, epistemology, and apologetics. Plantinga's Christian commitments are a crucial part of his philosophical work since nearly all of Plantinga's writings have focused on explaining and defending Christian beliefs. He argues that there is no objection or set of objections that shows that Christianity is epistemically lacking, and as such, Christians can be fully rational, justified, and warranted in their religious beliefs. This Element discusses his work as a whole, and focuses on his contributions on the problem of evil, religious knowledge, science and religion, and Christian philosophy.
Since Heidegger's reading of Aristotle covered three decades and presented itself in many courses, seminars, and essays, some still unpublished, one objective here is to provide a much needed and currently unavailable overview of this material. This Element seeks to determine what Heidegger's reading can tell us not only about Aristotle but also about Heidegger whose own thought was in many ways a 'repetition' of Aristotle. However, the ultimate aim is to identify the philosophical questions raised by 'Heidegger and Aristotle' and show how this can help us grapple with them. These questions include the distinctive way of being that defines life, the nature of time and specifically lived time, the nature of being itself and whether it is to be understood as static presence or as something more active, the nature of human action and its relation to production, and the relation between nature and technology.
Hugo Grotius, jurist and ‘father of natural law’, produced the first substantial discussion of punishment in On the Law of Peace and War (1625). The death penalty is not a central concern of Grotius. His unstated position is that it was legitimate and justified for certain offences, which he does not detail. Our specific interest is in his notion that the right to punish, including to punish with death, was already present in the State of Nature, that is, in an order outside of or prior to civil society. His views were criticised by later natural philosophers from Hobbes to Rousseau. The first abolitionists, close readers of the natural jurists, were compelled to oppose the notion that the right to deprive of life had the status of natural law. Pelli, in particular, made use of arguments critical of Grotius’s theory issuing from some of his successors, notably, Pufendorf and Heineccius. Beccaria went a step further in producing a version of social contract theory that ruled out the possibility that natural man could have surrendered to a civil sovereign his right of self-preservation in the form of the institution of capital punishment.
Thomas More was the first to question the application of the death penalty to a particular offence. Theft had long been classified as a capital crime in the penal codes and practices of Britain and elsewhere. In More’s Utopia, a range of arguments is marshalled against the execution of thieves, echoed by later progressive thinkers. More’s critique brings to bear a whole armoury of arguments, including proportionality, deterrence, the public good, the law of God, and the causal relationship between poverty and petty crime. His argumentation was picked up by radical thinkers in Britain in the seventeenth century and gave impetus to a movement to formulate and promote alternative punishments for trivial offences. The principal candidates were hard labour and exile, the latter involving, in Britain, transportation to America and later Australia. Transportation had obvious disadvantages, and in any case it began to be asked, ‘How can the criminal be made maximally economically useful to the mother country?’ The contribution of Sir William Petty in the first decade of the Restoration (1760s) was crucial in this, and the idea finally finds articulation in the philosophy of Jeremy Bentham.